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The International Responsibility of NATO 
and its Personnel during Military Operations
David Nauta
In 1999, the Alliance mistakenly bombed the Chinese embassy in Belgrade. Around 
the same period, allegations were made that NATO military personnel were involved in 
human trafﬁ cking and forced prostitution in Bosnia-Herzegovina.  A decade later, NATO 
airplanes hit a fuel truck causing signiﬁ cant civilian casualties in Kunduz, Afghanistan 
and alleged indiscriminate attacks were conducted on a village in Chora with unobserved 
artillery strikes in 2007. 
After more than 60 years of existence and a track-record of more than 30 missions 
performed worldwide, it is surprising that there is still uncertainty on the scope and 
content of NATO’s responsibility for wrongful conduct during its military operations.
This research provides an in-depth analysis of NATO’s institutional and legal framework, 
and is intended to complement existing research on the responsibility of international 
organizations for military operations.
This timely book deals with the international responsibility of NATO and its personnel 
during military operations. It examines, from a historic and institutional perspective, the 
status of the Alliance; whether it meets the indicia of an international organisation with 
its own international legal personality, or whether the Alliance is a mere confederacy of 
like-minded States. It investigates the existence of any international obligations under 
international conventional law and customary law and analyses the conditions by which 
violations of these obligations can be attributed to the Alliance. Finally, the responsibility 
of NATO for international crimes is examined.
The International Responsibility
of NATO and its Personnel
during Military Operations
David Nauta
T
he International R
esponsibility of N
A
T
O
 and its Personnel during M
ilitary O
perations            D
avid N
auta
www.wolfpublishers.com
The International Responsibility of NATO 
and  
its Personnel during Military Operations 
David Nauta 
a 
The International Responsibility of NATO and its Personnel during 
Military Operations 
A study on international public law and international criminal law 
David Nauta 
2016 
The views expressed are the author’s and do not necessarily represent 
those of NATO.  
© 2016 D. Nauta/ WLP (lay out) 
The International Responsibility of NATO 
and its Personnel during Military 
Operations 
A study on international public law and international 
criminal law 
Proefschrift 
ter verkrijging van de graad van doctor 
aan de Radboud Universiteit Nijmegen 
op gezag van de rector magnificus  
prof. dr. J.H.J.M. van Krieken, 
volgens besluit van het college van decanen 
in het openbaar te verdedigen op  
woensdag 21 december 2016 
om 12.30 uur precies 
door 
David Nauta 
geboren op 7 april 1976 
te Apeldoorn 
Promotoren:   
Prof. mr. Y. Buruma 
Prof. mr. P.H.P.H.M.C. van Kempen 
Copromotor:  
Dr. S. Trifunovska 
Manuscriptcommissie: 
Prof. mr. P.M. Frielink  
Prof. dr. T.J.M. Mertens  
Prof. dr. T.D. Gill (Universiteit van Amsterdam) 
The International Responsibility of NATO 
and its Personnel during Military 
Operations 
A study on international public law and international 
criminal law 
Doctoral Thesis 
to obtain the degree of doctor 
from Radboud University Nijmegen 
on the authority of the Rector Magnificus  
prof. dr. J.H.J.M. van Krieken, 
according to the decision of the Council of Deans 
to be defended in public on  
Wednesday, December 21, 2016 
at 12.30 hours 
by 
David Nauta 
Born on April 7, 1976 
in Apeldoorn (The Netherlands) 
Supervisors: 
Prof. dr. Y. Buruma 
Prof. dr. P.H.P.H.M.C. van Kempen 
Co-supervisor: 
Dr. S. Trifunovska 
Doctoral Thesis Committee: 
Prof. dr. P.M. Frielink 
Prof. dr. T.J.M. Mertens 
Prof. dr. T.D. Gill (University of Amsterdam) 
List of Contents 
Chapter 1 
Introduction 1 
1.1 Research Objective and Research Questions 4 
1.1.1 Research Objective 4 
1.1.2 Research Questions 8 
1.2 Methodology and Materials 10 
1.3 Object of Study 12 
1.4 Outline of the Study 16 
Chapter 2 
Four Illustrative Cases – Facts and Questions 19 
2.1 Introduction 19 
2.2 Case 1: Human Trafficking and Forced  20 
Prostitution in Kosovo 
2.2.1 Background, Legal Framework of the Operation 20 
and Command Relationships 
2.2.2 Status of Forces 23 
2.2.3 Background of the Incident 24 
2.2.4 Reaction by NATO, TCNs and / or Others 27 
2.3 Case 2: Detention Operations in ISAF 29 
2.3.1 Background, Legal Framework of the 29 
Operation and Command Relationships 
2.3.2 Status of Forces 32 
2.3.3 Background of the Incident 32 
2.3.4 Reaction by NATO, TCNs and / or Others 36 
2.4 Case 3: Kunduz Incident 40 
2.4.1 Background, Legal Framework of the Operation and 40 
Command Relationships 
2.4.2 Background of the Incident 41 
2.4.3 Reaction by NATO, TCNs and /or Others 42 
2.5 Case 4: Operation Unified Protector: Incidental Damage  48 
and Injury 
2.5.1 Background, Legal Framework and 48 
 Command Relationships 
2.5.2 Background of the Incidents 52 
2.5.3 Reaction by NATO, TCNs and / or Others 54 
2.6 Final Observations 57 
Chapter 3 
Overview of the Key Moments in the Development of NATO 59 
3.1 Introduction 59 
3.2 NATO from 1949 until 1989 60 
3.3 NATO in the Period after the Cold War 63 
vii
3.4 Conclusions 72 
Chapter 4 
Current Institutional Framework of NATO and 75 
NATO’s Decision Making Process 
4.1 Introduction 75 
4.2 Current Institutional Framework of NATO 76 
4.2.1 Introduction 76 
4.2.2 The Civilian Structure 76 
4.2.3 The Military Structure 79 
4.3 The Relationship between NATO and its Member States  81 
and the Decision-making Process 
4.3.1 Consensus-rule 82 
4.3.2 Planning Process of NATO Operations 85 
4.3.3 The Command and Control Relationship 86 
4.4 The Relationship between NATO and the UN 89 
4.5 Conclusions 93 
Chapter 5 
The International Legal Personality of NATO 95 
5.1 Introduction 95 
5.2 Indicia of the Existence of International Legal Personality 97 
5.3 The International Legal Personality of NATO 101 
5.4 Jurisprudence of International Courts and Tribunals 107 
5.5 State Practice and Practice of International Organizations109 
5.6 Conclusions 112 
Chapter 6 
Binding International Obligations Relevant 117 
to NATO’s Operations 
6.1 Introduction 117 
6.2 International Obligations under NATO’s Constitutional 118 
Documents: the Washington Treaty, the NATO SOFA, 
Ottawa Agreement and Paris Protocol 
6.3 International Obligations under the UN Charter and 122 
 the UN Security Council Resolutions 
6.4 International Obligations under Conventional law 127 
6.4.1 Conventional International Humanitarian Law  126 
 and International Human Rights Law 
6.4.2 Mission-SOFAs between NATO and the Host State 128 
6.4.3 Memoranda of Understanding between NATO and TCNs 130 
6.5 International Obligations under Customary Law 132 
6.5.1 International Obligations under Customary IHL 133 
6.5.2 International Obligations under Customary IHRL 143 
viii
6.5.3 IHL and IHRL Rules Applicable during Occupation 150 
6.6 Internal and External Rules of NATO 152 
6.7 Conclusions 153 
Chapter 7 
Attribution of Wrongful Acts to NATO 157 
7.1 Introduction 157 
7.2 Attribution of Wrongful acts of Agents and 158 
 Organs of NATO 
7.3 Attribution of Conduct of Organs or Agents Placed at 161 
 the Disposal of NATO 
7.4 Multiple Attribution of Wrongful Conduct in 168 
 NATO-led Operations 
7.5 Conclusions 170 
Chapter 8 
The Responsibility of NATO for International Crimes 173 
during NATO Operations
8.1 Introduction 173 
8.2 International Responsibility for the Commission of an 177 
International Crime 
8.3 International Responsibility to Prevent or 181 
 Punish International Crimes. 
8.4 The Criminal Responsibility of NATO Commanders 188 
and Superiors and its Relation to the Responsibility 
 of NATO 
8.5 Conclusions 192 
Chapter 9 
Final Conclusions and Recommendations 193 
9.1 Conclusions 193 
9.2 Recommendations 197 
Appendix A: Nato-led Military Operations 
Appendix B: Table of abbrevations 
Appendix C: Bibliography 
Appendix D: Table of cases 
English Summary
Nederlandse Samenvatting
Curriculum Vitae 
ix
201
205
209
217
221
225
229
Acknowledgements 
Writing a dissertation requires unwavering commitment. Such a 
commitment would not have been possible without the support of many 
people providing me continuous inspiration, encouragement and trust. I 
am truly indebted by all of them. It would be impossible to mention 
them all, but I would like to address some of them in particular. 
I would like to start with thanking Prof. Buruma, Prof. Van Kempen 
and Dr. Trifunovska. All their advice was truly invaluable. It has been 
an honour and real pleasure to work with you. I would also like to thank 
my colleagues at the Dutch ministry of Defence and at NATO for the 
many discussions we had on this topic. I enjoyed them a lot and I hope 
you enjoyed them too.  
I am also grateful for my parents, for their support. I’m sure my dad 
would have been proud to see me finishing this book. My two sons, Jin 
and Len, gave me necessary distraction and the feeling that there is a 
life beyond a dissertation. Finally, I am most grateful to Maiko, my 
wife. Your patience and kind words make writing come very easy.
x
Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
 
Few might have envisaged the scope and nature of transformation that 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) went through since the 
adoption of the Washington Treaty on the 4th of April 1949. The Alliance 
has originally been created to collectively defend the fundamental 
values and principles of the Transatlantic member States, embellished 
in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, which constitutes the cornerstone 
of the Alliance: 
“[I]f [...] an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of 
individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the 
Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so 
attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other 
Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed 
force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.”1  
In the first four decades since its inception, NATO prepared to counter 
an armed attack from the Soviet Union, but – fortunately – was never 
required to come into action. Ironically, NATO embarked on a large 
number of military operations that were outside of the original extent of 
the Treaty. In order to ”safeguard the freedom, common heritage and 
civilisation of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, 
individual liberty and the rule of law”2, the Alliance launched 
humanitarian assistance missions,3 anti-piracy operations,4 peace 
enforcement operations5 and military training missions.6 These so-called 
‘out-of-area, non-article 5’ operations are a far cry from the static 
collective self-defence mission for which the Alliance was originally 
created in 1949.  
With the increased involvement of NATO in operations around the 
world, the question of responsibility of the Alliance for breaches of 
                                                             
1 Article 5, North Atlantic Treaty 1949, 34 UNTS 243, 24 August 1949. 
2 Preamble, North Atlantic Treaty 1949, 34 UNTS 243, 24 August 1949. 
3 For example, NATO Relief mission to Pakistan, 11 October 2005 – 1 February 2006. 
For a complete list of NATO-led operations, see Appendix A “NATO-led Military 
Operations” to this thesis. 
4 Operations Allied Provider (24 October - 13 December 2008), Allied Protector (24 
March - 29 June 2009) and Ocean Shield (17 August 2009 – present). 
5 Operations Deadeye (30 - 31 August 1995), Deliberate Force (5 - 14 September 
1995), Joint Endeavour (IFOR, 20 December 1995 - 20 December 1996), Joint 
Guard / Joint Forge (SFOR, 20 December 1996 – 2 December 2004), Allied Force (24 
March – 20 June 1999), Allied Harbour (26 April – 30 August 1999), Joint Guardian 
(KFOR, 12 June 1999 – present), International Security Assistance Force (ISAF, 11 
August 2003 – present). 
6 NATO Training Mission – Iraq (NTM-I, 7 August 2004 – present), Operation 
Resolute Support (June 2014 - present)  
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international law became more impelling. The responsibility of 
international organizations is a subject that has attracted the attention 
of the public only relatively recently.7 There are two reasons that 
explain this, the first being that international organizations are a fairly 
new phenomenon in international law.8 Another reason is that 
internationally organizations were initially seen only as capable to do 
“good”.9 It may not have been anticipated that international 
organizations could also commit wrongful acts.  
That perception changed in the past two decades. The idea that 
international organizations should be held responsible for wrongful acts 
became gained traction in the wake of the failure of the UN to act in 
places where atrocities, like genocide in Rwanda and Srebrenica have 
taken place. Klabbers notes that holding international organizations 
responsible under international law is not straightforward; “With 
NATO dropping bombs over Belgrade in the late 1990s, should one 
blame NATO? Should one blame its most influential member State for 
quite possibly pushing the action through? Should one blame all 
member States? Or only those who actively participated?”10 Academic 
research emerged on the responsibility of international organizations, 
particularly relating to their activities during military operations.11 
                                                             
7 Klabbers, J. (2009), An introduction to international institutional law. United 
Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, pp. 271-273. Klabbers illustrates the 
relatively new phenomenon of responsibility of international organizations by 
taking the collapse of the International Tin Council in the mid-1980s as an 
example. Since then the study on the responsibility of international organizations 
gained significant attention. 
8 The International Telecommunications Union (ITU) is seen as the oldest 
intergovernmental organization, established in 1865. In respect of State 
responsibility, the responsibility of international organizations is a much younger 
concept and its rules and definitions are less established through practice and 
jurisprudence. Hartwig, M. (2013), International organizations or institutions, 
responsibility and liability. Available at:  
http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-
e509?rskey=26uGlh&result=6&prd=EPIL (Accessed: 12 May 2016). 
9 According to the representative of the Netherlands to the UN General Assembly, it 
was “unrealistic to assume that international organizations were by definition 
“good doers”. They were capable of internationally wrongful acts. A system and a 
set of rules on responsibility needed to be established even without extensive 
practice.”  UN General Assembly, press release, Treaties comprise bulk of 
international law, so States need guidelines, GA/L/3354, 30 October 2008. 
10 Klabbers, J. (2009), An introduction to international institutional law. United 
Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, p. 274. 
11 Schmalenbach, K. (2004) Die Haftung Internationaler Organisationen: Im Rahmen 
Von Militaereinsaetzen und Territorialverwaltungen. Germany: Peter Lang Gmbh, 
Internationaler Verlag Der Wissenschaften, Zwanenburg, M.C. (2005) 
Accountability of peace support operations, Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, Naert, F. (2010) International law aspects of the EU’s security and 
Defence policy, with a particular focus on the law of armed conflict and human 
rights. Belgium: Intersentia Publishers, International Law Commission (ILC), 
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International and domestic jurisprudence as well as State practice 
developed rapidly. NATO became the subject or at least was the context 
in cases before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and the 
European Court of Human Rights.12  
Other international organizations came under scrutiny of public for 
their role regarding criminal conduct of their personnel as well. In 2000, 
allegations arose of personnel of the United Nations Mission in Kosovo 
(UNMiK) and of Kosovo Force (KFOR) having committed acts of human 
trafficking and forced prostitution in Kosovo. The allegations caused 
certain human rights organizations to call for re-examination of the 
reason why UN personnel should be accorded immunity that prevented 
criminal prosecution.13 Questions were raised which measures the UN 
should have taken to prevent this kind of conduct.14 NATO was similarly 
criticised for their inaction against KFOR personnel allegedly involved 
in the same sort of conduct. Both organizations since then have issued 
                                                                                                                                                    
Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations, 2011. 
12 Before the International Court of Justice (ICJ), several respondent States argued 
that the use of force during the NATO air campaign in 1999 over Kosovo should be 
attributed to NATO rather than the individual member States, International Court 
of Justice, Legality of Use of Force (Serbia and Montenegro v. Belgium, Canada, 
France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, United Kingdom and 
Yugoslavia v. United States of America), (1999), ICJ Reports 1999, 916. The title 
refers to several cases before the ICJ, initiated by Serbia and Montenegro / 
Yugoslavia against ten NATO member States on 29 April 1999 regarding the 
bombing of Yugoslav territory as part of the NATO operation “Allied Force”, 
International Court of Justice, Legality of Use of Force (Serbia and Montenegro v. 
Portugal), Preliminary objections of the Portuguese Republic, 5 July 2000, Chapter 
II, para. 40. In Behrami, the European Court of Human Rights examined which 
entity – the UN, NATO or Troop Contributing Nations – should be held responsible 
for the death and injury of two children caused in 2000 by unexploded ordnance 
dropped during NATO operation “Allied Force”, European Court of Human Rights, 
A. Behrami against France, application no. 71412/01 and R. Saramati against 
France, Germany and Norway, application no. 78166/01, Decision of 2 May 2007. 
13 United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMiK) Regulation 2000/47, 18 August 2000, 
“UNMiK, its property, funds and assets shall be immune from any legal process. 3.2 
The Special Representative of the Secretary General, the Principal Deputy, and the 
four Deputy Special Representatives of the Secretary General, the Police 
Commissioner, and other high-ranking officials as may be decided from time to time 
by the Special Representative of the Secretary General, shall be immune from local 
jurisdiction in respect of any civil or criminal act performed or committed by them 
in the territory of Kosovo. 3.3 UNMIK personnel, including locally recruited 
personnel, shall be immune from legal process in respect of words spoken and all 
acts performed by them in their official capacity. 3.4 UNMIK personnel shall be 
immune from any form of arrest or detention. If erroneously detained, they shall be 
immediately turned over to UNMIK authorities [...]” (emphases added). 
14 Amnesty International (2004) ‘So does it mean that we have the rights?’ Protecting 
the human rights of women and girls trafficked for forced prostitution in Kosovo. 
Available at: http://reliefweb.int/report/serbia/so-does-it-mean-we-have-rights-
protecting. 
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policy on combating human trafficking and forced prostitution,15 but the 
incidents led to much more academic research on the responsibility of 
the international organizations in relation to criminal conduct of its 
personnel and their perceived inability to counter misconduct of their 
personnel.16  
The transformation of the Alliance, the substantial increase in out-of-
area operations and the emerging interest in the responsibility of 
international organizations were the main drivers to dedicate a study 
on NATO’s responsibility during military operations. 
 
1.1 Research Objective and Research Questions 
 
1.1.1 Research Objective 
The thesis focuses particularly on one specific international 
organization: the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. It does not cover 
the responsibility of other international organizations, such as the 
United Nations and European Union, which might participate together 
with NATO in an operation. The research may contribute to those 
existing efforts, but the conclusions drawn and observations made in 
this thesis are first and foremost relevant to NATO, given its specific 
characteristics, such as its institutional framework, decision-making 
procedures and the relationship between the States and other 
international organizations during NATO operations. 
A second limitation imposed on the scope of the thesis is the 
confinement of responsibility during NATO operations. This thesis will 
not examine the responsibility of NATO during peacetime garrison 
activities; rather it will focus on the responsibility during military 
operations. The term ‘operations’ will include all types of NATO 
operations (peace support operations17, post-conflict stabilisation 
operations and humanitarian operations), which involve the application 
of international humanitarian and international human rights laws and 
during which the questions of international criminal responsibility may 
arise. A characteristic of NATO operations is that it involves the use of 
(military) force and for this reason the thesis will examine in particular 
the international norms governing the justifications to use force (jus ad 
bellum) and the conduct of warfare (jus in bello). The sources of these 
                                                             
15 NATO, NATO Policy on combating human trafficking in human beings, and 
appendices, 29 June 2004. United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations 
(UN DPKO) Human trafficking and United Nations peacekeeping, March 2004. 
16 UN, General Assembly, Comprehensive review of the whole question of 
peacekeeping in all their aspects, A/59/710, 24 March 2005. 
17 Peace Support Operations includes conflict prevention, peace enforcement, 
peacekeeping, peace-making, peace building and humanitarian relief operations 
(Chapter 2, NATO Allied Joint Publication 3.4.1. Peace Support Operations, July 
2001). 
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obligations are found in international customary law and conventional 
law, such as the UN Charter, UN Security Council resolutions, 
international humanitarian law and international human rights law. 
The thesis will not examine other international obligations that may 
arise for NATO, such as the obligation to request diplomatic clearance 
for overflight of State aircraft under the Chicago Convention18 or other 
international obligations not directly pertaining to the use of military 
force.  
The thesis examines the scope and the extent of NATO’s responsibility 
for possible violations of the rules of public international law, including 
international humanitarian law, international human rights law and 
international criminal law. 
There are several motives to dedicate a study on the international 
responsibility of NATO. Perhaps needless to say, military operations 
inevitably have a negative impact on the civilian population. While the 
consequences of armed conflict may not be avoided in its entirety, 
international law aims to minimise these effects. For example, 
customary international humanitarian law obliges States and 
international organizations to distinguish between civilians and 
combatants and to take measures to avoid collateral damage. 
Customary international human rights law imposes specific obligations 
to ensure that individuals’ fundamental rights, such as the right to life, 
are protected. Additionally, international criminal law criminalizes 
certain grave violations of both of these sets of norms. Chapter 2 of this 
thesis illustrates the social magnitude of responsibility of NATO for 
violations of international public law and international criminal law. 
The lack of a clear position – by NATO, its member States as well as in 
academic literature – as to whether NATO as an international 
organization is responsible for violations of international law during its 
operations, is detrimental to ensuring respect for international 
humanitarian law and international human rights law and undermines 
efforts to prevent and repress violations of international law. It is the 
intention of this research to examine whether NATO is responsible for 
breaches of international law during its operations, and to determine 
whether NATO should adopt a more proactive role in taking up that 
responsibility. In the current situation where there is no unambiguous 
position as to whether the Alliance can be responsible for breaches of 
international law, NATO consequently barely takes action to prevent, 
investigate nor repress violations of international law committed or 
about to be committed during its military operations. It leaves this 
responsibility almost entirely to the individual troop contributing 
nations, resulting in very different approaches to address breaches of 
international law. For instance, there is no single approach in NATO 
                                                             
18 Convention on Civil Aviation, 1944, 15 UNTS 295, 4 April 1947. 
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operations regarding the treatment and transfer of detainees, nor is 
there a single overarching policy relating to the investigation and 
repression of misconduct of personnel. These issues are entirely left to 
the States, which does not support efficient and effective 
implementations to guarantee the respect of international law during 
NATO operations. 
Beyond the social relevance of examining the responsibility of NATO, 
the thesis aims at contributing to the scientific development of 
responsibility of international organizations in international law, in 
particular, during military operations. Other international 
organizations, for instance the European Union (EU), the United 
Nations (UN) and African Union (AU), are equally involved in military 
operations. There is an increasing academic research relating to their 
responsibility under international law. Although NATO is not identical 
to other international organization, some of the conclusions made in 
this thesis may equally be valid to some other international 
organizations. Another aspect that this thesis examines is the position 
of States vis-à-vis NATO, which may contribute to the general academic 
understanding of responsibility of international organizations for 
violations of international law. States may act as members of the 
international organization, while at the same time the international 
organization can be an independent legal entity separate from the 
member States. The position of States in relation to the international 
organization of which they are members, is not always clear. This thesis 
aims to contribute to the general academic efforts of the responsibility 
of international organizations. 
Since NATO operations are carried out by individuals, i.e. its personnel, 
it seems appropriate to define what is meant with ‘NATO personnel’. In 
the most basic form, NATO personnel consist of personnel in the 
employment of the Alliance. Their salaries are paid by the Alliance and 
the employment is regulated by a contract between the organization 
and the employee. Currently (2016), there are over 6.000 international 
civil servants working for NATO. 
The largest part of the NATO work-force consists, however, of military 
personnel. NATO does not have military forces of its own, but depends 
on contributions of States (which can be members and non-members of 
NATO) which participate in specific operations. Military personnel are 
seconded to NATO headquarters in Europe and the United States. 
Additionally, for the execution of its operations, it relies on military 
forces made available by Troop Contributing Nations, i.e. States that 
place their military forces under the command of NATO. Since military 
personnel remain in the service of their respective States, a prominent 
question is to determine to which entity certain conduct should be 
attributed. This issue has been a central question before various 
6
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international and domestic courts,19 most recently before the Supreme 
Court of The Netherlands which decided that the conduct of Dutch 
military personnel attached to the United Nations Protection Force in 
Srebrenica is attributable to both the United Nations as well as The 
Netherlands’ government.20 
This study will, in addition, examine NATO’s responsibility for 
violations of the rules of international humanitarian and human rights 
laws involving international criminal responsibility. It is important to 
note here that the study will not examine individual criminal 
responsibility nor criminal responsibility under national law. Instead it 
will focus on the responsibilities and obligations that NATO has in 
respect of criminal acts committed by its personnel. 
There are two reasons for including this topic, which relates partially to 
international criminal law, in a study that covers the responsibility of 
NATO under international public law. 
The first reason is that international crimes constitute the most severe 
form of wrongful conduct that could possibly take place during NATO 
operations. International crimes constitute gross or serious violations of 
international human rights law and international humanitarian law. 
The Statute of the International Criminal Courts includes four such 
core crimes: the crime of genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity 
and the crime against of aggression.21 The severity of these acts and the 
possibility that NATO could be held responsible for them, merit a 
dedicated chapter in thesis. 
The second reason is found in the development of rules establishing a 
positive obligation to prevent and supress international crimes.22 This 
obligation may be to prevent, criminalize, criminally investigate, 
prosecute and punish perpetrators of human rights violations, whether 
these have been committed by public officials or private individuals.23 As 
                                                             
19 ECtHR, Grand Chamber, Decision, Admissibility of Application no. 71412/01 by A. 
Behrami and B Behrami against France and Application no. 78166/01 by R. 
Saramati against France, Germany and Norway, 2 May 2007. European Court of 
Human Rights, Al-Jedda v. The United Kingdom, application no. 27021/08, 
Decision of 7 July 2011. 
20 Hoge Raad der Nederlanden, H. Nuhanović v. the Netherlands, 
ECLI:NL:HR:2013:BZ9225, 6 September 2013. 
21 E.g. Article 6, article 8, article 7, article 8 bis 202 Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court, 2002, 2187 UNTS 90, 1 July 2002.  
22 The UN has promulgated a set of principles for the protection and promotion of 
human rights through action to combat impunity, ECOSOC report 
E/CN.4/2005/102/Add.1. The principles refer to serious crimes under international 
law and include grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and other 
violations of international humanitarian law that are crimes under international 
law such as genocide, crimes against humanity and other violations of 
internationally protected human rights that are crimes under international law. 
23 E.g. Article 2(3) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966, 
999 UNTS 171, 23 March 1976, or the Optional Protocols to the Convention on the 
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a result, criminal offences perpetrated by public official or private 
individuals can lead to responsibility of states and international 
organizations under international law.24 
While it is perhaps interesting to analyse the available remedies for 
damages resulting from wrongful conduct by international 
organizations,25 this thesis will not examine the mechanisms that exist 
to invoke the responsibility of NATO. Legal literature doctrinally 
separates procedural and material aspects of responsibility. A study on 
the conditions under which responsibility for NATO arises does not 
necessarily require a study on the potential remedies available to 
invoke that responsibility. Moreover, the inclusion of available 
procedural mechanisms to invoke the responsibility of NATO would 
demand an additional and separate volume to the thesis. Such research 
would be well served in a separate study specifically dedicated to that 
aspect. 
 
1.1.2 Research Questions 
The central question of this research is: what is the scope and the 
extent of NATO’s responsibility for violations of the rules of public 
international law and international criminal law during military 
operations? This central question can be broken down into four sub-
questions.  
The first sub-question is whether NATO is a subject of international law 
to which a wrongful act can be attributed. Is the Alliance an association 
of States or an international organization, existing as a subject of 
international law and separate from its member States? Without 
international legal personality, only the member States – and not 
NATO – could be held legally responsible. The criteria to establish the 
existence of international legal personality are formulated by the ICJ in 
the Reparations case26 and developed in academic research.27 These 
criteria will be used to determine NATO’s status under international 
law. 
The second sub-question is which international obligations exist for 
                                                                                                                                                    
Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict, 2002, 1577 
UNTS 3, 12 February 2002. 
24 Responsibility in this case will arise from a violation of a primary rule.  
25 Zegveld, L. (2003) ‘Remedies for victims of violations of international humanitarian 
law’, International Review of the Red Cross, 85(851)Optional Protocols to the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed C. 
26 International Court of Justice, Reparations for Injuries suffered in the Service of 
the United Nations, (1949), ICJ Reports 1949, 174. 
27 I. Crawford, J. (2012) Brownlie’s principles of public international law. 8th edn. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, USA, Klabbers, J. (2009) An introduction to 
international institutional law. United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 
Shaw, M.N. (2014) International law. United Kingdom: Cambridge University 
Press. 
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NATO under international law, in particular during its military 
operations? A breach of an international obligation relating to military 
operations may result in a wrongful act of the Alliance. NATO’s military 
operations typically take place in situations of crisis or of armed conflict 
and consist of military personnel, authorized to use force. Given these 
characteristics, the norms of international humanitarian law and 
international human rights law are particularly relevant. Other 
international obligations may exist, such as the UN Charter and UN 
Security Council resolutions, providing in many cases the authorization 
for NATO operations.  
The third sub-question is when and under which conditions can 
wrongful conduct of NATO personnel committed during military 
operations be attributed to NATO? NATO personnel consist of military 
and civilian personnel, either in the employment of NATO or placed at 
the disposal of the Alliance. Under certain conditions their conduct can 
be attributed either to NATO, other international organizations such as 
the UN, or to States. It is also conceivable that the conduct can be 
attributed to multiple entities. Recent developments in academic 
research28 and jurisprudence29 have resulted in a set of generally 
accepted criteria by which conduct is assessed to be attributable and to 
which entity. 
The fourth sub-question regards the possible responsibility under 
international public law of NATO in case of international crimes 
committed by its personnel deployed in military operations. This 
question has several aspects to it. NATO may be internationally 
responsible for an international crime under international law only if it 
has violated an obligation to take measures to prevent, investigate or 
punish the perpetrator. To that extent, the immunity granted to NATO 
personnel and the powers of NATO to take preventive and repressive 
measures will be examined in so far that it may result in responsibility 
of NATO.  
 
 
                                                             
28 International Law Commission (ILC), Draft Articles on the Responsibility of 
International Organizations, Sixty-third session, A/CN.4/634, 2011. Nollkaemper, 
A. and Nedeski, N. (2012) ‘Responsibility of international organizations “in 
connection with acts of states”: ‘SSRN’, Amsterdam Centre for International Law, 
31 May 2012.  
29 ECtHR, Grand Chamber, Decision Admissibility of Application no. 71412/01 by A. 
Behrami and B Behrami against France and Application no. 78166/01 by R. 
Saramati against France, Germany and Norway, 2 May 2007. European Court of 
Human Rights, Al-Jedda v. The United Kingdom, application no. 27021/08, 
Decision of 7 July 2011. International Court of Justice, Legality of Use of Force 
(Serbia and Montenegro v. Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, 
Portugal, Spain, United Kingdom and Yugoslavia v. United States of America), 
(1999), ICJ Reports 1999, 916. 
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1.2 Methodology and Materials 
 
Article 38 of the Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICJ) lists 
the sources of international law. These sources have also been used to 
analyse and determine the scope and content of the responsibility of 
NATO during its operations.30 There are four sources enumerated: 
international conventions, international custom, general principles of 
law recognized by civilized nations and, as a subsidiary source, judicial 
decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the 
various nations. In addition, the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties has been used to interpret these primary sources.31  
International responsibility of international organizations is a topic that 
is not yet fully developed in international law, despite the adoption of 
the Draft Articles on Responsibility of International Organizations by 
the ILC in 2011. To date, there is only little State practice and there are 
only few clearly developed principles of law in that field. Despite these 
limitations, the Articles are the only document which can serve in the 
analysis of international responsibility of NATO.  
The subsidiary sources, i.e. academic research and judicial decisions of 
the international courts and tribunals, have been used more extensively 
to come to the conclusions in this research. 
As for the reliance on academic sources, this study uses the ILC’s “Draft 
Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations” 
extensively.32 There are several reasons for this choice. First, the ILC is 
an institute established by the UN General Assembly in 1946. It is 
mandated – among other tasks – to promote the codification of 
international law. As such, the ILC has a special status among others 
as the international community directly tasks the ILC to codify and 
develop international law directly. Secondly, particularly in the area of 
responsibility of international organizations where practice of States 
and international organizations is little available, it is important to 
receive agreement or at least acquiescence from these actors that the 
rules represent a degree of opinio iuris. The ILC inquired States and 
                                                             
30 Article 38, Statute of the International Court of Justice, 1945, 33 UNTS 993, 26 
June 1945, (1) The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with 
international law such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply: a. international 
conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly recognized 
by the contesting states; b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice 
accepted as law; c, the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations; d. 
subject to the provisions of article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of the 
most qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the 
determination of rules of law. 
31 Section 3, Interpretation of Treaties, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 
1980, 1155 UNTS 331, 27 January 1980.  
32 ILC, Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations. UN 
General Assembly (GA) Resolution A/RES/66/100, 27 February 2012. 
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international organizations and requested them to submit their 
comments and observations on the draft Articles. This interaction adds 
extra value to the work of the ILC and may to some extent compensate 
for the lack of State practice. Moreover, the Articles have been used as a 
reference by judicial institutions, such as the European Court of Human 
Rights33, the International Court of Justice34 and domestic courts,35 in 
their judgments. While there are other sources relating to the 
international responsibility of international organizations, such as the 
works of the International Law Association36, the work of the ILC can 
therefore be seen as most authoritative in this respect. The ILA’s work 
is primarily academic in nature and does not serve governments in the 
same respect as the ILC does.  
The ILC adopted the Draft Articles on the Responsibility of 
International Organizations during its 63rd session in August 2011 and 
recommended to the UN General Assembly to elaborate of a convention 
on the basis of the draft Articles.37 The General Assembly adopted 
without vote Resolution 66/100 in which it takes note of the Articles and 
considered the recommendation of the ILC. The General Assembly did 
not decide on the form that might be given to the Articles.38 Therefore, 
the Articles do not have the status of an internationally legally binding 
document for States and international organizations. It seems that it 
depends on the international legal community, including scholars, 
judicial institutions and state practice, whether the Articles will be 
considered and treated as an authoritative source.  
With regard to the responsibility of NATO for international crimes 
committed by its personnel, the same sources as described above are 
used, but with a particular focus on conventional and customary law on 
international humanitarian law, immunity39 and developments in 
                                                             
33 ECtHR, Grand Chamber, Decision, Admissibility of Application no. 71412/01 by A. 
Behrami and B Behrami against France and Application no. 78166/01 by R. 
Saramati against France, Germany and Norway, 2 May 2007. 
34 International Court of Justice, Case Concerning the Application of the Convention 
on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, (2007), ICJ Reports 
2007, 43. 
35 UK Court of Appeal, R (Al Jeddah) v. Secretary of State for Defence, EWCA Civ 327 
(2007), 12 December 2007. 
36 International Law Association, Study Group on the Responsibility of International 
Organizations, Sofia Conference 2012. 
37 ILC, Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its sixty-third 
session, 26 April – 3 June and 4 July – 12 August 2011, General Assembly, Sixty-
sixth Session, Supplement no. 10, A/66/10/Add.1. 
38 UN General Assembly, Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 9 December 
2011, A/RES/66/100, 27 February 2012. 
39 Voetelink, J. (2015) Status of forces: Criminal jurisdiction over military personnel 
abroad. United States: T.M.C. Asser Press; Muller, A.S. (1995) International 
organizations and their host states: Aspects of their legal relationship, 
Netherlands; Brill, Amerasinghe, C.F. (2005) Principles of the institutional law of 
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jurisprudence on the modalities of criminal responsibility in 
international criminal law.40 
Other sources, not covered by Article 38 of the ICJ Statute, include 
decisions of international organizations, in particular of the UN 
Security Council and NATO’s North Atlantic Council. The study also 
relies on NATO policy, doctrine and operating procedures. Most of the 
key materials, such as the Strategic Concepts, have been declassified 
and are publicly available. Other material may be classified, however 
its content is publicly available as it may have been disclosed in judicial 
proceedings41, parliamentary inquiries42 or investigations that have been 
made public.43 While I also had other material available in my positions 
as a legal adviser to the Netherlands Ministry of Defence and to NATO, 
the study has relied primarily on publicly available documents to allow 
academic review to take place. The preparation of the thesis has taken 
place through collection and critical analysis of documents, legal texts, 
jurisprudence, academic publications and other information. 
 
1.3 Object of Study 
 
This study examines the responsibility of NATO for wrongful conduct of 
its personnel during NATO operations and the responsibility for 
                                                                                                                                                    
international organizations (Cambridge studies in international and comparative 
law series), United Kingdom, Cambridge University Press; Fleck, D. (ed.) (2001) 
The handbook of the law of visiting forces, United Kingdom: Oxford University 
Press; D. Fleck, Status of Forces in Enforcement and Peace Enforcement 
Operations, in Gill, T.D. and Fleck, D. (eds.) (2010) The handbook of the 
international law of military operations, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press; 
Lazareff, S. (1971) Status of military forces under current international law, 
Sijthoff. 
40 Dutch Public Prosecutor’s statement, OM: geweldsaanwendingen Chora 
rechtmatig, 30 June 2008. International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia, Final Report to the Prosecutor by the Committee Established to Review 
the NATO Bombing Campaign Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 13 June 
2000. ICC, Office of the Prosecutor, Statement to the United Nations Security 
Council on the situation in Libya, pursuant to UNSCR 1970(2011), 2 November 
2011.  
41 E.g. the ISAF detention procedures are classified, but publicly made available to a 
large extent in the case of the Canadian Federal Court of Appeal, Amnesty 
International Canada and British Columbia Civil Liberties Association and Chief of 
the Defence Staff for the Canadian Forces, Minister of National Defence and 
Attorney General of Canada, A-149-08, 10 December 2008. 
42 E.g. Parliamentary reports describe operations in fairly detailed manner, referring 
to classified material in some instances. See, Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, 
Bestrijding internationaal terrorisme, vergaderjaar 2007-2008, 27925, nr. 272 on 
the ISAF operation in Chora, Afghanistan. 
43 For example, ISAF targeting directives are classified but publicly available when 
the newspaper Spiegel obtained the investigation on an allegedly indiscriminate 
airstrike in Kunduz, Afghanistan, Spiegel Online, New allegations against German 
officer who ordered Kunduz air strike, 21 September 2009. 
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international crimes committed by its personnel within the context of 
these operations. Since this study is limited to responsibility during 
“NATO operations”, it is appropriate to define here which operations 
qualify as such and which do not. 
NATO uses the term “NATO operations” to encompass any operation 
that is conducted under the command and control of NATO.44 
Operations that fall outside of this definition are those operations under 
the command and control of a State45, a coalition of States46 or other 
international organizations.47 
A broad range of activities fall under the definition of NATO 
operations.48 They include collective defence operations, peace support 
operations, security sector reform, interim-governance, disaster relief 
operations49 and even surveillance activities during certain popular 
events such as the Olympics and Football championships.50  
Arguably, responsibility may arise equally during all of these activities 
and even during peacetime garrison activities.51 However, there are 
three reasons why the study covers only NATO military operations. The 
first reason is that NATO is uniquely equipped to command large-scale, 
high-intensity military operations. These operations will justifiably 
have a prominent place in research on the responsibility of NATO. 
Secondly, the thesis focuses on the responsibility under public 
international law, which is defined as the law between states and / or 
international organizations, especially within the context of the law of 
war, peace and security, and the protection of territories.52 Therefore, 
                                                             
44 http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_75565.htm, accessed 15 July 2014. 
45 E.g. Operation Enduring Freedom, an operation conducted in inter alia 
Afghanistan, since 7 October 2001 against the terrorism, conducted under 
command and control of the United States. 
46 E.g. Multinational Force Iraq, an operation conducted in Iraq, from 14 May 2004 to 
31 December 2009, to implement UN Security Council resolution 1546(2004), 
conducted under the command and control of the United States, United Kingdom, 
Australia and Poland. 
47 E.g. Operation Atalanta, an operation conducted in the Horn of Africa, since 8 
December 2008, to combat piracy, conducted under the command and control of the 
EU. 
48 NATO Allied Joint Publication 3(A) Allied Joint Operations, 2 July 2007.  
49 Such operations include the humanitarian relief operations in Pakistan in response 
to the flooding in 2010, and in the US in response to the disaster caused by 
hurricane Katrina in 2005. 
50 NATO air surveillance was requested for the 2004 Summer Olympics in Greece, 
2004 European Football Championship in Portugal, 2006 World Cup Football 
Championship in Germany, 2012 Euro Football Championship and other important 
meetings. 
51 The term “peacetime garrison activities” refers to the activities undertaken by 
NATO during peacetime. They include activities relating to the sustainment of the 
headquarters. 
52 Vinopal, K. (2013) ‘Researching Public International Law’, American Society of 
International Law, Electronic Research Guide. 
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the thesis particularly focuses on the responsibility of NATO during 
operations within the context of the maintenance of international peace 
and security or during collective self-defence operations. Finally, a 
considerable source of relevant international obligations for NATO 
during military operations is found in international humanitarian law, 
international human rights law and jus ad bello, which includes the UN 
Charter and UN Security Council resolutions. For these three reasons, 
the thesis will primarily focus on NATO-operations in which the use of 
military force plays a central role.53 Broadly, there are three types of 
operations that fall in this category. These are collective defence 
operations,54 peace enforcement operations55 and peace operations.56 A 
short description of these operations is appropriate here.  
Collective defence operations are operations based on Article 5 of the 
Washington Treaty, which refers to the right of collective self-defence 
against an armed attack on one or more of its member States as 
recognised by Article 51 of the UN Charter.57 Member States agreed 
                                                             
53 Operations such as Peace building (NATO Allied Joint Publication 3.4.1, Peace 
Support Operations, Section VI), Humanitarian relief- (NATO Allied Joint 
Publication 3.4.1, Peace Support Operations, Section VII) and and Non-combatant 
Evacuation Operations (NATO Allied Joint Publication 3.4.2, Non-combatant 
Evacuation Operations, 2014) are not included, as these operations, in principle, do 
not, in principle, involve the use of military force. 
54 AJP 3.4, Allied Joint Operations  
55 AJP 3.4.1, Peace Support Operations, Section IV 
56 The latter category is not a NATO defined category, but encompasses peacekeeping 
(AJP 3.4.1, Peace Support Operations, Section IV), peacemaking (AJP 3.4.1, Peace 
Support Operations, Section V) and conflict prevention (AJP 3.4.1, Peace Support 
Operations, Section III). The terminology by NATO reflects the terminology used by 
the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, UN Peacekeeping Operations, 
Principles and Guidelines, 18 January 2008. All three have as a characteristic that 
the force is deployed and operates upon the consent of the host State and 
additionally is subject to the principles of impartiatlity and restricted to the use of 
force in self-defence, T.D. Gill, The UN Collective Security System, in Gill, T.D. and 
Fleck, D. (eds.) (2010) The handbook of the international law of military operations, 
United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.  
57 Article 5, North Atlantic Treaty 1949, 34 UNTS 243, 24 August 1949, “The Parties 
agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North 
America shall be considered an armed attack against them all and consequently 
they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of 
individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the UN Charter of 
the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, 
individually or in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, 
including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North 
Atlantic area. Any such attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall 
immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be 
terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore 
and maintain international peace and security.” 
Article 51, Charter of the United Nations, 1945, 1 UNTS XVI, 24 October 1945, 
“Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or 
collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United 
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that they would assist each other by taking actions as deemed 
necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the 
security of the North Atlantic area. Article 5 leaves it up to the member 
States to choose which actions to take in this context. They may choose 
to limit their support to, for example, political or economic support. 
Article 5 neither obliges the member States to achieve consensus within 
the North Atlantic Council (NAC) to approve an operation in the case of 
an armed attack. The provision merely affirms that an armed attack on 
one of the member States is considered an armed attack on each of them 
and that each of them may render assistance either individually or 
collectively. Two collective self-defence operations have been conducted 
under NATO command and control, both in response to the attacks on 
the US by a terrorist organization “Al Qaida” on 11 September 2001.58 
Peace enforcement and peace operations do not find their basis 
explicitly in the Washington Treaty. Instead, on the basis of a decision 
taken during the NATO Summit in Washington D.C. in 1999, the 
member States included conflict prevention and crisis management 
missions as part of the NATO’s fundamental security tasks.59 The 
purpose of a peace enforcement operation is to maintain or restore 
international peace and security through the employment of a necessary 
degree of force.60 Peace enforcement operations are undertaken on the 
basis of Chapter VII of the UN Charter. If the UN Security Council 
determines that there is a threat to or breach of the international peace 
and security,61 it may decide to take measures – including the use of 
armed force – to restore or maintain international peace and security.62 
The UN Security Council can choose to authorize member States or 
                                                                                                                                                    
Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain 
international peace and security. Measures taken by the Members in the exercise of 
this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and 
shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council 
under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in 
order to maintain or restore international peace and security.” 
58 Operation Active Endeavour and Eagle Assist, see for an overview of all NATO 
operations appendix A to this thesis. 
59 Strategic Concept 1999, 24 April 1999, paras. 10 and 31-32. 
60 Gill, T.D. and Fleck, D. (eds.) (2010) The handbook of the international law of 
military operations, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press, p. 82. 
61 Article 39, Charter of the United Nations, 1945, 1 UNTS XVI, 24 October 1945, 
“The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, 
breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall take recommendations, or decide 
what measures shall be taken in accordance with Article 41 and 42, to maintain or 
restore international peace and security.” 
62 Article 42, Charter of the United Nations, 1945, 1 UNTS XVI, 24 October 1945, 
“Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 
would be inadequate or have proven to be inadequate, it may take such action by 
air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international 
peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other 
operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations.” 
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international organizations, such as NATO, to undertake a peace 
enforcement action.  
Peace operations do not find their basis in the UN Charter, but have 
become an established and generally accepted instrument in the 
maintenance of peace.63 Lacking a formal basis, these operations require 
the consent of the host State in order to deploy and operate on that 
State’s territory.64 The principles of peace operations are, next to the 
necessity of consent of the parties involved, that the operation is 
impartial towards the parties of the conflict and that the use of force is 
in principle restricted to that of self-defence.65  
Accordingly, this study will deal with the responsibility of NATO during 
NATO operations, which are defined here as those operations conducted 
under the command and control of the Alliance and limited to collective 
defense operations, peace enforcement- and peace operations. 
 
1.4 Outline of the Study 
 
The study starts with setting out four cases, providing practical 
examples of events that have occurred during operations. The events 
relate to alleged violations of international law and show the reaction of 
States, NATO and other entities to those allegations. The purpose of the 
cases is threefold. First, they are intended to show the relevance of the 
topic of the thesis. The cases illustrate that responsibility of NATO is 
not a purely hypothetical issue, but is relevant for the Alliance. 
Secondly, by providing practical examples of responsibility of NATO, 
the cases will make all that is discussed more concrete. Lastly, the cases 
will be used throughout the thesis to exemplify conclusions, analyses or 
positions. For these reasons the four cases are presented at the 
beginning of this dissertation. In the concluding chapter of this study a 
brief assessment of the cases is provided that apply the conclusions and 
recommendations made in this thesis to the cases. 
Research on NATO itself logically starts with an overview of the 
organization and the way it has come into being. Therefore, Chapter 3 
provides an overview of key historical events that have shaped the 
Alliance. It outlines the transformation of NATO as an alliance of 
member States to collectively defend themselves against a perceived 
threat emanating from the Soviet Union to an international 
organization capable to respond to various security threats, even beyond 
                                                             
63.  Gill, T.D. and Fleck, D. (eds.) (2010) The handbook of the international law of 
military operations, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press, p. 138. 
64 Gill, T.D. and Fleck, D. (eds.) (2010) The handbook of the international law of 
military operations, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press, p. 136. 
65 UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, UN Peacekeeping Operations, 
Principles and Guidelines, 18 January 2008, p. 31.  
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the borders of the territory of the member States. The chapter serves to 
provide a general understanding of the principles and objectives of 
NATO, but even more to provide the historical background to the 
analysis and conclusions made in subsequent chapters. For instance, 
the conclusion made in Chapter 5 that NATO is an international 
organization with international legal personality separate from its 
member States, may not be fully appreciated from reading NATO’s 
founding documents. Neither would the analysis of the current 
institutional framework in Chapter 4 be fully appreciated, if no 
historical context had been provided. This context is an essential part 
for the analysis throughout the thesis and is – for this reason – given in 
Chapter 3. 
Chapter 4 will discuss the current institutional framework of NATO. 
This includes a study on the various organs of the Alliance and their 
respective powers with respect to NATO operations, but also the 
relationship of NATO with other international entities, such as States 
and international organizations. A brief overview is given on the 
various categories of personnel employed by or attached to NATO. The 
conclusions and findings made in chapters 3 and 4 are relevant to the 
rest of the research. The finding that the organization has grown into 
an independent actor distinct from its member States is relevant to 
chapter 5 to determine whether NATO has international legal 
personality. The institutional framework discussed in Chapter 4 will 
also be used in the chapter on attribution of conduct to determine e.g. 
effective control over agents and organs placed at NATO’s disposal or in 
chapter 8 on the role that NATO can or cannot fulfil with respect to the 
prevention and repression of criminal conduct. 
Chapter 5 deals with the international legal personality of the Alliance. 
Legal personality is relevant as only those organizations, which possess 
legal personality can be held responsible for violations of international 
legal norms.66 Without international legal personality, conduct cannot 
be attributed to NATO and the organization cannot bear responsibility 
under international public law. In order to determine NATO’s status 
under international law, as above pointed out, primarily recourse is 
made to the conditions set by the International Court of Justice in its 
Advisory Opinion on the Reparation for injuries suffered in the Service 
of the United Nations.67 Having examined the historic developments 
that the Alliance has gone through and the current institutional 
framework in Chapter 2, some conclusions may be drawn based upon 
the indicia set by the ICJ whether NATO enjoys such status under 
                                                             
66 Zwanenburg, M.C. (2005) Accountability of peace support operations, Netherlands: 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, p. 35. 
67 International Court of Justice, Reparations for Injuries suffered in the Service of 
the United Nations, (1949), ICJ Reports 1949, 174. 
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international law.   
Chapters 6 and 7 examine the responsibility of NATO for wrongful 
conduct under international public law. Chapter 6 identifies the 
international obligations binding upon the Alliance as far as they are 
relevant to its operations. It will discuss in particular obligations as 
they apply during military operations. Chapter 7 deals with the 
attribution of conduct of agents and organs to the Alliance. Again, the 
previous analysis on the Alliance’s institutional framework discussed in 
Chapter 4 is used to determine for which conduct NATO can be held 
responsible.  
Chapter 8 examines the potential responsibility of NATO for criminal 
conduct of its personnel. It is important to underscore again that the 
focus is on the responsibility of NATO with respect to the criminal 
conduct of personnel, not the responsibility of the individuals 
themselves. This is notwithstanding the fact that some aspects of the 
responsibility of NATO – e.g. the immunity accorded to the 
Organization and its personnel – affect individual responsibility. The 
main focus, though, is the responsibility of NATO for international 
crimes committed by its personnel. The Chapter consists of five 
paragraphs. After an introductory paragraph, the chapter will continue 
with a discussion on the responsibility of NATO for commission of 
international crimes (paragraph 8.2) and responsibility failing to 
prevent or punish these crimes (paragraph 8.3). The fifth paragraph 
examines a modality of criminal responsibility: command responsibility 
Under the modality of command responsibility, NATO may be obliged to 
receive reports and submit allegations of criminal behaviour to 
competent authorities to avoid responsibility under international law. 
These obligations are derived directly from command responsibility, as 
well as IHRL and IHL.  
The final chapter, Chapter 9, gives the conclusions and 
recommendations drawn from the previous chapters. It is also intended 
to provide practical recommendations to some of the challenges on the 
issue of responsibility that NATO might face during NATO-led 
operations.  
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Chapter 2  
Four Illustrative Cases – Facts and Questions  
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter describes four situations taken from NATO operations in 
Kosovo, Afghanistan and Libya. The cases are introduced at the 
beginning of the thesis, because their intent is to illustrate the 
relevance of the research into the responsibility of NATO and to provide 
practical examples of that responsibility, which are then used 
throughout the thesis. Moreover, the practical examples make all that is 
discussed throughout the thesis more concrete.  
While other cases were also available and could have been relevant to 
the thesis the selection of the four cases has been made based upon 
three criteria. First, for obvious reasons, the cases must relate to a 
NATO operation as this research deals with the responsibility of NATO 
during its operations. More specifically, the four cases relate to those 
NATO operations in which the international norms governing the 
justification to use force and the conduct of warfare are applicable. As 
mentioned in the previous chapter, NATO operations typically take 
place in situations of crisis or of armed conflict and in which personnel 
is authorized to use force. Given these characteristics IHL and IHRL 
are of particular relevance.  
Second, each case covers several topics that will be examined 
throughout the thesis. Thus all four cases meet this criterion too. The 
“Kunduz” incident (Afghanistan), covers the aspect of binding 
obligations68 to NATO as well as attribution of conduct to either NATO 
or the member State. The case is also relevant to the role of NATO 
towards criminal conduct of its personnel.69 The case relating to the 
transfer of detainees in Afghanistan deals primarily with the issue of 
attribution of conduct to several Troop Contributing Nations and NATO 
as well as a breach of an international obligation under the Convention 
against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.70 The case on human trafficking that allegedly has 
                                                             
68 In particular, article 52 and 57 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 
August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed 
Conflicts, 1977, 1125 UNTS 3, 8 June 1977.  
69 The alleged indiscriminate attack on the fuel truck in Kunduz may be considered a 
crime under national host nation law (Afghanistan) and under German law as well 
as an international crime under article 8 of the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court, 2002, 2187 UNTS 90, 1 July 2002. 
70 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, 1984, 1465 UNTS 85, 26 June 1987. 
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occurred in Kosovo by KFOR members is relevant, primarily, to the 
question on the role that NATO plays regarding criminal conduct of its 
personnel as well to the issue of attribution to either the contingents 
involved or to the Alliance. Finally, the case relating to the NATO 
airstrikes in Libya, which gave rise to (criminal) investigations led by 
the United Nations Office of the Human Rights Council71 and the 
International Criminal Court,72 is relevant to the question of binding 
international obligations, attribution of conduct to NATO and / or the 
Troop Contributing Nations, as well as criminal responsibility of NATO 
personnel and the role of NATO therewith. 
The third criteria for the selection of the cases is that the incidents have 
led to inquiries, e.g. by non-governmental organizations, judicial 
institutions, national parliaments, or international organizations, such 
as the UN Human Rights Council. This gives insight in how 
responsibility of NATO and its role towards criminal conduct of its 
personnel is viewed by others. 
The cases are presented in a structure consisting of three parts. The 
description of the cases will start with explaining the legal basis of the 
NATO-led mission, the command structure of the mission and the 
status of mission personnel. The second part deals with the factual 
background of the incident that has occurred during the mission and 
which is relevant to this research. Finally, any eventual reaction by 
NATO and Troop Contributing Nation or third parties to these incidents 
is described. 
 
2.2 Case 1: Human Trafficking and Forced Prostitution in 
Kosovo 
 
2.2.1 Background, Legal Framework of the Operation and Command 
Relationships 
Following the NATO air-campaign “Operation Allied Force” in Kosovo in 
1999,73 representatives of the European Union and the Russian 
Federation presented a peace plan to the United Nations, which 
resulted in the conclusion of a Military Technical Agreement (MTA) 
between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and NATO establishing the 
cessation of the NATO air strikes upon the condition that Yugoslav 
forces would withdraw from the territory of Kosovo.74  
                                                             
71 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on 
Libya, A/HRC/19/68, 8 March 2012. 
72 ICC, Office of the Prosecutor, Statement to the United Nations Security Council on 
the situation in Libya, pursuant to UNSCR 1970(2011), 2 November 2011. 
73 Operation Allied Force, 24 March – 20 June 1999. 
74 Military Technical Agreement between the International Security Force (“KFOR”) 
and the Governments of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of 
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The MTA anticipated that the United Nations Security Council would 
authorize an international security presence to be deployed in order to 
establish and maintain a secure environment in Kosovo.75 Pending this 
authorization, the agreement stipulated that the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia “understand and agree that the 
international security force (“KFOR”) will deploy [...] and operate 
without hindrance within Kosovo and otherwise carry out its mission”.76  
Neither the MTA nor the peace plan were intended to legitimize an 
international security presence in Kosovo, but rather to serve as a 
guarantee to the United Nations Security Council that the Federal 
Yugoslav Republic would agree to the deployment of such a presence.  
By its resolution 1244(1999) of 10 June 1999 the UN Security Council 
authorized the creation of an international civil presence and an 
international security presence in Kosovo. The international civil 
presence was to be established by the “Secretary General, with the 
assistance of relevant international organisations”77 and would have the 
task to provide for an interim administration for Kosovo. On 12 June 
1999, the UN Secretary General presented a concept for the 
organization of the civil presence, which became known as the United 
Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMiK)78 led by the 
UN Special Representative of the Secretary General for Kosovo (SRSG). 
The concept outlined four pillars of activity,79 individually led by the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (humanitarian 
assistance, Pillar I), the United Nations (civil administration, Pillar II), 
the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (institution-
building, Pillar III) and the European Union (reconstruction, Pillar 
IV).80 
In contrast to the international civil presence, not the UN Secretary 
General but the “member States and relevant international 
                                                                                                                                                    
Serbia, 9 June 1999. 
75 Article I, para 2, Military Technical Agreement between the International Security 
Force (“KFOR”) and the Governments of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the 
Republic of Serbia, 9 June 1999. 
76 Article I, para 2, Military Technical Agreement between the International Security 
Force (“KFOR”) and the Governments of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the 
Republic of Serbia, 9 June 1999. 
77 United Nations Security Council resolution 1244(1999), 10 June 1999, para 10. 
78 United Nations Security Council, Report of the Secretary General pursuant to 
paragraph 10 of the Security Council resolution 1244(1999), S/1999/672, 12 June 
1999. 
79 Article I, para 3, Military Technical Agreement between the International Security 
Force (“KFOR”) and the Governments of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the 
Republic of Serbia, 9 June 1999. 
80 United Nations Security Council, Report of the Secretary General on the United 
Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, S/1999/779, 12 July 1999, para 
43.  
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organisations” would establish the international security presence.81 The 
tasks of this presence included “[d]eterring renewed hostilities,[...] 
[d]emilitarizing [...] armed Kosovo Albanian groups, [...] [e]nsuring 
public safety, [...] [s]upervising demining, [...] [s]upporting, [...] and 
coordinating [...] with [...] the international civil presence, [c]onducting 
border monitoring duties [and] [e]nsuring the protection and freedom of 
movement of itself, the international civil presence, and other 
international organizations;”82 These tasks reflect the tasks set out in 
the MTA and, as was envisaged in the peace plan, NATO would have a 
substantial participation in the international security presence.83  
The international security presence and the international civil presence 
were placed under two separate commands, with a task to coordinate 
and support each other.84 UNMiK is placed within the command chain of 
the UN and subordinate to the UN Special Representative of the UN 
Secretary General,85 while NATO would have the responsibility over 
KFOR. This separation in command is emphasized by the UN Secretary 
General in its first report to the UN Security Council where it remarked 
KFOR as an “outside agency”, with whom close coordination is 
required.86  
KFOR is headed by the Commander KFOR, who sits within the NATO 
command structure. Political oversight of the operation is given by the 
NAC, while the NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) 
gives strategic military direction and guidance. Operational command 
and control is delegated to the Commander Joint Force Command 
Brunssum (at the time Commander in Chief South, NATO’s 
Commander in Chief over the Southern region).  
KFOR, at the time, was divided into four regionally based contingents, 
called Multinational Brigades (MNBs), each led by a “lead nation”.87 The 
composition of the nations leading the MNBs varied over time. In 2008, 
Finland led MNB Centre, France led MNB North, MNB South was led 
by Austria, MNB West was led by Italy and the USA led MNB East. 
Although the brigades were responsible for their area, they all fall 
under the “unified command and control” of the Commander of KFOR 
(COMKFOR).88 
                                                             
81 United Nations Security Council resolution 1244(1999), 10 June 1999, para 7. 
82 United Nations Security Council resolution 1244(1999), 10 June 1999, para. 9. 
83 Annex, para 4, Letter dated 7 June 1999 from the Permanent Representative of 
Germany to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council, 
S/1999/649, 7 June 1999. 
84 United Nations Security Council resolution 1244(1999), 10 June 1999, para. 6, 9(f) 
and 20. 
85 United Nations Security Council resolution 1244(1999), 10 June 1999, para. 6. 
86 Report of the Secretary General on the United Nations Interim Administration in 
Kosovo, S/1999/779, 12 July 1999, para. 47.  
87 The US, UK, France, Germany and Italy would each lead a Multinational Brigade. 
88 United Nations Security Council resolution 1244(1999), 10 June 1999, annex 2, 
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The mandate and tasks of KFOR were given in the UNSCR 1244(1999), 
which were transposed in NATO’s operational plan 10413 (Operation 
Joint Guardian). The tasks encompassed the deterrence of renewed 
hostilities and the establishment of a safe and secure environment in 
Kosovo, but also the marking and clearing of minefields and obstacles, 
and liaison with the UN and the Organization for Security and Co-
operation in Europe (OSCE).89 KFOR’s operational plan envisaged four 
phases, starting with a preparatory phase, followed by the deployment 
of the force. The third phase consists of monitoring the withdrawal of 
the Yugoslav forces, ensuring a safe and secure environment, 
supervising the demining efforts until the international civil presence 
takes over this task and supporting and coordinating with the work of 
the international civil presence. The end-state of the KFOR operation is 
reached when these tasks of KFOR are either completed or handed 
over.90  
 
2.2.2 Status of Forces 
To regulate the status of UN personnel on mission, the UN ordinarily 
concludes a Status of Mission Agreement (SOMA) with the host nation91, 
which would refer to the Convention on Privileges and Immunities of 
the United Nations and accords immunity to UN personnel on mission 
from the host State jurisdiction for words spoken and acts performed by 
them in their official capacity. The Convention authorizes the Secretary 
General to waive immunity for UN personnel on mission if the course of 
justice would be obstructed. For UNMiK, the procedure has been 
slightly different, but with a similar result. As the legislative functions 
of the host State in Kosovo were taken over by UNMiK92, the UN did not 
pursue a bi-lateral SOMA, rather it issued UNMiK Regulation 2000/47 
referring to the UN Convention on Privileges and Immunities and 
accorded functional immunity to UNMiK personnel.93  
The status of KFOR personnel is different from UNMiK personnel. 
Although initially an agreement (Status of Forces Agreeent, SOFA) 
                                                                                                                                                    
para 4 and 76. 
89 Operational Plan 10413, Operation Joint Guardian, p. 4-5, [non-classified version], 
12 February 1999. 
90 KFOR is currently (beginning of 2016) still in Kosovo, which has been given a 
different set of tasks, including the standing down of the Kosovo Protection Corps 
and the creation of the Kosovo Security Force, www.aco.nato.int/kfor. 
91 Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) and Status of Mission Agreement (SOMA) is 
seemingly used inter-changeably. The UN uses the term SOMA for Chapter VI UN 
Charter operations commanded by the UN (JAG’s Legal Center & School, U.S. 
Army, Operational Law Handbook, 2011, p. 62).  
92 UNMiK Regulation No. 1999/1, 25 July 1999. 
93 UNMiK Regulation No. 2000/47, UNMiK/REG/2000/47, 18 August 2000, on the 
status, privileges and immunities of KFOR and UNMiK and their personnel in 
Kosovo, section 3.3. 
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with the host nation was envisaged in Article 3 of annex B of the MTA, 
this was never concluded. Instead, UNMiK and KFOR came to a joint 
declaration that “KFOR personnel shall be subject to the exclusive 
jurisdiction of their respective sending States. They shall be immune 
from local criminal, civil and administrative jurisdiction and from any 
form of arrest or detention other than by person acting on behalf of their 
sending States”.94 The joint declaration was likely to be agreed upon, 
since UNMiK was the sole entity possessing legislative powers in 
Kosovo to grant such immunity to KFOR. Subsequently, UNMiK issued 
Regulation 2000/4995 providing KFOR immunity from the host nation 
and exclusive jurisdiction to the sending States.96  
 
2.2.3 Background of the Incident 
KFOR entered Kosovo on 12 June 1999 and deployed around fifty 
thousand troops from thirty-six NATO and non-NATO nations.97 Given 
the fact that in 1999 Kosovo counted around two million inhabitants, 
the international security presence is in comparison very large; 
accounting for 2,5% of the local population. The amount of international 
personnel involved indicates the magnitude of the abovementioned 
tasks given to NATO to maintain and preserve security in Kosovo.  
The large presence of relatively well-paid personnel from KFOR and 
various other international (non-governmental) organizations gave a 
significant impetus to the local economy.98 At the same time, the 
international presence also drew the attention from individuals engaged 
in criminal activities such as prostitution and human trafficking. 
Several studies on Kosovo link the presence of personnel from 
international organizations such as NATO and the UN to an increase in 
human trafficking and forced prostitution.99 A number of non-
governmental organizations reported that Kosovo became a major 
                                                             
94 UNMiK/KFOR Joint Declaration, CJ(00)0320, 17 August 2000, reprinted in Fleck, 
D. (ed.) (2001) The handbook of the law of visiting forces, United Kingdom: Oxford 
University Press, p. 596. 
95 UNMiK Regulation No. 2000/47, UNMiK/REG/2000/47, 18 August 2000, on the 
status, privileges and immunities of KFOR and UNMiK and their personnel in 
Kosovo, Section 2. 
96 UNMiK Regulation No. 2000/47, UNMiK/REG/2000/47, 18 August 2000, on the 
status, privileges and immunities of KFOR and UNMiK and their personnel in 
Kosovo, section 2.4(a). 
97 KFOR is deployed under NATO’s operation “Joint Guardian”. 
98 The number of international personnel amounted to 2.5% of the total population of 
Kosovo, H.M. Smith, C.A. Smith, “Human trafficking; the unintended effects of 
United Nations intervention”, International Political Science Review, Issue 34(2), 
March 2013, p. 14. 
99 Amnesty International (2004) ‘So does it mean that we have the rights?’ Protecting 
the human rights of women and girls trafficked for forced prostitution in Kosovo. 
Available at: http://reliefweb.int/report/serbia/so-does-it-mean-we-have-rights-
protecting, Human Rights Watch, “World Report 2003: events of 2002”, 2003. 
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destination for women trafficked into prostitution.100 Within six months 
of KFOR’s arrival, at least four brothels opened within the vicinity of 
military bases and locations of the international organizations.101 
Eighteen premises were identified where clients included military and 
international civilian personnel. Since then, prostitution increased with 
unprecedented expectation; by January 2001, seventy-five premises 
were identified. Three years later this number climbed to two hundred. 
Prior to the deployment of the international presences these numbers 
were significantly lower.102  
The problem of human trafficking and forced prostitution reached such 
a severity that UNMiK created a special police unit, called the “UNMiK 
Police Trafficking and Prostitution Investigation Unit (TPIU)” in 
November 2000. TPIU’s aims were to “[gather] evidence to assist in the 
prosecution of those believed to be responsible for trafficking”.103 TPIU’s 
mission statement reads:  
“The TPIU is a group of investigators with the task of investigating into 
the criminal aspects of Prostitution and Trafficking in humans. It is the 
sole responsibility of the unit to gather intelligence information, 
investigate the crime of Prostitution and Trafficking in humans and to 
separate the criminal element from the victimized of this crime. It is the 
goal of the unit to prosecute criminals and to facilitate assistance to 
victims. It is also the goal of this unit to present to the criminal justice 
system of Kosovo the most prosecutable criminal cases possible. This 
ensures that the victims receive help and the criminals are 
prosecuted.”104  
Additionally, on 13 January 2001, the Special Representative of UNMiK 
issued Regulation 2001/4 providing assistance to victims of trafficking 
and criminalizing the act of human trafficking.105 TPIU acted 
                                                             
100 Amnesty International (2004) ‘So does it mean that we have the rights?’ Protecting 
the human rights of women and girls trafficked for forced prostitution in Kosovo. 
Available at: http://reliefweb.int/report/serbia/so-does-it-mean-we-have-rights-
protecting and UNIFEM, “No safe place: an assessment on violence against women 
in Kosovo”, 2000. 
101 UNIFEM, “No safe place: an assessment on violence against women in Kosovo”, 
2000, p. 93. 
102 UNIFEM, “No safe place: an assessment on violence against women in Kosovo”, 
2000, p. 94, “Prostitution took place in Kosovo before the advent of the 
international agencies but appears to be fairly limited [...] In four years 
investigating prostitution before 1998, my evidence is for 75-85 women in Kosovo 
[...] Professor, Pristina.” 
103 Amnesty International (2004) ‘So does it mean that we have the rights?’ Protecting 
the human rights of women and girls trafficked for forced prostitution in Kosovo. 
Available at: http://reliefweb.int/report/serbia/so-does-it-mean-we-have-rights-
protecting, p. 8. 
104 UNMiK, Combating Human Trafficking in Kosovo, Strategy and commitment, May 
2004, p. 7. 
105 UNMiK Regulation 2001/4, 12 January 2001. 
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expeditiously; issuing fifty-one indictments for persons involved in 
human trafficking of which fifteen were convicted. The numbers rose to 
ninety-two indictments the following year with twenty-seven 
convictions. The indictments and convictions were not directed at NATO 
personnel, but to other persons outside the NATO mission. In 2003, 
sixty persons were indicted for these criminal acts of which sixteen were 
convicted.106  
Human trafficking is a crime and a grave violation of an international 
human right. The Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking 
in Persons to the United Nations Convention against Transnational 
Organized Crime obliges member States to prevent, suppress and 
punish human trafficking.107 The Statute of the International Criminal 
Court classifies forced prostitution as a crime against humanity,108 as 
well as a war crime.109 Human trafficking is also a violation of 
international humanitarian law.110 
The United Nations received criticism that – in relation to trafficking 
and the linked issue of sexual exploitation and abuse of trafficked 
women and women forced into prostitution – peacekeepers were rather 
part of the problem than of the solution.111 While exact figures on the 
involvement of UN personnel are not available, Amnesty International 
and other NGOs have reported that UNMiK personnel – including 
UNMiK police – were involved in human trafficking and forced 
prostitution or were frequenting brothels suspected of being involved in 
human trafficking and forced prostitution.112 The OSCE reported that in 
                                                             
106 TPIU reports 2001, 2002 and 2003, available on the UNMiK website. 
107 The United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, entered 
into force on 29 September 2003 is supplemented by the Protocol to Prevent, 
Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children and 
the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air. Article 5 of 
the Convention obliges States to establish as criminal offences the participation in 
an organised criminal group. Article 5 of the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and 
Punish Trafficking in Persons particularly obliges States parties to enact legislation 
to criminalise the act of human trafficking. The Convention and Protocols did not 
enter into force at the time of misconduct of KFOR. Therefore, there was no 
international obligation of the member States, or NATO, to prevent, suppress and 
punish human trafficking at that time. 
108 Article 7(1)(g), Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 1998, 2187 UNTS 
38544, 1 July 2002. 
109 Article 8(2)(vii), Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 1998, 2187 
UNTS 38544, 1 July 2002. 
110 Articles 49 and 146, Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian 
Persons in Time of War (Geneva Convention IV), 1949, 75 UNTS 287, 12 August 
1949.  
111 Department of Peacekeeping Operations, “Human Trafficking and United Nations 
Peacekeeping”, DPKO Policy Paper, March 2004. 
112 Amnesty International (2004) ‘So does it mean that we have the rights?’ Protecting 
the human rights of women and girls trafficked for forced prostitution in Kosovo. 
Available at: http://reliefweb.int/report/serbia/so-does-it-mean-we-have-rights-
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1999, 80% of the clients in brothels were international personnel. This 
number diminished in subsequent years to 30% in 2003,113 but the 
brothels remained heavily dependent on their international clientele, as 
they comprised 80% of the revenues.114 The UN SRSG took measures to 
halt the involvement of UN personnel in prostitution by issuing a code 
of conduct115 together with a monthly updated “off-limits” list of 
premises that UNMiK staff is forbidden to access.  
The problems did not pertain exclusively to the United Nations; the 
outcomes of TPIU investigations revealed that KFOR military 
personnel were frequenting the brothels as well.116 According to TPIU, 
KFOR was – moreover – involved in the human trafficking process.117 
 
2.2.4 Reaction by NATO, TCNs and / or Others 
As early as 2001, the OSCE recommended UNMiK and KFOR to adopt 
a stronger response to the involvement of their personnel in trafficking 
activities.118 Internal disciplinary measures were, according to the 
OSCE, insufficient to address the problem adequately. UNMiK adopted 
a “code of conduct” which set as a consequence for UN personnel’s 
involvement in human trafficking a waiver of immunity, followed by 
disciplinary measures or criminal proceedings. A specific order 
prohibiting military personnel from committing acts of sexual 
exploitation – in similar fashion as the UN SRSG did by declaring a 
Code of Conduct – was never issued by COMKFOR.119 COMKFOR 
issued a general order not to leave military base except for official duty, 
                                                                                                                                                    
protecting. 
113 Unicef (2002) Trafficking in human beings in south eastern Europe 2002, available 
at: http://www.iom.md/materials/1_traff_human_beings_se.pdf (Accessed: 14 May 
2016), p. 96; Organization for security and Co-operation in Europe mission in 
Kosovo department of human rights (2001) Kosovo: Review of the Criminal Justice 
System, p. 51. 
114 Amnesty International (2004) ‘So does it mean that we have the rights?’ Protecting 
the human rights of women and girls trafficked for forced prostitution in Kosovo. 
Available at: http://reliefweb.int/report/serbia/so-does-it-mean-we-have-rights-
protecting. 
115 Issued on 24 January 2001. 
116 Unicef (2002) Trafficking in human beings in south eastern Europe 2002, available 
at: http://www.iom.md/materials/1_traff_human_beings_se.pdf (Accessed: 14 May 
2016), p. 96, “According to the police, the majority of the customers are local men, 
although members of the international community constitute a sizeable 40 per cent 
of clientele, mostly KFOR soldiers”. 
117 Amnesty International, ““So does it mean we have rights?”, Protecting the human 
rights of women and girls trafficked for forced prostitution in Kosovo”, 5 May 2004, 
p. 66. 
118 Organization for security and Co-operation in Europe mission in Kosovo 
department of human rights (2001) Kosovo: Review of the Criminal Justice System. 
119 UN Code of Conduct for UNMiK staff, 24 January 2001, which was based on a 
previously issued UNMiK Regulation 2001/4, On the prohibition of Trafficking 
Persons in Kosovo, 12 January 2001. 
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which left ample room to circumvent the International Military Police 
that had to implement the order.120  
In an interview with Amnesty International, one NATO official 
admitted that the issue of soldiers frequenting prostitutes was “hard to 
end” and stated that disciplinary action was a matter for the respective 
national authorities.121 COMKFOR directed commanders of TCNs “to 
publish national policies that regulate against the use of prostitutes for 
sexual services and to ensure that such regulations are enforceable 
through national disciplinary sanctions”,122 but did not refer to the 
possibility that violating the anti-trafficking regulation could lead to 
criminal proceedings.  
COMKFOR relied mainly on national commanders to issue policies to 
ensure that KFOR personnel would not be involved in human 
trafficking and forced prostitution. If national commanders would deem 
it necessary, they would take disciplinary action, or waive immunity for 
KFOR personnel followed by repatriation and criminal prosecution 
before national courts.123 This raises the question which role NATO has 
in the prevention and repression of crimes committed by military 
personnel placed at its disposal. Does NATO have an international 
obligation to prevent crimes from happening and punish the 
perpetrators during NATO operations and does the Alliance have any 
measures at its disposal to effectively prevent and repress misconduct 
committed by its personnel? 
While there have been indictments against persons involved in human 
trafficking and forced prostitution, the majority of these persons 
concerned were nationals of Kosovo. However, already in 2000, reports 
emerged that peacekeeping personnel were also involved in the 
trafficking of women and girls.124 The UN Secretary General noted that 
often “contributing States fail to prosecute their nationals accused of 
                                                             
120 The IMP is a collaboration between of military police units of various TCNs. By 
combining MP units in an IMP a more efficient use of MP units is achieved. 
121 Amnesty International (2004) ‘So does it mean that we have the rights?’ Protecting 
the human rights of women and girls trafficked for forced prostitution in Kosovo. 
Available at: http://reliefweb.int/report/serbia/so-does-it-mean-we-have-rights-
protecting, p. 53. 
122 Amnesty International (2004) ‘So does it mean that we have the rights?’ Protecting 
the human rights of women and girls trafficked for forced prostitution in Kosovo. 
Available at: http://reliefweb.int/report/serbia/so-does-it-mean-we-have-rights-
protecting, p. 54. 
123 The Times, Colonel caught in brothel, 6 July 2000; AFP, Royal Marines sent home 
from Kosovo after strip-club booze up, 11 January 2001; Associated Press, 10 
French NATO peacekeepers caught at off-limits bar, 6 December 2002. 
124 UN Secretary General, Women, Peace and Security, Study submitted by the 
Secretary General pursuant to Security Council resolution 1325 (2000), 2002, para. 
268. The report refers to the report of the UN Commission on Human Rights, 
Report of the Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and 
consequences, E/CN.4/2001/73, 23 January 2001. 
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wrongdoing while on services for the [UN]” 125 The report noted the 
inaction of sending States to exercise jurisdiction over, in particular, 
their military forces. More recently, the UN General Assembly urged 
States to exercise jurisdiction over crimes of a serious nature, 
committed by their nations while serving as UN officials or experts on 
mission.126 Of note is that neither the UN Secretary General nor the 
commanders of national elements have ever issued a waiver of 
immunity. At the same time, neither are there records of indictments 
issued against KFOR personnel. However, according to some sources, at 
least in one instance, the US has investigated the involvement of its 
troops in this criminal behaviour but has found no substantial evidence 
of such.127 Investigations by other TCNs are not known of.  
 
2.3 Case 2: Detention Operations in ISAF 
 
2.3.1 Background, Legal Framework of the Operation and Command 
Relationships 
Following the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 on American 
territory by members of the Al Qaida, the United States initiated 
Operation Enduring Freedom-Afghanistan (OEF-A) to conduct together 
with its allies a counter-terrorism operation in Afghanistan. OEF-A 
started 7 October 2001 and by 13 November 2001, Coalition Forces and 
the Afghan Northern Alliance removed the Taliban regime from its 
power in the capital Kabul. In December 2001, Afghan representatives 
participated in the so-called “UN Talks on Afghanistan” to formulate 
arrangements intended as first steps towards the establishment of a 
new Afghan government. An interim government would be established 
on 22 December 2001 with a mandate of six months. Within this period 
a Loya Jirga would convene to allow for a smooth and orderly transfer 
of power to a legitimate transitional government.128 The arrangements 
were laid down in the “Agreement on provisional arrangements in 
Afghanistan pending the re-establishment of permanent government 
institution”, also referred to as the Bonn Agreement.129 The United 
                                                             
125 UN Secretary General, Women, Peace and Security, Study submitted by the 
Secretary General pursuant to Security Council resolution 1325 (2000), 2002, 
paras. 267-272. 
126 UN General Assembly Resolutions A/RES/62/63 and A/RES/63/119, para. 3. 
127 In 2003, the US Department of Defense Inspector investigated human trafficking in 
Bosnia Herzegovina and concluded that there was “negligible evidence that US 
Armed Forces in the Balkans patronized prostitutes or engaged in other activities 
on a wide-spread basis that supported human trafficking”, Assessment of DoD 
efforts to combat trafficking in persons, 
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2002/bosnia/ig.pdf (accessed 14 October 2012). 
128 A Loya Jirga is a meeting by representatives of the Afghan population, usually for 
prepared for major events such as electing a president. 
129 Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan pending the Re-
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Nations Security Council later endorsed the Bonn Agreement in 
Security Council resolution 1383(2001).130 
The participants recognised that “the responsibility for providing 
security and law and order throughout the country resides with the 
Afghans themselves.”131 Considering that some time may be required for 
the new Afghan security and armed forces to be fully constituted and 
functioning, they requested the UN Security Council to mandate an 
international force to assist in the maintenance of security in Kabul and 
its surrounding areas.  
On 20 December 2001, the UN Security Council determined that the 
situation in Afghanistan continued to pose a threat to the international 
peace and security and issued resolution 1386(2001). The resolution 
established the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) with a 
mandate to take all necessary measures to “assist the Afghan Interim 
Authority in the maintenance of security in Kabul and its surrounding 
areas”132 and invited member States to contribute forces to ISAF and to 
take leadership of the mission.  
In January 2002, the Interim Administration of Afghanistan and the 
Commander of ISAF concluded a Military Technical Agreement (MTA), 
setting out the terms of deployment of ISAF.133 The Interim 
Administration agreed to direct Afghan military units to return to their 
barracks and to refrain from all offensive operations within ISAF’s area 
of responsibility.134 ISAF would maintain security in the area of 
responsibility as defined in annex B to the MTA, but the mission could 
later be expanded throughout the country.  
The United Kingdom agreed to lead ISAF for the first three months 
with 17 other nations participating in it.135 In February 2002, around 
4.800 personnel were deployed to Afghanistan. The lead role of the 
United Kingdom’s was handed over to Turkey and later to a joint 
command under the lead of Germany and The Netherlands.  
The six-month’s rotational basis under which ISAF is led by a nation 
                                                                                                                                                    
establishment of Permanent Government Institutions, 5 December 2001. 
130 United Nations Security Council resolution 1383(2001), 6 December 2001. 
131 Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan pending the Re-
establishment of Permanent Government Institutions, 5 December 2001, annex I, 
para 3. 
132 UNSCR 1386(2001) 20 December 2001, para 1.  
133 Military Technical Agreement between the International Security Assistance Force 
(ISAF) and the Interim Administration of Afghanistan (‘Interim Administration’), 4 
January 2002. 
134 Military Technical Agreement between the International Security Assistance Force 
(ISAF) and the Interim Administration of Afghanistan (‘Interim Administration’), 4 
January 2002, paras. 3 and 4. 
135 Letter dated 19 December 2001 from the Permanent Representative of the United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations addressed to 
the President of the Security Council, 19 December 2001, S/2001/1217. 
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did not provide the opportunity for a broader, long-term strategic plan. 
While NATO had been involved in supporting Germany and The 
Netherlands in the planning and execution of the ISAF mission, it did 
not until that time take command over the mission. On 16 April 2003 
the NAC decided that NATO would take over the responsibilities over 
ISAF. SACEUR promulgated Operational Plan 10302 and appointed 
Allied Joint Force Command Brunssum136 to establish a NATO-led 
headquarters in Afghanistan to command the ISAF mission.137 On 11 
August 2003, NATO assumed the leading role in ISAF, taking over from 
Germany and The Netherlands.  
The tasks of ISAF, as were initially established by UN Security Council 
resolution 1386(2001), remained the same. NATO would assist the 
Afghan government in the maintenance of security within Kabul, and 
more widely within Afghanistan in accordance with the provisions of the 
Bonn Agreement as well as ensuring the safety of UN personnel.138 The 
resolution leaves ample room for NATO to choose the means and 
methods to accomplish these tasks by stating that ISAF is authorized to 
take “all necessary measures to fulfil its mandate”. In October 2003, 
NATO informed the UN about its long-term strategy in Afghanistan. 
NATO formulated ISAF’s objective as the establishment of a self-
sustaining, moderate and democratic Afghan government, able to 
exercise its authority and to operate throughout Afghanistan, without 
the need of ISAF to help provide security. To this end, NATO informed 
the UN about the expansion of the ISAF mission, in particular relating 
to reconstruction efforts, training of Afghan national security forces and 
expansion throughout the country.139 On 13 October 2003, the Afghan 
government welcomed NATO’s assumption of strategic command, 
control and coordination of ISAF and the prospect of an expansion of 
NATO’s ISAF mission.140 Several days later, the UN Security Council 
authorized the expanded mission through adoption of resolution 
1510(2003).141 The resolution reiterates the call to ISAF to work closely 
with the UN Special Representative in Afghanistan and requires ISAF 
to report to the Security Council on the implementation of the mandate.  
NATO’s Operational Plan for ISAF consists of five phases, transitioning 
from a preparatory phase to deployment phase throughout the entire 
                                                             
136 In 2003, Allied Joint Force Command Brunssum was called “Regional Command 
North”. 
137 OPLAN 10302, 18 December 2003. 
138 United Nations Security Council resolution 1386, 20 December 2001, para. 1. 
139 Letter dated 6 October 2003 from the Secretary General of the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization addressed to the Secretary General, UN Security Council 
S/2003/970. 
140 Letter dated 10 October 2003 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Afghanistan 
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territory of Afghanistan. Following expansion, ISAF will focus on 
stabilisation, until the responsibilities can be handed over to Afghan 
authorities. The fifth phase involves the redeployment of ISAF forces. 
NATO deployed in August 2003, and on its peak in 2013, commanded 
over 100.000 ISAF troops.  
 
2.3.2 Status of Forces 
Annex A to the MTA regulates the status of ISAF’s presence in 
Afghanistan, according, functional immunity from personal arrest as 
necessary for the independent exercise of their functions during the 
period of their missions. Paragraph 3 of Annex A to the MTA mentions 
that “ISAF and supporting personnel fall under the exclusive 
jurisdiction of their respective national elements in respect of any 
criminal or disciplinary offences committed within the territory of 
Afghanistan”.142 The provision of exclusive jurisdiction by the sending 
State over their personnel is commonly found in SOFAs and often a 
prerequisite for States to send their personnel on deployment.143 
Furthermore, the MTA stipulates that “ISAF and its personnel will not 
be held liable for any damages to civilian or government property 
caused by any activity in pursuit of the ISAF mission.”144 Although the 
MTA does not mention it explicitly, NATO interprets this clause as such 
that this provision also applies to injury or death of persons in 
Afghanistan caused by ISAF members.  
In an exchange of letters in 2004 between the NATO Secretary General 
and the Afghan Minister of Foreign Affairs the provisions of the already 
existing MTA and its Annex A regarding the status of ISAF are mutatis 
mutandis applicable to NATO, NATO forces and NATO personnel. The 
immunities and privileges accorded in the MTA were even extended to 
NATO contractors.145 A contractor is limited to those – other than locally 
– contracted by NATO, NATO member States and non-NATO member 
States participating in the ISAF.  
 
2.3.3 Background of the Incident 
SACEUR’s Operational Plan 10302 includes Rules of Engagement 
                                                             
142 Military Technical Agreement between the International Security Assistance Force 
(ISAF) and the Interim Administration of Afghanistan (‘Interim Administration’), 4 
January 2002, Annex I, section 1, para 3. 
143 Mason, C.R. (2012) CRS report for congress, status of forces agreement (SOFA): 
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144 Military Technical Agreement between the International Security Assistance Force 
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(ROE) for ISAF, which are approved by the North Atlantic Council 
(NAC). The ROE allow ISAF to detain persons who pose a threat to the 
mission or where detention is necessary for the purposes of execution of 
the mission. The NAC directed in the ROE that detained persons would 
subsequently either be released or transferred as soon as possible to 
Afghan authorities. The aim is to detain such persons for no longer than 
96 hours, unless logistical conditions dictate otherwise.146 The NAC 
likely wished to avoid the need of instituting a costly ISAF-led prison 
facility. Moreover, there was little political appetite to have a detention 
facility under the command of NATO after the incident at Abu Ghraib in 
Iraq, where prisoners were tortured by US forces and caused significant 
political embarrassment.  
Between 2002 and 2005, ISAF operated in Kabul and its surroundings. 
Due to the limited area of operations, ISAF did not detain many 
individuals. After the expansion throughout the country in 2005, 
detention operations became more frequent and COMISAF saw the 
need to issue detailed procedures setting out standards and conditions 
of treatment of detainees during their – relatively short – period of 
detention. Moreover, the procedures provided guidance on the transfer 
of detainees to Afghan authorities or their release.147  
When ISAF became more and more involved in detention operations, 
differences in political views of the various NATO member States on the 
detention policy became more apparent. It became clear that even 
without the burden of having to deal with long-term detention of 
individuals, NATO and its member States could not avoid challenges 
associated with detention. In particular, the hand-over procedures to 
Afghan authorities were complicated issues. 
In fact, some TCNs refused to hand over detainees to Afghan 
authorities, in contradiction to the direction of the NAC. Two factors 
seemed to preclude them to transfer detainees to Afghan authorities. 
The first factor related to the circumstance that the Government of 
Afghanistan did not have effective measures in place to guarantee that 
transferred detainees would be treated humanely in Afghan-run 
detention facilities. UN Secretary General and several human rights 
organizations reported on frequent abuse of detainees and instances of 
torture, especially within the Afghan National Directorate of Security.148 
                                                             
146 Deeks, A. (2008) Detention in Afghanistan: The need for an integrated plan, 
available at: http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/080213_deeks_afghanistan.pdf 
(Accessed: 12 May 2016). 
147 ISAF Standard Operating Procedure 362, Detention of non-ISAF personnel, dated 
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148 Amnesty International (2007) Afghanistan, Detainees transferred to torture: ISAF 
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In its report of June 2004 until May 2005, the Afghan Independent 
Human Rights Commission (AIHRC) identified 439 cases of torture.149 
By 2006, torture of detained or imprisoned persons was still frequent, 
although the number declined.150 The UN Secretary General reported 
these concerns again in 2006..151 
According to certain authors, the transfer of detainees from one State to 
another, when there is a risk of torture in the latter, would be a 
violation of international humanitarian law, refugee law, extradition 
treaties and international human rights law.152 In particular during 
armed conflict, such transfers would be in violation of Article 3 of the 
Geneva Conventions of 1949153, 5(4) of Additional Protocol II to the 
Geneva Conventions154, Article 7 of the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (ICCPR)155 and Article 3(1) of the Convention 
against Torture, and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment (CAT).156 Moreover, in the opinion of one author, non-
refoulement is considered a principle of customary international law.157 
Another reason for TCNs not complying with the ISAF’s limitation on 
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the detention period and handover to Afghan authorities was the 
existence of the death penalty in Afghanistan for certain criminal acts. 
States party to the conventions that abolish the death penalty – such as 
Protocol 6 and 13 to the European Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms concerning the abolition of 
the death penalty – are to choose not to transfer detainees to another 
State when the suspect risks to be exposed to the death penalty.158 The 
ICCPR prohibits the transfer of detainees to a State where he would 
face the imposition of the death penalty without fundamental 
guarantees of a fair trial.159 A similar provision is found in Article 3 
ECHR. 
These two factors caused certain nations to issue far-reaching 
restrictions on detention operations, essentially excluding themselves 
from those operations. In those cases where there were substantial 
grounds for believing that the detainee would be in danger of being 
subjected to torture or ill-treatment if transferred, or running the risk 
to be charged with the death penalty, some nations refused to transfer 
detainees within the proscribed 96 hours set forth in the ISAF rules of 
engagement.160  
This raises several questions regarding the relationship between the 
member States and NATO, which are examined more elaborately in the 
following chapters of this thesis. It shows that TCNs are able to re-
assume command over their forces, without terminating their 
commitment to the NATO mission. This flexibility illustrates the 
separate status of NATO from the member States, which will be further 
analysed in chapter 4 and 5. Another question that arises relates to the 
attribution of conduct. To whom a potential breach of the obligation not 
                                                             
158 Protocols 6 and 13 to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms adopted respectively on 1 November 1998 and 3 May 
2002, European Court of Human Rights, Soering v. The United Kingdom, 
Application no. 14038/88, Judgment of 7 July 1989, “[t]he likelihood of the feared 
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159 C. Droege, Transfer of detainees: legal framework, non-refoulement and 
contemporary challenges, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol 90, no. 871, 
September 2008, p. 672. 
160 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, 1984, 1465 UNTS 85, 26 June 1987, article 3 para 1 state that “no 
State shall expel, return or extradite a person to another State where there are 
substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to 
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to transfer detainees in case of a likelihood of torture, should be 
attributed? Is it NATO – for having issued the directive to transfer – or 
States – that have implemented the directive, or both. This question 
and the issue of multiple attribution is examined in chapter 7.  
A practice emerged in which individual TCNs entered into bilateral 
agreements with the Afghan authorities to ensure adherence to human 
rights standards by the Afghan government after the individual was 
transferred.161 This instrument was criticised by NATO Commanders as 
the bilateral agreements created a substantial risk that different, and 
possibly contradictory, standards and procedures regarding the 
treatment of detainees would develop. The preferred idea was to 
conclude a single overarching agreement between ISAF and the 
Government of Afghanistan, however the NAC could not reach 
consensus on its content.  
 
2.3.4 Reaction by NATO, TCNs and / or Others 
Human rights organizations criticised the transfer of detainees. In 
particular, Amnesty International and the British Columbia Civil 
Liberties Association (BCCLA) brought a case before the Canadian 
Federal Court to end Canadian Force’s practice of transferring 
detainees to Afghan authorities as there were concerns that the 
prisoners would face the risk of torture and other human rights 
violations. The civil rights organizations claimed that the transfers 
were in breach of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. 
BCCLA and Amnesty International did not invoke a breach of Article 3 
of the United Nations Convention Against Torture, which obliges 
parties to the Convention not to return (“refouler”) a person to another 
State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he would 
be in danger of being subjected to torture. While Canada is party to this 
convention, the extra-territorial applicability of the Convention is 
disputed, which likely persuaded the applicants to base their claim on 
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. This Charter provides in 
similar protection of human rights as the ECHR.  
The Canadian Court did not decide on the substance of the matter, as it 
ruled that the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms did not apply 
to Canadian Forces in Afghanistan due to lack of extra-territorial 
applicability.162 Nevertheless, the case is illustrative to the position of 
                                                             
161 An example is the Memorandum of Understanding between the Minister of Defence 
of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and the Minister of Defence of the Kingdom 
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Canadian Forces, Minister of National Defence and Attorney General of Canada, A-
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TCNs in NATO-led operations.  
Canadian forces have been deployed in Afghanistan in support of both 
OEF-A163 and ISAF164. Canada concluded an agreement with the 
government of Afghanistan to outline the objectives of the Canadian 
forces – participating in OEF-A as well as ISAF - in Afghanistan and to 
regulate the status of their military forces.165 In this agreement, 
Canadian forces are, under all circumstances, immune from Afghan law, 
arrest or detention. Canadian forces may take “such measures as are 
considered necessary to ensure the accomplishment of their operational 
objectives”. The agreement further stipulated that  
“Canadian personnel may need to use force (including deadly force) to 
ensure the accomplishment of their operational objectives, the safety of 
the deployed force, including designated persons, designated property, 
and designated locations. Such measures could include the use of close 
air support, firearms or other weapons; the detention of persons; and 
the seizure of arms and other materiel. Detainees would be afforded the 
same treatment as Prisoners of War. Detainees would be transferred to 
Afghan authorities in a manner consistent with international law and 
subject to negotiated assurances regarding their treatment and 
transfer.”166  
It is unclear what additional value the arrangements could have, seen 
in the light of the existing ISAF MTA, but likely the Canadian 
government preferred to regulate the status with the Afghan 
government for all Canadian forces, whether they operate within ISAF 
or OEF, in one single document.  
Canada, in addition, has concluded several agreements with the 
Government of Afghanistan on the treatment of transferred detainees. 
The first Arrangement of 19 December 2005 established procedures to 
be followed in the event that a detainee was transferred from the 
custody of the Canadian Forces to a detention facility operated by 
Afghan authorities. On 3 May 2007, Canada and Afghanistan concluded 
a second Arrangement governing the transfer of detainees held by the 
Canadian Forces, requiring that detainees transferred by the Canadian 
Forces be held in a limited number of detention facilities, to assist in 
keeping track of individual detainees, to allow access of the AIHRC, 
ICRC and Canadian officials to the facilities and to require approval by 
                                                                                                                                                    
149-08, 10 December 2008, paras. 24-35.  
163 Operation Archer. 
164 Operation Athena. 
165 Technical arrangements between the government of Canada and the government of 
the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, 18 December 2005, cited in Federal Court of 
Canada, Amnesty International et al v. Attorney General of Canada et al, T-324-07, 
12 March 2008, para. 44.  
166 Technical arrangement between the government of Canada and the government of 
the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, 18 December 2005, para 12. 
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Canadian officials before any detainee to be transferred on to the 
custody of a third country. Finally, the Agreement provides that 
allegation of abuse are to be investigated by the Government of 
Afghanistan.167 
From 2006, reports from Canadian-led Provincial Reconstruction Teams 
(PRT) and the Canadian embassy in Afghanistan were sent to the 
Canadian Ministry of Defence warning on the maltreatment of 
detainees in Afghan custody168 The Canadian detachment commander 
(Commander Task Force Afghanistan) issued a national detention policy 
for Canadian Forces participating in ISAF, which, in general terms, is 
similar to the ISAF Detention SOP.169 Canada retains the power to 
decide not to transfer detainees, and it has done so on various 
occasions.170 
Canada informed ISAF that it unilaterally “had suspended detainee 
transfers until such time as transfers could be resumed “in accordance 
with Canada’s international obligations”. The decision to suspend 
detainee transfers came about as a result of a “credible allegation of 
mistreatment” having been received on November 5, 2007 by Canadian 
personnel monitoring the condition of detainees transferred to Afghan 
authorities.”171  
Likely, Canada, when acknowledging its obligations under international 
law in relation to the transfer of detainees, referred to its obligations 
under customary IHL and IHRL, as stated in Canada’s response in the 
case Amnesty International et al v. Attorney General of Canada cited 
above.172 
The suspension was temporary, lasting from 5 November 2007 until 26 
February 2008.173 The Canadian contingent, by holding the detainees for 
a longer period than 96 hours, was thereby contravening ISAF ROE and 
detention procedures. Notwithstanding its unilateral decision, Canada 
declared to remain committed to the ISAF policy of transferring 
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detainees to the custody of Afghan authorities and would resume the 
transfers when they would be in accordance with Canada’s 
international legal obligations.174 From 26 of February 2008, transfers 
have resumed as the Canadian Forces had implemented additional 
measures to reduce the risk to detainees transferred into the custody of 
Afghan authorities.175 
The case between BCCLA/Canada and the Canadian government led in 
October 2008 to the establishment of a parliamentary investigation, the 
“Study of the transfer of Afghan detainees from the Canadian Forces to 
Afghan authorities” by the Special Committee on the Canadian Mission 
in Afghanistan.176 Canada selected the facilities of the Afghan National 
Directorate of Security (NDS) “as the first place in the transfer chain for 
Afghans detained by Canada.”177 The choice to use these facilities was 
done in order to assist in keeping track of the individual detainees.178 
Despite reports on the propensity of NDS to torture detainees, 
Canadian forces continued to transfer to this agency. According to 
evidence submitted by – primarily – the Embassy of Canada to the 
United States of America, the Canadian government has been made 
aware of the substantial risk of torture that detainees run when being 
transferred to the NDS. Nevertheless, the reports did not lead to a 
change in position of the Canadian government. According to a 
statement of the Canadian Embassy,  
“as of May 2007, Canada had transferred to the Afghan authorities six 
times as many detainees as the British, [...] and 20 times as many 
detainees as the Dutch [but] did not monitor our own detainees after 
their transfer. Canada’s memorandum of understanding on detainees in 
2005 had no provision for Canadian officials to follow up detainees after 
being handed over”.179  
Furthermore,  
“senior officials in DFAIT and the Canadian Forces did not welcome our 
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reports or advices. [...] By April 2007, we were receiving written 
messages from the senior Canadian government coordinator for 
Afghanistan to the effect that we should be quiet and do what we were 
told and there was a phone message from the DFAIT assistant deputy 
minister suggesting that in future we should not put things on paper 
but, instead, use the telephone.” 
The Canadian House of Commons Special Committee on the Canadian 
Mission in Afghanistan was prorogued from 10 December 2009. It is 
unclear whether “the committee charged with investigating [the] claims 
will be resurrected once Parliament reconvenes in March given that the 
unanimous consent of all parties in House of Commons would be needed 
to re-establish it.”180 
NATO decided to suspend the transfer of detainees to certain Afghan 
detention facilities on 6 September 2011181 on the basis of observations 
contained in a report of UNAMA.182 The findings of UNAMA were that 
in some of the detention facilities, detainees were tortured. NATO 
conducted its own inspection at six facilities and begun remediation 
training in one facility.183 After the inspections and remedial action, 
transfers resumed. Two years later, UNAMA re-evaluated the detention 
facilities and concluded that torture was still taking place in some of the 
detention centres. NATO again suspended the transfer of detainees.184 
The actions taken by NATO in 2011 and 2013 show that the Alliance 
was in a position to effectively address the concerns of TCNs in ISAF 
regarding the treatment of detainees in Afghanistan. 
 
2.4 Case 3: Kunduz Incident  
 
2.4.1 Background, Legal Framework of the Operation and Command 
Relationships 
As with the case presented in the previous paragraph, this case relates 
to the ISAF mission as well. Therefore, for information on the 
background and legal framework of the operation as well as the 
command relationship reference is made to paragraph 2.3.  
The command structure of the NATO-led ISAF mission, as outlined in 
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the previous paragraph, is as follows. The NAC retains political control 
over the ISAF mission, while SACEUR has operational command and 
control. SACEUR has delegated operational control over the mission to 
Allied Joint Force Command Brunssum, which has deployed a forward 
command (HQ ISAF) to Afghanistan. During the period in which this 
case takes place, the Headquarters of ISAF commanded 5 regional 
commands, Regional Command North, East, South, West and Capital. 
Among other tasks, the Regional Commands coordinate civil-military 
activities conducted by Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), in 
their area of responsibility. Regional Command North at that time had 
5 PRTs, one of which in Kunduz. 
 
2.4.2 Background of the Incident 
In the evening of 3 September 2009, Taliban insurgents hijacked two 
fuel trucks arriving from Tajikistan and destined to an ISAF PRT 
compound in Kunduz. When one of the trucks got stuck in the soft soil 
of a riverbed between Ali Abad and Char Dara districts, the hijackers 
chose to siphon fuel out of the tankers. Civilians from a village nearby 
the stranded trucks were either forced to assist the hijackers185 or – 
according to the Taliban’ version of events186 – allowed them to loot from 
the fuel tankers. 
According to the German media, an ISAF aircraft spotted the trapped 
fuel tankers and relayed the location through a Special Forces unit in 
the area to the ISAF PRT Commander.187 This unit informed the ISAF 
PRT commander that several Taliban commanders were among the 
hijackers of the fuel trucks. 
Several hours later, the ISAF PRT Commander authorised an air strike 
on the two fuel tankers – neglecting the possibility that civilians might 
be present among the group gathered around the fuel tankers. A US F-
15 aircraft conducting the strike proposed to perform a low flying 
manoeuvre to warn off the civilians, but this was answered in the 
negative by the joint tactical air controller. The question from the pilot 
whether the individuals posed an immediate threat to ISAF was 
answered in the affirmative.188 The latter question indicates that the 
pilot wanted to ascertain that the risk of civilian casualties outweighed 
the military necessity – such as in case of imminent danger to own 
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187 Bild.com, German KSK Special Forces involved in deadly bombing, 10 December 
2009. 
188 Bild.com, footage from the US aircraft involved. 
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troops 
Although the PRT Commander did not report that there were any 
civilians among the deaths caused by the air strike,189 the higher 
headquarters at ISAF Regional Command North received information 
that several children arrived at hospitals in Kunduz with shrapnel 
wounds, likely caused by the air strike earlier that day.190 The Regional 
Command informed the German Defence ministry and Headquarters 
ISAF that civilians were amongst the casualties.  
Attacks that are not directed at a military objective, or attacks which 
may cause incidental loss of civilian life or injury to civilians which 
would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military 
advantage anticipated, are prohibited.191 These violations constitute war 
crimes under the ICC Statute, if the indiscriminate attacks were part of 
State or organizational policy.192 
The initial reports from the Afghan Governor of the Kunduz province 
were that 56 armed men were killed and 12 injured. Notwithstanding 
this statement, the Afghan President declared the same day that it 
would appoint a fact-finding mission to investigate the details of this 
event.193 The result of this investigation was that at least 30 civilians 
were among the 119 casualties.194 
 
2.4.3 Reaction by NATO, TCNs and /or Others 
Mainly due to Afghanistan’s size, mountainous landscape and ISAF’s 
relatively small amount of military forces,195 most of the operations are 
executed, or at least supported, by air strikes. In the course of time, 
                                                             
189 Spiegel online, Oberst Klein wollte “Feinde des Wiederaufbaus treffen”, 12 
December 2009. 
190 Bild.de, Hat Minister Jung die Wahrheit verschwiegen?, 25 November 2009. 
191 Article 51(4), 51(5)(b) and 57 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 
August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed 
Conflicts, 1977, 1125 UNTS 3, 8 June 1977. 
192 Article 8(1) “The Court shall have jurisdiction in respect of war crimes in particular 
when committed as part of a plan or policy or as part of a large-scale commission of 
such crimes.” Article 8(2)(b)(iv) Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 
1998, 2187 UNTS 38544, 1 July 2002“Intentionally launching an attack in the 
knowledge that such attack will cause incidental loss of life or injury to civilians or 
damage to civilian objects or widespread, long-term and severe damage to the 
natural environment which would be clearly excessive in relation to the concrete 
and direct overall military advantage anticipated.” 
193 Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Office of the President, Press release, President 
Karzai ordered investigation into Kunduz incident, 4 September 2009. 
194 Tageschau.de, 30 Zivilisten und 20 Unbewaffnete getötet, 23 March 2010. 
195 KFOR was composed at its height of 50.000 troops  
(www.nato.int/issues/kfor/evolution.html, accessed 14 March 2010) to cover 
Kosovo’s size of 10.902 km2, while ISAF is currently composed of 85.795 troops 
(www.nato.int/isaf/docu/epub/pdf/placemat.pdf, accessed 14 March 2010) to cover 
Afghanistan’s size of 652.090 km2, twice the size of KFOR but Afghanistan is 60 
times larger. 
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however, the President of Afghanistan expressed his concerns over the 
civilian lives lost during military operation, in particular those due to 
the numerous ISAF air strikes.196  
UNAMA’s Special Representative expressed similar concerns on the 
topic of civilian casualties in 2008.197 UNAMA’s Human Rights Unit 
recorded 2118 civilian casualties from 1 January 2008 until 31 
December 2008, compared to 1523 recorded in the same period in 2007. 
Around 39 % is attributed to pro-government forces – which include 
military forces operating under ISAF, Operation Enduring Freedom and 
the Afghan Nations Security Forces.198 UNAMA analysed that air strikes 
account for the largest percentage of civilian deaths.199 In its 2009 report 
UNAMA reported 2412 civilian deaths.200 The percentage of civilian 
casualties attributed to pro-government forces has diminished to 25%, 
but “air strikes remain a concern; they are responsible for 61% of 
civilian deaths attributed to pro-Government forces in 2009”.201  
The UN Human Rights Council voiced the same concerns.202 In 2007, the 
Council directed attention to defensive air strikes, which allegedly were 
particular disproportionate in some cases. The then UN High 
Commissioner for Human Rights, Louise Arbour, concluded that the 
“alarming levels” of civilian casualties caused by ISAF and OEF 
operations “breach international law”.203 The Special Rapporteur on 
extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions to the Human Rights 
Council, Philip Alston, criticised ISAF on its obscure procedures on the 
vetting of military targets, which prevented him to assess compliance 
                                                             
196 BBC News online, Karzai anger over civilian deaths,  
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/6615781.stm, accessed 14 March 2010, 2 May 2007 
and CBS News/60 Minutes, Karzai: stop the air strikes, 28 October 2007. 
197 Briefing to the UN Security Council by the Special Representative of the Secretary 
General for Afghanistan: “First and foremost, every effort must be made to reduce 
the number of civilian casualties to a minimum. I am in a regular dialogue with 
COMISAF concerning this and other topics.” 10 July 2008.  
198 UNAMA Human Rights Unit, Afghanistan, Annual report on protection of civilians 
in armed conflict, 2008, January 2009. 
199 UNAMA, Human Rights Unit, Afghanistan, Annual Report on Protection of 
Civilians in Armed Conflict, 2008, January 2009 “Air-strikes account for the largest 
percentage of civilian deaths attributed to pro-governments forces. UNAMA 
recorded 552 civilian casualties of this nature in 2008. This constitutes 64% of the 
828 non-combatant deaths attributed to actions by pro-government forces in 2008 
and 26% of those killed overall”, p. 16 
200 UNAMA Human Rights Unit, Afghanistan, Annual report on protection of civilians 
in armed conflict, 2009, p. 1. 
201 UNAMA, Human Rights Unit, Afghanistan, Annual Report on Protection of 
Civilians in Armed Conflict, 2008, January 2009, p. 3. 
202 United Nations Human Rights Council, Report of the High Commissioner for 
Human Rights on the situation of human rights in Afghanistan and on the 
achievements of technical assistance in the field of human rights, A/HRC/7/27, 27 
February 2008. 
203 Reuters, “U.N. blames all sides for Afghan civilian deaths”, 20 November 2007. 
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with international law. The Rapporteur noted that  
“[t]he international forces have procedures for vetting targets and 
selecting an appropriate method of attack [but] it is not clear that 
sufficient caution is shown in practice to ensure that attacks are not 
indiscriminate and that civilian casualties will not be excessive in 
relation to the military advantage anticipated.”204 
The UN Secretary General relayed the concerns voiced by the UN 
agencies in Afghanistan in its reports to the UN General Assembly. In 
various occasions he pointed towards ISAF and other pro-government 
forces that they caused a significant percentage of the civilian casualties 
in the armed conflict.205 The Secretary General recommended that 
“[c]ivilians must be protected, not only from terrorists and insurgency, 
but also from unintended consequences of pro-Government military 
operations”.206 The Secretary General’s Special Representative has been 
active in raising this issue and seeking solutions with COMISAF.207 
Human rights organisations, such as Human Rights Watch, have 
reported on the rise in civilian casualties due to military operations 
conducted by ISAF. Human Rights Watch specifically recommended 
NATO in 2008 to “ensure air attacks comply with the legal obligation to 
take all feasible precautions to minimize harm to the civilian 
populations”.208 The ICRC has expressed similar concerns to COMISAF 
in confidential correspondence already in 2007.209 
The Afghan government called for a change in the MTA to obtain 
influence in the planning and execution of ISAF operations, but without 
result. The proposed amendments would give the Afghan government 
influence in the conduct of operations, escalation of force procedures 
and operations that have a serious impact Afghan’s personal lives 
culture, like night raids of civilian houses.210 NATO remained of the 
opinion that the MTA did not need to be changed. Instead, COMISAF 
                                                             
204 Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, 
addendum, “Mission to Afghanistan”, A/HRC/11/2/Add. 4, 6 May 2009, p. 7 
205 Report of the Secretary General, The situation in Afghanistan and its implications 
for international peace and security, para 54, A/62/345 – S/2007/555, 21 September 
2007; para 53, A/63/372 – S/2008/617, 23 September 2008; para 66, A/64/751 – 
S/2009/135, 10 March 2009; para 54, A/64/364 – S/2009/475, 22 September 2009; 
para 24, A/64/705 – S/2010/127, 10 March 2010. 
206 Report of the Secretary General, The situation in Afghanistan and its implications 
for international peace and security, A/63/372 – S/2008/617, para 68, 23 September 
2008. 
207 Report of the Secretary General, The situation in Afghanistan and its implications 
for international peace and security A/63/751 – S/2009/135, para 88, 10 March 2009. 
208 Human Rights Watch, “Troops in Contact”, airstrikes and civilian deaths in 
Afghanistan, September 2008, p. 37. 
209 Letter from the head of mission of the ICRC in Afghanistan and COMISAF of 5 
September 2007 and response from COMISAF of 20 September 2007. 
210 Letter from the Minister of National Defence to the Secretary General of NATO, 30 
August 2008. 
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issued a Tactical Directive, demanding a more cautious approach in the 
use of force.211  
In light of this more cautious approach in the Tactical Directive, the air 
strike on 4 September 2009 in the Kunduz province, causing between 
30212 to 74213 civilian deaths, came as a surprise to the ISAF commander. 
Early reports indicated that the strike to be in contravention of the 
latter directive.  
COMISAF – in conformity with Standard Operating Procedures214 – 
received reports on the strike and since there was a possibility of 
civilian casualties, convened an Initial Action Team to conduct a review 
of the incident. COMISAF stated in a press conference that he takes the 
“possible loss of life or injury to innocent Afghans very seriously”.215 The 
Initial Action Team would verify whether the PRT Commander abided 
by targeting procedures and more specifically the terms of the Tactical 
Directive.216 The investigation did focus on the abidance to international 
humanitarian law but rather on the more operational aspects, since 
TCNs retained criminal jurisdiction over their personnel.217 COMISAF 
took administrative measures by suspending the German Joint Tactical 
Air Controller, who directed the US aircraft on the targets, pending the 
ISAF investigation.218 The ISAF investigation, brought to a close in 
October 2009, concluded that there were between 30 to 40 civilians 
among the casualties. The statement by the Joint Tactical Air 
Controller to the US F-15 aircraft that there were “troops in contact” 
with insurgents was insufficiently founded. The ISAF investigative 
team concluded that both the PRT Commander and the Joint Tactical 
Air Controller operated outside ISAF directives and procedures.219  
The question arises whether COMISAF was required to take additional 
                                                             
211 COMISAF Tactical Directive, 6 July 2009, unclassified version. 
212 Bild.de, Amtlich! 30 Zivilisten wurden getötet, 13 September 2009.  
213 UNAMA Human Rights Unit, Annual report on protection of civilians in armed 
conflict, 2009, p. 18, January 2010. 
214 Standard Operating Procedure 302, CJ3 – Operational Reports and Returns, 29 
August 2007 and Standard Operating Procedure 307, I-IQ ISAF CIVCAS Battle 
Drill.  
215 Youtube.com, ISAF Commander announces investigation to Afghan people, 4 
September 2009. 
216 NATO Press release of 9 September 2009, PR# 2009-681, NATO Website: 
http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/pressreleases/2009/09/pr090908-681.html 
217 Annex A (Arrangement regarding the status of the International Security 
Assistance Force) to the Military Technical Agreement of 4 January 2002, shows 
that: “The ISAF [...] personnel [...] will under all circumstances and at all times be 
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218 ISAF Memorandum, Red Baron 20 Suspended from controlling ISAF aircraft, 4 
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219 Spiegel online, Ein deutsches Verbrechen, 1 February 2010. 
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measures beyond the investigation of the incident in Kunduz. 
International criminal law requires commanders to take all necessary 
and reasonable measures within his or her power to prevent or repress 
the commission of international crimes and to submit the matter to 
competent authorities for investigation and prosecution.220 Failing to do 
so, results in the international criminal responsibility of the NATO 
commander. Criminal responsibility of NATO personnel could 
subsequently result in the responsibility of NATO under international 
public law if the conduct constitutes a breach of an international 
obligation binding upon the Alliance and if the conduct is attributable to 
the organization. There are also other questions which deserve 
attention. For example: Should NATO be granted criminal jurisdiction 
by the TCNs, and how does the immunity granted from Afghan 
jurisdiction affect NATO’s position? These and other issues will be dealt 
with in particular in chapter 9. 
The German Military Police led a separate criminal investigation 
against the PRT Commander and the Joint Tactical Air Controller.221 
The German investigators noted that the Commander of the PRT acted 
mostly on its own behalf, without informing Regional Command North. 
Furthermore, it remained unclear for the Military Police why “battle 
damage assessment”222 was conducted several hours after the attack, 
which should have been done within two hours. At the time when the 
battle damage assessment was performed, the bodies were already 
removed. The German Ministry of Defence requested the Commander of 
Regional Command North how it was ascertained that no civilians were 
present at the fuel tankers. The Commander responded that an Afghan 
informant confirmed that the persons nearby the fuel trucks were all 
insurgents.223  
Criminal proceedings against the PRT Commander and the Joint 
Tactical Air Controller were initiated in Germany in March 2010224 for 
launching an attack, which caused excessive loss of civilian lives in 
relation to the concrete military advantage anticipated.225 The German 
                                                             
220 Article 28, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 1998, 2187 UNTS 
38544, 1 July 2002. 
221 20. Deutsches Einsatzkontingent ISAF, Undersuchungsbericht zum “Close Air 
Support KUNDUZ” vom 04.09.2009”, 9 September 2009. 
222 AAP-6, NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions, 22 March 2010, “The assessment 
of effectis resulting from the application of military action, either lethal or non-
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223 20. Deutsches Einsatzkontingent ISAF, Untersuchungsbericht zum “Close Air 
Support KUNDUZ” vom 04.09.2009”, 9 September 2009. 
224 Spiegel online, Nichtinternationaler bewaffneter Konflikt”, 15 March 2010. 
225 The relevant article in the German criminal code: “Paragraf 11 des 
Völkerstrafgesetzbuch” reflects article 51 of Protocol Additional to the Geneva 
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of 
International Armed Conflicts, 1977, 1125 UNTS 3, 8 June 1977. 
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Federal Prosecutor terminated the investigations for potential war 
crimes on grounds that there were no indications of violations of either 
international or domestic criminal law.226 
In March 2013, several survivors of the air strike initiated civil 
proceedings against the German government before the regional court 
in Bonn, Germany. The victims claimed compensation for the death of 
their family members caused by the airstrike. On 11 December 2013 the 
court rejected the claims, stating that the Commander PRT acted 
correctly.227 
The incident has had serious political consequences in Germany, but not 
due to the possible illegitimacy of the air strike, rather because of the 
failure to provide accurate information to the German parliament by 
the German Ministry of Defence and military leadership. The Minister 
of Defence subsequently resigned.228 Germany’s new Defence Minister 
announced that a new examination of the air strike would be 
undertaken.229 In the report issued on 25 October 2011, it was concluded 
that there was no breach of national or international law.230  
Besides investigations conducted by the TCN involved and ISAF, 
several human rights organisations, as well as the ICRC have issued 
reports on this incident. Amnesty International has based its findings 
on interviews with relatives of the deceased and survivors of the 
incident. It also provided a list of names of 83 people killed. No 
assessment was given on whether the principles of international 
humanitarian law were violated.231 
The ICRC reported that around 75 civilians were killed in the air strike 
and – according to the German media – concluded that the attack was 
not in conformity with standards of international humanitarian law.232 
UNAMA has announced that it would investigate the incident as well,233 
however with the exception of the Annual Report on the Protection of 
                                                             
226 German prosecution office, Generalbundesanwalt, Ermittlungsverfahren wegen des 
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Civilians in Armed Conflict of 2009, the UN made no further reference 
of any results of the intended investigation on the air strike.234 The UN 
Human Rights Council (UN HRC) lamented the lack of transparency by 
ISAF forces when investigating incidents with a high loss of civilian life 
and specifically referred to the incident in Kunduz.235 The Council 
recommended “pro-government forces [to] pursue and strengthen 
procedures in place to mitigate the impact of the conflict on the civilian 
population.”236 
Each investigation has examined the facts of the Kunduz airstrike from 
a different perspective. While the German authorities have investigated 
whether any criminal offences may have occurred, the UN HRC and 
other NGOs examined more in general breaches of international 
humanitarian and human rights law. ISAF, on the other hand, 
investigated whether the TCN has abided by NATO ROE and other 
policies of the Alliance. Similarly, the outcome of each investigation has 
had diverging consequences. The ISAF investigation has led to the 
suspension of the Joint Tactical Air Controller. The German prosecution 
has led to the cancellation of further prosecution of German military 
personnel. 
 
2.5 Case 4: Operation Unified Protector: Incidental Damage 
and Injury  
 
2.5.1 Background, Legal Framework and Command Relationships  
Uprisings against governments in the Middle-East in early 2011, also 
known as the Arab Spring, resulted in tense situations in different 
places in the region. States like Tunisia and Egypt were in the process 
of an abrupt shift of power brought about by massive demonstrations 
and civil unrest. Similar popular uprisings took place in Libya. The 
excessive amount of force against the civilian protestors taken by the 
Libyan government led by Libyan President Gaddafi shocked the 
international community.237 Fuelled by condemnations of States and 
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organizations from all over the world, the UN Security Council adopted 
resolution 1970 on the 26th of February 2011.238 This resolution 
established, among other measures, an embargo to prevent the sale, 
supply or transfer to Libya of “arms and related materiel”.239  
On the 7th of March 2011, the NAC decided to increase its surveillance 
operations in the Central Mediterranean by increasing the operation of 
NATO Airborne Warning and Control Systems aircraft (AWACS), which 
were already deployed in the region, but in support of NATO’s counter-
terrorist operation Active Endeavour240 to 24 hours a day241 in order to 
provide in situational awareness on movements in Libyan airspace. The 
next day the NAC approved SACEUR’s proposal to move ships from 
NATO’s Standing Maritime Groups to the region to boost the 
monitoring effort.242  
Seemingly unimpressed by the measures taken by the international 
community, the Libyan government continued to violently oppress its 
own population. Concerns were raised by the League of Arab States, 
which called on the UN Security Council to adopt a resolution to impose 
a no-fly zone over Libya and to establish safe areas for the Libyan 
population.243  
This call was answered by the UN Security Council through the 
adoption of Resolution 1973 on the 17th of March 2011, imposing a no-fly 
zone over Libya,244 an enforcement regime for the arms embargo,245 while 
authorizing States and organizations to take “all necessary measures, 
[...] to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of 
attack in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, including Benghazi, while 
excluding a foreign occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan 
territory.”246 The Resolution was adopted with 5 abstentions, including 
Germany, who was opposed to any military intervention in Libya.247 
Two days after the adoption of the UN Security Council resolution, 
France, the United Kingdom, the United States of America and Canada 
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– supported by various other States – commenced military operations to 
implement the three measures laid out in UN Security Council 
resolutions 1970 and 1973. Instead of a multinational coalition under 
unified command, these missions were conducted in parallel to each 
other,248 which proved to cause confusion of the leadership and prompted 
the participating nations to come with a better – unified – solution.249 
Initially, the solution – favoured by the UK and France – was sought in 
a single EU-led operation. On 11 March 2011, no consensus was 
reached at the extraordinary meeting of the European Council for a EU-
led mission, mainly because of opposition by Germany and Poland.250 
Moreover, scepticism existed among the member States of the EU 
whether the EU could lead such an operation without the US and in 
absence of a EU Operational Headquarters.251 
At the same time, SACEUR was tasked to commence “prudent 
planning” for a possible NATO-led operation to support humanitarian 
action, weapons embargo and a no-fly zone.252 But, as a consequence of 
overlapping membership with the EU, NATO was plagued with the 
same political division. In addition, Turkey opposed military 
intervention in Libya as well and France was reluctant to give NATO 
the lead, instead of the EU.253 
The NAC members managed to reach consensus on a NATO-led 
“Operation Unified Protector” on 22 March 2011. Germany did not want 
to block the decision-making at the NAC, but decided to pull its 
personnel out of the NATO AWACS surveillance activities, as well as 
two frigates. At the same time, Germany committed extra personnel to 
the AWACS operations in Afghanistan, thereby freeing up personnel of 
other nations to participate in the Libya operation.254  
Initially, NATO started to take over the responsibility to enforce the 
                                                             
248 The UK participated in the Libya operation under the name “Operation Ellamy”, 
the US under the name “Operation Odessey Dawn” (supported by Belgium, 
Denmark, Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, United Arab Emirates), France 
as “Operation Harmattan” (supported by Qatar) and Canada as “Operation Mobile”. 
249 M. Petersson, Pursuing Strategy: NATO Operations from the Gulf War to Gaddafi, 
in Dstrom, H. and Gyllensporre, D. (eds.) (2012) Pursuing strategy: NATO 
operations from the gulf war to Gaddafi, United Kingdom: Palgrave Macmillan, 
Chapter 6, 2012. 
250 Engberg, K. (2015) The EU and military operations: A comparative analysis, 
United Kingdom: Routledge, chapter 8.2 “The Non-Case of Libya 2011”, 2013. 
251 Engberg, K. (2015) The EU and military operations: A comparative analysis, 
United Kingdom: Routledge, chapter 8.2 “The Non-Case of Libya 2011”, 2013. 
252 NATO, Press Briefing by NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen 
preceding the March NATO Defence Ministerial Meeting, 7 March 2011. 
253 Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, Turkey’s Position on the Libyan 
Revolution, March 2011. 
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arms embargo in Libya255 This decision would entail that still a parallel 
coalition operation would be conducted to enforce the other aspects of 
the UN Security Council resolutions 1970 (2011) and 1973 (2011), 
including the protection of civilians and the no-fly zone. Running two 
parallel operations would still not result in a unified strategy for the 
operations in Libya. 
A day later, the NAC decided to take over the responsibility over 
initially only the no-fly zone,256 and later257 also the protection of civilians 
under direct threat of attacks.258 The Operational Plan had three main 
military tasks: (1) the enforcement of the arms embargo, (2) the 
enforcement of the no-fly zone and (3) the protection of civilians and 
civilian centres.259 By the 31st of March 2011, NATO effectively took over 
command from the individual lead nations.  
Since the operations in Libya were already ongoing when NATO took 
over, there was little room for large deviations from the existing design 
of the military campaign plan. The main effort was to integrate 
command, recalibrate target selection and establishing a robust 
command chain.260  
The transfer of responsibilities did not entail that the participating 
States automatically transferred command and control over their forces 
and assets to NATO. A formal request by NATO to potential Troop 
Contributing Nations is required as part of the Force Generation 
Process, after which the participating nations will formally transfer 
authority over their forces. As a result of the change in command, some 
States reduced their participation, while other States joined Unified 
Protector.261  
The command structure of Operation Unified Protector was as follows: 
SACEUR commanded at the military strategic level, while Allied Joint 
Force Command Naples exercised operational command but delegated 
this authority to the Combined Joint Task Force Command OUP 
(Naples), supported by two component commands, Allied Air Command 
Izmir and Allied Maritime Command, Naples.262 Allied Air Command 
Izmir had primary responsibility over the no-fly zone and protection of 
civilians under direct threat, while Allied Maritime Command Naples 
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was primarily engaged in enforcing the arms embargo. 
18 States pledged their forces to NATO’s operation Unified Protector263 
of which four were non-NATO contributing nations (NNCN)264, totalling 
over 12.000 personnel. Under NATO’s command, 26.530 air sorties (of 
which 9710 were strike missions) were flown, over 3175 vessels were 
hailed, 296 boarded and 11 denied passage.265 
 
2.5.2 Background of the Incidents 
NATO enforced the no-fly zone, weapons embargo and protected 
civilians in Libya by means of air and maritime missions. The Alliance 
did not have any land operations in Libya, as it interpreted the UN 
Security Council’s mandate as not authorizing any presence on the 
ground.266  
The air operations attracted the most public attention. In some 
instances, strike sorties were executed in densely populated areas with 
higher risks of civilian casualties and collateral damage. These 
operations were more complicated when compared to, e.g. ISAF, as the 
aircrew could not rely on Joint Tactical Air Controllers (JTAC) that 
could provide guidance to pilots and to designate targets.267 
Notwithstanding these challenges, the vast majority of NATO airstrikes 
did not result in civilian casualties or collateral damage to civilian 
objects.268  
However, human rights organizations and the UN Human Rights 
Council claimed that airstrikes conducted on targets in Tripoli269, 
Zlitan270, Majer271 Sirte,272 Bani Walid,273 Surman,274 Gurdabiya275 resulted 
                                                             
263 Troop Contributing Nations included Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Denmark, 
France, Greece, Italy, Jordan, The Netherlands, Norway, Qatar, Romania, Spain, 
Sweden, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States. 
Www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_71652.htm.  
264 Jordan, Qatar, Sweden and the United Arab Emirates. 
265 NATO press release, 31 October 2011. 
266 Www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_71842.htm. NATO Spokesperson stated in 
an interview the following: “As I understand the UN Security Council resolution 
1973 there’s going to be no presence on the ground. The Security Council resolution 
explicitly refers to the fact that there’s going to be no foreign military intervention 
on the ground”.  
267 De Cock, C. (2012) ‘Operation unified protector: Targeting densely populated areas 
in Libya - open access library’, Military and Strategic Affairs, 4(2), p. 27.  
268 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on 
Libya, A/HRC/19/68, 2 March 2012, para. 609, p. 162. 
269 Amnesty International, The Forgotten Victims of NATO Strikes, March 2012, p. 7, 
Human Rights Watch, Unacknowledged Deaths, Civilian Casualties in NATO’s Air 
Campaign in Libya, 2012, p. 36, UN Human Rights Council, Report of the 
International Commission of Inquiry on Libya, A/HRC/19/68, 2 March 2012, Annex 
II, Correspondence from NATO to the International Commission of Inquiry on 
Libya, p. 165. 
270 Amnesty International, The Forgotten Victims of NATO Strikes, March 2012, p. 9, 
Human Rights Watch, Unacknowledged Deaths, Civilian Casualties in NATO’s Air 
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in civilian casualties and damage to civilian property.  NATO reported 
that it did not have the possibility to investigate these incidents fully 
and could therefore not verify the alleged violations of international 
humanitarian law.276  
International humanitarian law obliges parties to the conflict to take 
feasible precautions in attacks to avoid incidental loss of life, injury to 
civilians and damage to civilian objects, which would be excessive in 
relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.277 
Parties are also obliged to investigate alleged grave breaches of the 
1949 Geneva Conventions.278 Post-strike investigations are essential to 
                                                                                                                                                    
Campaign in Libya, 2012, p. 32, UN Human Rights Council, Report of the 
International Commission of Inquiry on Libya, A/HRC/19/68, 2 March 2012, Annex 
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II, Correspondence from NATO to the International Commission of Inquiry on 
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Air Campaign in Libya, 2012, p. 47, 50, UN Human Rights Council, Report of the 
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II, Correspondence from NATO to the International Commission of Inquiry on 
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273 Human Rights Watch, Unacknowledged Deaths, Civilian Casualties in NATO’s Air 
Campaign in Libya, 2012, p. 43, UN Human Rights Council, Report of the 
International Commission of Inquiry on Libya, A/HRC/19/68, 2 March 2012, Annex 
II, Correspondence from NATO to the International Commission of Inquiry on 
Libya, p. 167, 168. 
274 Human Rights Watch, Unacknowledged Deaths, Civilian Casualties in NATO’s Air 
Campaign in Libya, 2012, p. 39, UN Human Rights Council, Report of the 
International Commission of Inquiry on Libya, A/HRC/19/68, 2 March 2012, Annex 
II, Correspondence from NATO to the International Commission of Inquiry on 
Libya, p. 167. 
275 Human Rights Watch, Unacknowledged Deaths, Civilian Casualties in NATO’s Air 
Campaign in Libya, 2012, p. 53. 
276 NATO, Office of the Legal Adviser, OLA(2012)006, letter to the UN Human Rights 
Council’s International Commission of Inquiry on Libya, 23 January 2012, p. 4, 
“NATO had no ground observers in Libya, and had no ability during the campaign 
to assess the effects of its strikes on the ground”. Similarly, Amnesty International 
concluded that NATO did not investigate the conduct of NATO’s own forces, nor 
contacted the survivors o relatives of those killed in NATO strikes, as it had “no 
mandate to conduct any activities in Libya following OUP’s (Operation Unified 
Protector) termination on 31 October 2011”, Amnesty International, The Forgotten 
Victims of NATO Strikes, March 2012, p. 18.  
277 Article 57, Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and 
relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, 1977, 1125 
UNTS 3, 8 June 1977. 
278 Article 49 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded 
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fulfil this obligation.  
Launching attacks in the knowledge that such attacks will cause 
excessive incidental loss of life, injury to civilians and damage to 
civilian property, which would clearly be excessive in relation to the 
concrete and direct military advantage anticipated constitutes a war 
crime under Article 7 of the ICC Statute. 
NATO did assess the effects caused by the air strikes279, but these 
assessments were not primarily aimed to investigate alleged violations 
of international humanitarian law. The Alliance could therefore not 
provide conclusive answers to the allegations of violations of 
international humanitarian law by the UN Human Rights Commission 
or Amnesty International.  
 
2.5.3 Reaction by NATO, TCNs and / or Others 
Several human rights organizations have expressed their concern over 
the airstrikes conducted by NATO. Human Rights Watch investigated 
eight airstrikes, which resulted in civilian casualties and damage to 
civilian property.280 It interviewed witnesses, examined the sites and 
inquired NATO on the military nature of the target, but could not come 
to conclusive statements on the legality of the targets. Hence, Human 
Rights Watch recommended NATO, its Troop Contributing Nations and 
the Libyan government to investigate further the allegations of 
breaches of International Humanitarian Law.281 
Amnesty International expressed similar concerns and came to the 
same conclusions. After having examined the consequences of five 
airstrikes in Libya, it stated that NATO members had the responsibility 
to redress any violations of International Humanitarian Law that its 
forces have committed, and to pay compensation to the victims as 
required by Article 91 of First Protocol Additional to the Geneva 
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of 
Victims of International Armed Conflicts, 8 June 1977.282 According to 
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12 August 1949, Article 50 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the 
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(Geneva Convention II), 1949, 75 UNTS 85, 12 August 1949, article 129 Geneva 
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1949, 75 UNTS 135, 12 August 1949 and article 146 Geneva Convention Relative to 
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279 So-called “battle damage assessments”. 
280 Human Rights Watch, Unacknowledged Deaths, Civilian Casualties in NATO’s Air 
Campaign in Libya, 2012.  
281 Human Rights Watch, Unacknowledged Deaths, Civilian Casualties in NATO’s Air 
Campaign in Libya, 2012, p. 16. 
282 “A Party to the conflict which violates the provisions of the Conventions or of this 
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Amnesty International, “NATO cannot fulfil this obligation without 
properly investigating attacks in which civilians were killed or 
injured.”283 It also called upon NATO to ensure that investigations are 
conducted into any allegations of civilian casualties in NATO strikes 
and possible violations of international law by participants in Operation 
Unified Protector. 
The UN Human Rights Council ordered an investigation of the eight 
incidents, some of which have been also to the interest of Human Rights 
Watch and Amnesty International.284 The UN Human Rights Council 
dispatched an independent, international commission of inquiry on 25 
February 2011, with the mandate to “investigate all alleged violations of 
international human rights law in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 
establish the facts and circumstances of such violations and of the 
crimes perpetrated and where possible, to identify those responsible, to 
make recommendations, in particular on accountability measures, all 
with a view to ensuring that those individuals responsible are held 
accountable.285 The Commission also considered events within the 
context of international criminal law, in light of the UN Security 
Council’s referral of events in Libya to the International Criminal 
Court. The UN Human Rights Council finalised its initial report on 15 
June 2011.  
The Commission of Inquiry’s investigation focused on possible violations 
of international humanitarian law.286 It examined whether during the 
operation, NATO adhered to the principles of distinction, 
proportionality, precautions, humanity and military necessity.287 This 
raises the question whether NATO has obligations contained in 
international humanitarian law, as apparently, the UN Commission of 
Inquiry seems to affirm. This question is examined in chapter 6. 
Similar to Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International, the 
Commission of Inquiry could not come to conclusive statements on the 
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285 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on 
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International Commission of Inquiry on Libya, p. 163, para. 613. 
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nature of the targets that resulted in civilian casualties and damage to 
civilian property, nor could it conclude whether NATO had taken all 
necessary precautions to avoid civilian casualties entirely.288 The 
Commission therefore recommended that NATO conducts investigations 
in Libya to determine the level of civilian casualties, and review the 
effectiveness of the procedures used during the operation.289 
Interestingly, the Commission raised its concerns directly with NATO. 
If the Commission sees NATO as the addressee for concerns regarding 
possible violations of international humanitarian law, it apparently 
considers it an entity with separate legal status from its member States 
and raises the question whether NATO does actually possess 
international legal personality. This assertion is examined in Chapter 5. 
Moreover, since the UN Commission solely addressed its concerns to 
NATO and not to the individual Troop Contributing Nations, the 
question is posed here whether the conduct should be attributed to the 
nations instead of NATO or whether it would be possible to attribute 
alleged wrongful conduct to both NATO and States. This question is 
examined in Chapter 7. 
NATO responded to all three of the abovementioned organizations on 
the questions relating to the airstrikes. In its response to the UN 
Commission of Inquiry, the Alliance stated that it conducted a generic 
‘battle damage assessment’ of the airstrikes, but could not conduct an 
investigation on the ground, due to the interpreted limitations in the 
mandate given by the UN Security Council.290 Additionally, it held that 
the Libyan government (i.e. the National Transitional Council) had the 
primary responsibility for responding to any possible request for 
investigations or claims.291 
The Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court also conducted an 
investigation on the conduct of NATO on the basis of the referral by the 
UN Security Council292 and in accordance with Article 13(b) of its 
Statute.293 On 2 November 2011, the Prosecutor informed the UN 
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Security Council that there were allegations of crimes committed by 
NATO forces and that they would be examined accordingly.294 The 
Prosecutor focused on the allegations of crimes against humanity 
(Article 7 of the ICC Statute) and of war crimes, in particular when 
committed as part of a plan or policy or as part of large-scale 
commission of such crimes (Article 8 of the ICC Statute).295 It noted that 
“[i]n relation to the overall direction of Operation Unified Protector 
(OUP) exercised by NATO’s supreme decision-making authority, the 
North Atlantic Council, the Office has no information to suggest that 
the North Atlantic Council authorized the launching of strikes in the 
knowledge that such attacks would cause incidental loss of life or injury 
to civilians or damage to civilian objects which would be clearly 
excessive in relation to the concrete and direct overall military 
advantage anticipated”296, nor was the Office of the Prosecutor aware of 
any information that such strikes would have been directed by the 
Combined Joint Task Force OUP, which operationally commanded 
OUP.297 
 
2.6 Final Observations 
 
This chapter described four cases to illustrate the relevance of the topic 
of this thesis, to provide practical examples of the responsibility of 
NATO during its operations and to make the issue of NATO’s 
responsibility more concrete.  
As presented in these cases, some non-governmental organizations – 
including Amnesty International, British Columbia Civil Liberties 
Association, the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission and 
Human Rights Watch – considered NATO responsible for violations of 
international law by its personnel deployed in NATO operations. 
NATO’s responsibility has also been investigated by agencies of 
international organizations, such as the UN Human Rights Council in 
the case of Operation Unified Protector. As will be examined further on, 
States – including NATO member States themselves – have examined 
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or alluded to the responsibility of NATO during its operations. This 
shows that non-governmental organizations, international 
organizations and States consider NATO as an entity under 
international law that can be held responsible for violations of 
international law. 
The cases intend to provide examples of situations in which NATO’s 
responsibility could be invoked. The description of the position, role and 
status of NATO, as well as its command structure during the operations 
should help in drawing conclusions, on responsibility which NATO can 
incur in its operations. The elements of these cases are of relevance for 
the discussion, further in this thesis, on the international legal 
personality of NATO, its obligations under international law and 
attribution of conduct of NATO personnel to the Alliance.  
Finally, the cases are linked to the rest of the thesis. When examining 
the international legal personality of NATO, for instance, the case 
relating to Operation Unified Protector will be referred to as a practical 
example in which the UN Human Rights Council addresses NATO as a 
separate entity from its member States. In the discussion on 
international obligations, a link is made with the cases relating to the 
detention of individuals and Kunduz-incident during the ISAF-
operation which relate to obligations under international humanitarian 
law. As per the discussion on the responsibility of NATO for criminal 
conduct in Chapter 8, the case relating to human trafficking and forced 
prostitution in Kosovo as well as the Kunduz incident is referred to.  
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Overview of the Key Moments in the Development of 
NATO 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter provides a historical overview of the most important 
events that have shaped the Alliance into the organization it is today. 
The chapter serves to provide a better understanding of NATO’s 
functions, legal framework and objectives. A reading of NATO’s 
constituent document alone would not be sufficient to understand the 
Alliance’ tasks that it currently undertakes and organization that it 
currently requires. A brief analysis of historical events is therefore 
required. 
More specifically, the chapter examines whether the organization has 
evolved to such an extent that the Alliance should be regarded as an 
autonomous actor in its own right and distinct from the policies of its 
member States. Such an examination is relevant to the question 
whether NATO has international legal personality,298 which is pivotal to 
whether NATO can be held responsible under international public law.  
The chapter is divided into two parts separated by a key historical 
milestone that influenced the course of action for NATO: the end of the 
Cold War. The first part of this chapter will outline the establishment of 
the Alliance and its purpose to counter the threat coming from the 
Soviet Union. During this period, NATO was often described as a static 
alliance of individual nations that convened into a common military 
strategy against the Warsaw Pact. With the fall of the Berlin Wall in 
1989, this strategy came to an end as well and NATO needed to realign 
itself in order to remain relevant.  
The end of the Cold War introduced a new era for NATO in which it 
reinvented itself into a flexible organization capable of deploying 
military forces far from NATO territory. Paragraph 3.3 examines the 
transformation that the Alliance has gone through and discusses the 
differences between NATO version “1.0” and “2.0”.299 The last paragraph 
of this chapter will provide observations and conclusions. 
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3.2 NATO from 1949 until 1989 
 
One of the motives for the United States of America and Western 
Europe to create a system of collective defence was the perceived threat 
coming from the Soviet Union and the ideological aims of the Soviet 
Communist Party.300 The Western European nations and the United 
States sought ways to restrain the expansionist movement by the USSR 
evidenced by the occupation of the Baltic States during the Second 
World War and the direct threats against the sovereignty of Norway, 
Greece, Turkey and other European countries in the period of 1947 to 
1949. In particular, the covert backing from the Soviet Union of the 
coup d’état by the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia in 1948 and the 
illegal blockade of Berlin in the same year gave significant impetus to 
the USA and western European countries to develop a common defence 
system. Although the United Nations’ Charter explicitly prohibits the 
use of force between States, many Western countries felt that eventual 
appeals for respect of the UN Charter would not guarantee national 
sovereignty and independence of democratic States when faced with a 
threat like that of the Soviet Union.  
A collective security system was necessary against a two-fold threat: the 
renewal by Germany of a policy of aggression and the possible invasion 
of Europe by the Soviet Union. For this purpose, the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization was established. NATO, founded by twelve States 
on the 4th of April 1949301, was aimed at safeguarding the freedom of the 
NATO community302 by acting collectively in self-defence against an 
armed attack against one or more on the territory of a NATO member 
State.303  
NATO’s raison d’être is explained in a mere fourteen Articles in the 
North Atlantic Treaty. The size reflects the practical resolution and the 
idealism of the founding nations to confront the threat at the time posed 
by the USSR.304 The cornerstone of NATO is its collective defence 
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mechanism is contained in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. 
The Treaty acknowledged that any decision to use force by its member 
States would be taken in accordance with the provisions of the United 
Nations Charter. In fact, the Treaty makes reference to the Charter no 
less than nine times; emphasizing the primary responsibility of the UN 
for the maintenance of international peace and security.  
Once NATO was established, the members set out how the goals of the 
Alliance would be achieved. The first strategic document issued by the 
North Atlantic Council in 1949 became known as “The Strategic 
Concept for the Defence of the North Atlantic Area” (DC 6/1).305 The 
document had two main topics. First, an emphasis was put on the re-
strengthening of European military capacity. Secondly, since the USSR 
had far outnumbered the Alliance’s military power and it would take 
years before the European allies would match those numbers, plans 
were drawn up on the use of thermonuclear weapons to compensate for 
the numerical inferiority.306 At this time NATO mostly functioned as 
vehicle of military assistance – in the form of monetary aid – by the US 
to European allies. The Alliance was more a promise by the US of 
assurance and assistance to Europe rather than an institutionalised 
organization. 
The first Strategic Concept didn’t last long. The North Korean invasion 
of South Korea in 1950 grew fears that such communist expansion could 
occur in Europe as well. It was recognized that Western European 
forces were too loosely organized in the NATO structure. Structural 
changes were necessary if the European allies were to be able to 
withstand a Soviet invasion. A process started that resulted in a 
increase in defence efforts, deployment of US forces in Europe and 
rearmament of Germany.307 Institutional changes were made to NATO, 
including the establishment the Supreme Allied Command Europe 
(SACEUR) integrating all European military forces under one 
command. In wartime, SACEUR would assume command over all allied 
forces in Western Europe. The new structure led to a new Strategic 
Concept – MC 3/5.308 Prior to that, there was neither a headquarters 
structure nor an overall commander that could provide in the vital 
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element of integrated command and control. Even in the new command 
structure, military forces were commanded by national authorities, but 
the new structure changed the Alliance from a loosely political alliance 
into a North Atlantic Treaty Organization with an elaborate political 
and military structure.309 The new structure, in which SACEUR has 
unified command over European military forces, is the start of a 
development showing the transformation from an Alliance of member 
States towards a separate entity with international legal personality. 
As some authors noted: it had put the “O” in NATO.310 Early literature is 
generally pessimistic on the achievements on the institutional change of 
NATO from 1949 to 1989.311 However, the establishment of SACEUR 
spurred the institutionalization of NATO in such a way that it could act 
on its own initiatives.312 
To which extent SACEUR has gained separate powers and purposes 
from the member States is examined in detail in Chapter 4 on the 
institutional framework of NATO. SACEUR commanded military forces 
in Europe. In 1951 two new organs were created: Supreme Allied 
Commander Atlantic (SACLANT) commanding forces in the United 
States and Commander in Chief Channel (CINCHAN), commanding 
forces in the (English) Channel.  
 
 
 
Figure 1, NATO's Command Structure 1951-1991 
 
The crisis in 1956 between France and the UK on one side and Egypt on 
the other regarding the blockade of the Suez Canal led to a 
reconsideration of the Strategic Concept. France requested, “to include 
sections dealing with the effects upon NATO of Soviet political and 
economic activities outside the NATO area.”313 In a political directive of 
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the NAC, two conclusions were drawn: not all cases of aggression by the 
USSR would necessarily lead to the use of nuclear weapons;314 
conventional forces would deal with incursions, infiltration and hostile 
acts. Secondly – reflecting on the Suez crisis – NATO’s defence planning 
would need to take into account developments outside its North-Atlantic 
area. The conclusions were implemented in MC 14/2. While recognizing 
that NATO military authorities have no responsibilities or authority 
except with respect to incidents covered by Article of the Treaty, they 
would need to take into account the dangers that may arise from crises 
as the abovementioned.315 
The final change to the strategic plans of NATO before the end of the 
Cold War was MC 14/3 of 1968.316 The advent of Russian long-range 
bombers and the successful developments in space aviation brought the 
US’ territory into the reach of Russian nuclear weapons. The US 
subsequently sought to avoid an all-out nuclear weapons exchange and 
probed the NATO allies in changing the strategic policy of “massive 
retaliation”. The US already implemented certain plans with regard to 
Berlin to de-escalate situations. The new proposed strategy included 
more flexibility in the use of nuclear weapons. The French government 
opposed the proposals of the US, as it went too far from the original idea 
of massive retaliation. If France had not withdrawn as a member of the 
NAC, the strategy would likely not have been accepted. The Strategic 
Concept MC/14/3 of 1968 remained in place until after the fall of the 
Berlin Wall in 1989 and the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact in 1991. 
These developments resulted into drastic changes in NATO’s strategic 
thinking. The Strategic Concept of 1991 started to part from the original 
idea of the founders of NATO, which was oriented against a threat from 
the Eastern Bloc. It also was the prelude to a change into a more distinct 
role for NATO than it has been during the Cold War Period. NATO was 
shifting away from a pact between member States to defend each other in 
case of an armed attack to a vehicle capable of undertaking much broader 
functions, powers and decision-making structure.  
 
 
3.3 NATO in the Period after the Cold War 
 
The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the gradual dissolution of the 
Soviet Union from 1990 to 1991 led initially to the thought that NATO’s 
                                                                                                                                                    
http://www.nato.int/archives/strategy.htm (Accessed: 12 May 2016), p. XIX. 
314 CM(56)138, 13 December 1956. 
315 Overall Strategic Concept for the Defense of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization Area, MC 14/2 23 May 1957, para. 22. 
316 Overall Strategic Concept for the Defense of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization Area, MC 14/3 16 January 1968. 
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raison d’être would seize to exist. The members nevertheless believed 
that NATO could continue to be of use in maintaining security in the 
North-Atlantic area. 
During the London summit in July 1990, a new strategic direction of 
NATO was discussed.317 The members summed up a range of changes 
that could guarantee NATO’s continuity, which led to the promulgation 
of the New Strategic Concept of 1991.318 One change – which is of 
particular importance here – was the shift of focus in possible threats 
facing the Alliance’ security.319 The 1991 Strategic Concept committed 
itself to a broad approach to stability and security. For the first time it 
addressed the security threats beyond the NATO area as defined by 
Article 6 of the Washington Treaty. The Strategic Concept of 1991 
envisioned contingencies that might occur outside NATO’s member 
States’ territory. The Alliance noted that security couldn’t be guaranteed 
if it would not take the global context into account. The “proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction, disruption of the flow of vital resources 
and actions of terrorism and sabotage” could all take place well beyond 
NATO’s borders, but with an impact on the security of Alliance.320 The 
1991 Strategic Concept identified security challenges and risks coming 
from mainly countries in Central and Eastern Europe, due to “serious 
economic, social and political difficulties, including ethnic rivalries and 
territorial disputes”.321 This served as a basis for peacekeeping and joint 
crisis management operations.  
This change meant that NATO could be involved in tasks not purely 
related to Article 5 collective self-defence operations. Due to the political 
sensitivity of the topic at the time, no consensus could be reached to 
include “non-article 5 crisis response operations” as a new task in the 
1991 Strategic Concept.322 Despite the omitted reference in the 1991 
                                                             
317 Declaration on a Transformed North Alliance issued by the Heads of State and 
Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council (“The 
London Declaration”), 6 July 1990. 
318 The Alliance’s New Strategic Concept agreed by the Heads of State and 
Government participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, 7-8 
November 1991. 
319 Another important change was that NATO would cooperate with the countries of 
Central and Eastern Europe, through a Partnership for Peace Program (PfP), 
NATO’s Ministerial Communiqué; Partnership with the Countries of Central and 
Eastern Europe – 6-7 June 1991. 
320 The Alliance’s New Strategic Concept agreed by the Heads of State and 
Government participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, 7-8 
November 1991, para. 12. 
321 The Alliance’s New Strategic Concept agreed by the Heads of State and 
Government participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, 7-8 
November 1991, para. 9. 
322 At the signing of the Washington Treaty, these contingencies that might occur 
outside NATO’s borders would not lead to any obligation of the NATO member 
States to assist one another. Article 5 and 6 state that only in case of an armed 
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Strategic Concept, certain Alliance members remained convinced that 
“if NATO does not address the primary security challenges facing 
Europe today, it will become increasingly irrelevant. NATO must go out 
of area or it will go out of business.”323  
The shift in focus introduced by the 1991 Strategic Concept is 
significant to the topic of this thesis, because it sets in motion several 
changes in the military planning procedures resulting in NATO 
functioning more independently from its members and, hence, 
developed towards an international legal subject.  
The 1991 Strategic Concept required NATO to be prepared to respond to 
a variety of contingencies. During the Cold War, the Alliance was 
focussed on one adversary, requiring a single military plan and military 
forces on stand-by. Planners at the member States’ Ministries of 
Defence contributed to and developed a single war plan which was 
approved by the NAC and to which member States assigned forces in 
case the plan would be executed. They also agreed on several alarm 
plans that spelled out the conditions under which they would transfer 
their operational command of assigned forces to allied commanders.324 
These pre-delegation procedures, however, would not meet the 
requirements of the post-Cold War security environment. The planning 
of operations, the committal by Member States to contribute their forces 
to a mission and the transfer of authority over these forces to SACEUR 
would need to take place on a more ad hoc basis and more frequently. 
Planning shifted away from national Defence planners to the NATO 
Command Structure, which was able to produce on an ad hoc basis 
operational plans for a variety of operations. The influence and role that 
the member States had in the planning of operations and the 
identification of capabilities and resources was hence significantly 
reduced. These measures effectively resulted in that NATO would 
acquire a more distinct role from the member States. The changes in 
                                                                                                                                                    
attack on the territory of a member State in Europe and North America (and on 
forces in or over the Mediterranean Sea or the North Atlantic area north of the 
Tropic of Cancer) would result in an obligation for the other member States to 
assist in the collective self-defence. Even at the time certain member States had 
vested interests outside of the territory specified in article 6 –France in Indochina, 
Britain at Suez and America in Vietnam – these interests were not guaranteed by 
the provisions of the NATO constituent treaty. With the advent of the 1991 
Strategic Concept, the possibility to intervene in situations that pose a threat to the 
Alliance’ security became a possibility. In these – later so-called – non-article 5 
operations, the geographical limitations set by article 6 would not apply. The 
expansion to “out-of-area” operations was politically sensitive. Thies, W.J. (2009) 
Why NATO endures. New York: Cambridge University Press, p. 202. 
323 Asmus, R.D., Kugler, R.L. and Larrabee, F.S. (1993) ‘Building a New NATO’, 
Foreign Affairs, 72(4), p. 28. 
324 Chr. Tuschhoff, The Impact of NATO’s Defence Planning and Force Generation on 
Member States, in Mayer, S. (ed.) (2014) NATO’s post-cold war politics: The 
changing provision of security, United Kingdom: Palgrave Macmillan, Chapter 11.  
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operational planning was put to the test almost immediately. 
When at the beginning of the 1990s, the Socialist Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia started to disintegrate and a multi-ethnic conflict emerged, 
NATO saw itself for the first time operating outside the member States’ 
territory and outside the traditional tasks mentioned in the Washington 
Treaty. As the events rapidly succeeded each other, NATO was forced to 
go beyond merely portraying its capabilities. NATO had never fired a 
shot until the 28th of February 1994 when it took down four Bosnian-
Serb military aircraft in support of the implementation of a “no-fly 
zone” over Bosnia.325  
In 1992, NATO assisted the UN with various minor operations, 
including the enforcement of a naval embargo326, a no-fly zone over 
Bosnia-Herzegovina327 and close air support to the United Nations 
Protection Force (UNPROFOR). 328 The – then still young – relationship 
between the UN and NATO led sometimes to unworkable situations. 
Illustrative was the so-called “dual key” arrangement for approval for 
air strikes in support of UNPROFOR. Close air support could only be 
provided when both organizations – NATO and the UN – agreed.329 The 
result was that many air strikes were delayed due to different 
perceptions between the two organizations. By the end of 1995, the 
crisis in Yugoslavia had developed into a massacre where more than 
250.000 people already were killed. 
NATO took decisive action after the genocide of Srebrenica.330 When the 
UN withdrew its forces to safe areas, NATO unilaterally started air 
strikes for eleven days on Bosnian-Serb military facilities331, without the 
previously mentioned UN-NATO dual-key authorization.332 The air 
                                                             
325 Operation “Deny Flight”, 12 April 1993 until 20 December 1995. 
326 Operation “Maritime Monitor”, started 16 July 1992 based on UNSCR 713 and 715, 
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327 Operation “Sky Monitor”, started 16 October 1992 and was based on UNSCR 781 
(1992). 
328 United Nations Security Council resolution 836 (1993), 4 June 1993. 
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Although the North Atlantic Treaty makes no reference to article 52 of the UN 
Charter nor does NATO consider itself as a regional organization, the UN considers 
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days (29 August 1995 until 14 September 1995), the operation started from 30 
August 1995 until 20 September 1995. 
332 Gazzini, T. (2006) The changing rules on the use of force in international law, 
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strikes had a significant contribution in ending the hostilities and 
concluding the Dayton Peace Accords,333 but also resulted in the collapse 
of the UN-NATO operational relationship. NATO would not let the UN 
anymore dictate its rules of engagement of the operation or veto its 
action. The relationship between the two organizations became more of 
a coordinating- rather than joint decision-making arrangement.334 The 
fact that the UN would not exercise joint command and control over 
NATO’s operations anymore is relevant in respect to questions of 
attribution of wrongful conduct, which will be analysed more closely in 
chapter 7 of this thesis. NATO’s preferred model for cooperation with 
the UN henceforth became a strict separation of military and civilian 
responsibilities.335 
The 1991 Strategic Concept did not explicitly include the type of 
operations that the Alliance was conducting in the Balkans. The fact 
that, by 1992, the Alliance was conducting “out-of-area, non-article 5 
crisis response operations” pressed the NATO member States to adjust 
the Strategic Concept to the new situation. On 24 April 1999, the NAC 
approved a revised Strategic Concept that, among other changes, 
explicitly introduced crisis-management operations or so-called “non-
article 5 crisis response operations”.336 As the name “non-article 5” 
suggests, the task does not find reference in the provisions of the 1949 
Washington Treaty. 
There has been academic337 and political debate338 whether the new tasks 
                                                                                                                                                    
United Kingdom: Manchester University Press, p. 70 “The changes in the 
procedural arrangements, and in particular the abandonment of the so-called dual-
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334 R. Blermann, NATO’s Troubled Relations with Partner Organizations: A Resource-
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335 Harsch, M.F. (2015) The power of dependence: NATO-UN cooperation in crisis 
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336 The Alliance’s Strategic Concept, approved by the Heads of State and Government 
participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Washington D.C., 24 
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337 Simma, B. (1999) ‘NATO, the UN and the use of force: Legal aspects’, European 
Journal of International Law, 10(1), pp. 1–22. doi: 10.1093/ejil/10.1.1, p. 18. 
Gazzini, T. (2001) ‘NATO coercive military activities in the Yugoslav crisis (1992–
1999)’, European Journal of International Law, 12(3), pp. 391–436. doi: 
10.1093/ejil/12.3.391, p. 413-414. Gazzini argues that the text of the 1999 Strategic 
Concept is vague and does not create any legally binding obligation. Therefore, a 
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in the 1999 Strategic Concept constituted an amendment of the 1949 
Washington Treaty and whether the Strategic Concept required 
parliamentary approval.339 The view held here is that the 1949 
Washington Treaty is open-worded, allowing the NAC to adapt the 
Alliance to the new security environment and to introduce new 
functions in accordance with its aims.340 The Washington Treaty is a 
starting point, from where through decisions of the NAC the 
organization grows.341 In the words of the German Constitutional Court, 
the changes made by the NAC are ”understood as a further 
development and a concretisation of the open wording of the NATO 
Treaty”.342 It is relevant, however, to note that the Strategic Concept did 
not introduce new changes. Rather the 1999 Strategic Concept 
“summarizes and formalizes a string of ministerial communiqués and 
lesser decisions that have emerged since the last Strategic Concept”. 343 
The changes were already set in motion by the time that the NAC 
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adopted the 1999 Strategic Concept.344 This underlines the volonté 
distincte of NATO – and the existence of international legal personality 
– by taking decisions that can be separated from the will of the member 
States. 
The 1999 Strategic Concept did not answer some of the poignant 
questions that remained after the operations in the Balkans. One of 
those questions was whether Operation Allied Force set a precedent for 
NATO to operate without an explicit UN mandate.345 Several scholars 
view that the military intervention did not have a legal basis in 
international law and hence violated the provisions of the UN Charter 
on the prohibition of inter-State use of force. Operation Allied Force 
resulted in a claim submitted by the former Yugoslav Republic against 
the members of the Alliance for, inter alia, an alleged breach of the 
obligation not to intervene in the internal affairs of another State, 
contained in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter.346 An important observation 
for this thesis is that the respondent NATO member States argued that 
if there was a case of a breach of the UN Charter, the breach should be 
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for which they are empowered to – i.e. the principle of attribution, J. Klabbers, An 
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and the use of force: Legal aspects’, European Journal of International Law, 10(1), 
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attributed to NATO and not to the individual member States.347 This 
observation will be further examined in Chapter 5 regarding the 
practice of member States regarding the international legal personality 
of the Alliance. Irrespective of whether Operation Allied Force 
constituted a breach of an obligation of the UN Charter, many of the 
member States agreed that NATO’s legitimacy of using force in non-
article 5 operations should stem from an explicit mandate from the UN 
Security Council.348 
The 1999 Strategic Concept left the possibility open for NATO to act 
globally and did not restrict it to the Euro-Atlantic region. The Concept 
refers to threats affecting the Euro-Atlantic area. For this reason, the 
Alliance is determined “to shape its security environment and enhance 
the peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area” and must “also take 
account of the global context”. The risks include for instance terrorism, 
sabotage and organized crime.  
The events on 11 September 2001 proved the prediction in the 1999 
Strategic Concept correct. This time the Alliance acted with more 
coherence than in the 1990s during the Yugoslav crisis. The Al Qaida 
terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 on US’ territory destroyed 
several landmark buildings, among those the Twin Towers in New York. 
Within hours after the terrorist attacks, the North Atlantic Council 
unanimously condemned the attacks, pledged its assistance and 
support, and determined that the attack consisted of an action covered 
by Article 5 of the Treaty.349 The debate on whether NATO would or 
would not operate out of its Euro-Atlantic area ended, in the words of 
the French Ambassador to NATO: “with the collapse of the twin towers”. 
The expectation was that NATO would be an integral part of the 
military response in Afghanistan. However, the US preferred to pursue 
its right to self-defence only with a select group of capable allies.350 
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Ultimately, NATO became involved in Afghanistan but not as a result of 
the invocation of Article 5. In August 2003, NATO took the lead over the 
peace support operation “International Security Assistance Force 
(ISAF)”.351  
The “11 September” attacks had an impact on NATO in several areas. 
NATO’s enlargement plans have usually been met with strong 
opposition from Russia, especially when in 1999 NATO enlarged with 
Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic. The common interests to 
combat terrorism led Russia to reconsider its opposition to 
enlargement.352 In 2004, NATO expanded to 26 members, with the 
accession of seven Eastern-European countries; the largest expansion 
round ever.353 It also set out a transformation of NATO, envisaging a 
new role on counter-terrorism and the defence against weapons of mass 
destruction.  
The threat that terrorism posed to the Alliance deserved a new 
Strategic Concept, but the relationships within NATO were not 
conducive for such revisions.354 As late as 2009, a Group of Experts 
prepared recommendations for the formulations of the Concept of 
2010.355 The Strategic Concept 2010 outlines three tasks for the Alliance: 
Collective Defence, Crisis Management and Cooperative Security. All 
three tasks have a global and expeditionary dimension. These first two 
tasks are relevant to this thesis, because it aims at examining the 
responsibility of NATO during its military operations, which are either 
collective self-defence operations or crisis response operations. The 1999 
Strategic Concept formalised NATO non-article 5 crisis response 
operations and, with the advent of the 2010 Strategic Concept, the 
interests of NATO to conduct military operations are global as long as 
there is a threat against the security of the member States. Whereas 
the 1991 and 1999 Concepts related to threats and attacks against ‘the 
territory of the Alliance’, these references have been completely 
removed in the 2010 Concept.356  
The traumatic experience of NATO in conducting crisis management 
operations in Kosovo and Afghanistan has not led to a decision to 
abandon the task of non-article 5 crisis response operations. On the 
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contrary, the 2010 Strategic Concept elevated crisis management to a 
core task, next to collective security and cooperation. Lessons learned 
from past operations were also drawn in the Strategic Concept; NATO 
now commits to a more comprehensive approach in crisis management 
operations, integrating politics, security, development, rule of law, 
human rights and humanitarian dimensions in cooperation with 
humanitarian actors, the UN, EU and other players in international 
missions. 
The tension in the consensus decision-making process by NATO’s has 
not been diminished. The greater number of operations and the 
expansion of member States to 28 call for greater commitment of the 
members when embarking on new missions. The Group of Experts for 
the 2010 Strategic Concept recommended changes for streamlining the 
decision-making process, including proposals to give the Secretary 
General or NATO military leaders more authority to respond in 
emergency situation and to consider that only fundamental decisions 
should be submitted for decision based on consensus by the NAC.357 
These tools and processes move the operation from national autonomy 
to an institutionally-driven operation. NATO itself now generates 
necessary incentives for member States to agree on collective action and 
comply with the common policies, making the Alliance more than a 
simple sum of its parts.358 Clearly, member States can politically have 
reservations to a particular mission and even opt out in contributing 
forces. This happened in the case of Operation Unified Protector, where 
Germany abstained on the vote on a UN Security Council mandate and 
withdraw its forces from the NATO Airborne Warning and Control 
System (AWACS) and the Standing NATO Maritime Group 1 (SNMG-
1).359 At the same time, Germany approved the NAC decision to initiate 
the operation and supported the mission to launch a successful mission. 
This built-in flexibility in NATO’s planning and execution of operations 
shows the evolving distinct role between NATO and its member States. 
 
3.4 Conclusions 
 
This chapter provided an overview of the key moments in the 
development of NATO. The Alliance was primarily created in 1949 as a 
trans-Atlantic collective defense mechanism. Through its sixty-five 
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years of existence, NATO adapted its strategy and institutional 
structure. NATO’s strategy changed from focusing only on collective 
self-defence to include non-article 5 crisis response operations.360 The 
Alliance’ institutional structure has been adapted to cope with the new 
strategy and be flexible and responsive to a wide range of contingencies. 
NATO has played an autonomous role in the process of adjusting 
NATO’s policies, institutional structure and strategy.361  
Two conclusions can be drawn which are of relevance to the topic of 
responsibility of NATO during its military operations. 
Firstly, the key moments in the development of NATO show that the 
Organization changed in scope and character of its activities through 
political processes without involving any formal changes in its legal 
character. This conclusion is drawn from the nature of the documents 
that have transformed and enlarge the Alliance. All of the documents 
are not legal, but military and political in nature. The member States 
did not make any formal amendments to NATO’s constituent document, 
the 1949 Washington Treaty. Moreover, during NATO’s existence, 
member States did not express any intention to strengthen the 
attributes of its legal personality. Therefore, any conclusion on whether 
NATO has international legal personality should come from a de facto 
analysis – through activities and objectives of the Organization. This 
chapter briefly touched upon some of the aspects that allude to such an 
international legal personality, which will be further elaborated upon in 
chapter 5 on the international legal personality of NATO. 
Secondly, without adopting any formal amendments of the Washington 
Treaty, NATO underwent substantial transformation into an 
organization with much broader activities both in type and scope, 
through the adopted political documents and decision-making. This 
raises the questions whether these informal changes of its constituent 
treaty have created international legal obligations for NATO and had 
impact on the development of its international legal personality. Both 
questions are of relevance for international responsibility of NATO for 
an unlawful conduct. 
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Chapter 4  
Current Institutional Framework of NATO and 
NATO’s Decision Making Process 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter describes the current institutional framework of NATO 
and the decision making process for its operations. This will provide 
further understanding in the powers of NATO and the relationship 
between NATO and the member States, which is relevant for the 
question of attribution of conduct of personnel to NATO, troop 
contributing nations or other international organizations such as the 
UN. Moreover, the overview provides also in insight on whether NATO 
is an entity separate from its member States, i.e. whether it meets the 
indicia of an international organization with international legal 
personality. The conclusions in this chapter will therefore be used 
further on in chapters 5 and 7.  
Paragraph 4.2 gives a brief outline of the various organs of the Alliance, 
their composition, tasks and their position within the NATO structure. 
The intention of providing this outline is to facilitate understanding of 
the political-military structure and how hierarchically NATO is 
organized. 
Paragraph 4.3 examines the relationship between NATO and its 
member States and NATO’s decision-making process. Since the North 
Atlantic Council (NAC) in which all the member States participate, is 
the highest political decision-making organ of NATO, it is appropriate 
to examine both the relationship between NATO and States as well as 
NATO’s decision-making process. It is important to discuss the decision-
making process in the NAC to establish to whom a wrongful act can be 
attributed: to NATO, to its member States or to both. It can also assist 
in establishing in which situations – i.e. under which conditions – 
NATO member States and / or NATO as an international organization 
will be held responsible. This paragraph will, additionally, examine the 
relationship between NATO and non-NATO member States, for the 
same reasons as indicated above and because non-member States 
regularly participate in NATO-led operations.  
The outline is followed by an analysis of the relationship between 
NATO and the UN. The choice to limit the analysis to the relationship 
between NATO and the UN is made in order to avoid an overly generic 
or exhaustive study on relationships between NATO and other 
international organizations or such organizations in general. Moreover, 
the relationship with the UN is the more straightforward choice to 
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examine as the member States made explicit reference in the 
Washington Treaty to the context and position NATO takes within the 
UN system. The context is established by referring to Article 51 of the 
UN Charter – the right to take collective action against an armed attack 
– which forms the basis for the establishment of NATO. The 
Washington Treaty also acknowledges the primary role of the UN 
Security Council in the maintenance and restoration of international 
peace and security. Moreover, since NATO relies for its non-article 5 
crisis response operations – which consist of the majority of NATO-led 
operations – on a mandate or authorization from the UN Security 
Council, the relationship between NATO and the UN is of relevance 
here. Finally, from a practical point of view, the UN is likely one of the 
most important partners of NATO. 
 
4.2 Current Institutional Framework of NATO 
 
4.2.1 Introduction 
Currently, NATO consists of two main types of institutional structures: 
a civilian structure and a military structure. The civilian structure is 
responsible for policy- and decision-making which provides for the 
functioning of the Organization both internally and externally. 
The military structure is involved in the planning and execution of 
military operations. All NATO operations are decided upon by the 
civilian structure and carried out by military structure. It means that 
both parts of NATO participate in the initiation, planning and execution 
of NATO operations. 
 
4.2.2 The Civilian Structure 
a. The North Atlantic Council  
The Washington Treaty stands out for its brevity, with a mere 14 
articles and does expand a great deal on the structure, tasks and 
responsibilities of the Alliance. The treaty establishes only one organ, 
the North Atlantic Council (NAC), and attributes the necessary powers 
to implement the treaty.362 The NAC is the highest decision-making 
organ in the Organization. The Council is composed of the 
representatives of all Member States, which holds regular meetings at 
the level of Foreign- or Defence Ministers (Ministerials), Heads of 
States (Summits) or Permanent Representatives. As such, the NAC is 
the most important organ for the member States to express their views 
and to take collective decisions on political issues of the Alliance. The 
                                                             
362 Article 9, North Atlantic Treaty 1949, 34 UNTS 243, 24 August 1949, “The Parties 
hereby establish a Council, on which each of them shall be represented to consider 
matters concerning the implementation of this Treaty”. 
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NAC is not subject to the authority of any other State or organized 
community, other than the participating States, which contributes to 
the assumption that NATO has international legal personality.363 
The Washington Treaty does not prescribe the way the Council should 
take its decisions, but the NAC adopted consensus as the standard. This 
translates to decisions being adopted without a formal voting procedure, 
provided that no member raises any formal objection.364 The decision-
making process of NATO is described more elaborately when this thesis 
examines the relationship between the member States and NATO in 
paragraph 4.3. It is relevant to note here that decision-making through 
consensus is both seen as an argument in favour365 and against366 the 
existence of international legal personality of the Alliance. Arguments 
against such personality put emphasis on the fact that NAC decisions 
are collective decisions made by its member States, which assumes that 
the NAC expresses the will of the member States, rather than the 
Organization. On the other hand, member States have a right to 
express objections that they may have and block any decision, making 
the NAC’s decisions entirely reliant on the common agreement of all 
member States, rather than that of one State. The introduction of the 
“silence procedure” and opting-out mechanism enhances the autonomy 
of the Organization – referred to later in this chapter – and alludes to 
the possibility that NATO may have a volonté distincte from its member 
States. It is held here that the consensus rule on itself is not an 
indicator of either the existence or non-existence of international legal 
personality. Rather, a more distinguishing factor is to examine in how 
far the member States retain in practice control in the decision-making 
process taken by the NAC. A final conclusion on the existence of 
international legal personality of the Alliance will be given in chapter 5.  
The Washington Treaty does not prescribe the span of topics which the 
NAC can decide upon. The Council’s authority is generally confined to 
the aim of NATO, which is to “safeguard the freedom, common heritage 
and civilization of their peoples” and to “promote stability and well-
being in the North-Atlantic Area”. In that respect, the Washington 
Treaty leaves ample room for interpretation and discretion in decision-
                                                             
363 Seyersted, F. (1964b) ‘Objective International Legal Personality of 
Intergovernmental Organizations: Do Their Capacities Really Depend upon the 
Conditions Establishing Them’, Nordisk Tidsskrift for International Ret, I(34), p. 
47. 
364 NATO Handbook, 2001.  
365 Rosen, N. (2013) ‘How Are Multinational NATO Operations Responsible for 
International Humanitarian Law Operations’, The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, 
37(3), p. 165. 
366 Gazzini, T. (2006) The changing rules on the use of force in international law. 
United Kingdom: Manchester University Press. 
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making.367 
The founders have left to the discretion of the Council to “set up such 
subsidiary bodies as may be necessary.”368 The NAC created a variety of 
subsidiary bodies, of which the most important here are the Secretary 
General, the Military Committee and the various organs of the NATO 
Command Structure. 
 
b. The Secretary General 
The Secretary General leads a unified international secretariat to assist 
the plenary organ – the NAC – and to serve as the Chairman of the 
Council.369 As such, he is the chief executive of NATO and responsible 
for promoting and directing the process of consultation and decision-
making within the Alliance.370 The Secretary General is supported by 
the International Staff, forming the so-called “civilian structure”.  
The Secretary General is also the representative for external relations. 
He maintains relationships on the level of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, 
Defense and Heads of State during the operations.371 The Secretary 
General is usually the signatory for international agreements binding 
the Alliance, e.g. the exchange of letters with the Afghan authorities 
relating to the Status of ISAF Personnel in Afghanistan.372  
 
                                                             
367 The US Deputy Secretary of State Talbott stated for instance that the Washington 
Treaty does not impose arbitrary geographical or functional limits, in Simma, B. 
(1999) ‘NATO, the UN and the use of force: Legal aspects’, European Journal of 
International Law, 10(1), pp. 1–22. doi: 10.1093/ejil/10.1.1, p. 15. Moreover, even if 
the NAC would take on topics that are beyond those that were explicitly conferred 
to in the Washington Treaty, it has always acts – primarily through the NAC – 
with the consent, acquiescence or approval of the members. Various authors, such 
as Klabbers, Engström and Kennedy, have argued that if the member States 
consent in these powers by demonstrating approval or acquiescence, these powers 
are implied to achieve the purposes for which the Alliance was set up. Klabbers, J. 
(2001) ‘The Life and Times of International Organizations’, Nordic Journal for 
International Law, 70; Engström, V., Understanding Powers of International 
Organizations, 2009, pp. 53-73; D. Kennedy, The sources of international law, 
American University International Law Review, Vol. 2:1, 1987, p. 4. Contrary: 
Kaniel, M. (1996) The exclusive treaty-making power of the European community: 
Up to the period of the single European act, The Netherlands: Wolters Kluwer Law 
& Business, p. 101. 
368 Article 9, North Atlantic Treaty 1949, 34 UNTS 243, 24 August 1949.  
369 Final Communiqué of the Ninth Session of the North Atlantic Council (“The Lisbon 
Decisions” on the reorganization of the Alliance and the appointment of a Secretary 
General), 25 February 1952. 
370 NATO Legal Deskbook, 16 January 2008, draft. 
371 E.g. Letter of the Afghan Minister of Defence to the Secretary General, dated 30 
August 2008. 
372 Exchange of letters between the NATO Secretary General and the Afghan Minister 
of Foreign Affairs, 5 September 2004 and 22 November 2004. 
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4.2.3 The Military Structure  
NATO’s military structure consists of the Military Committee, 
supported by its International Military Staff, and the NATO Command 
Structure.  
 
a. The Military Committee 
The Military Committee (MC) is composed of the highest national 
military representatives from each member State, assisting the Council 
with military expertise373 and works under the overall political authority 
of the NAC.374 It assists and advises the NAC on military matters and 
provides military guidance to the NATO Strategic Commanders of the 
NATO Command Structure (discussed below). The MC takes its 
decisions by consensus; this way full commitment is achieved in both 
the military as well as the political requirements and objectives of the 
mission. 
The MC plays an important role in the drafting of NATO strategic 
concepts and advises the Council of the military situation in countries 
were NATO is conducting operations. The role of the Chairman of the 
MC is to represent and defend the consensus-based advice to the NAC. 
The Military Committee is supported by the International Military 
Staff. 
The Committee is an essential link between the political and military 
structure of NATO. The Military Committee provides the NAC with 
military advise agreed by all Chiefs of Defence. The consensus among 
the highest military authorities of NATO represents a firm commitment 
that the operation is militarily achievable with the forces available from 
the nations. 
 
b. The NATO Command Structure 
The NATO Command Structure consists of two Strategic Commands, 
Allied Command Operations and Allied Command Transformation. In 
1950, the NAC created the Supreme Allied Commander Europe 
(SACEUR)375 and gave it the responsibility to “organize [national units 
assigned to him] into an effective integrated defence force”.376 Currently, 
SACEUR is responsible for the planning and commanding all NATO-led 
operations. He is bound by the political constraints given by the NAC, 
who maintains political oversight of operations. The command structure 
                                                             
373 Excluding Iceland, which – due to the lack of military forces – sends a civilian 
representative. 
374 The Defence Planning Committee was dissolved in June 2010 during the third 
NATO Committee Review. Its responsibilities are absorbed by the North Atlantic 
Council. 
375 Final Communiqué, 18-19 December 1950. 
376 Final Communiqué, 18-19 December 1950. 
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enables NATO to plan and execute operations while maintaining 
strategic military and political coherence throughout the chain of 
command.  
SACEUR has at his disposition various subordinate commands which 
makes up Allied Command Operations, or ACO. ACO includes two Joint 
Force Commands (JFC Brunssum and JFC Naples), which are capable 
to plan, conduct and sustain a major joint operation377 at the operational 
level. There are also three other specialised commands (Air Command, 
Land Command and Maritime Command) directly under SACEUR’s 
command, which provide support to the Joint Force Command, but are 
also able to plan, conduct and sustain a smaller joint operation by 
themselves and report directly to SACEUR.  
Supreme Allied Command Transformation has the lead role for the 
transformation of NATO’s military structure, forces, capabilities and 
doctrines in order to improve the military effectiveness of the Alliance. 
SACT does not have a specific role in commanding operations and will 
not be further examined in detail as it is not of particular relevance to 
NATO’s responsibilities during its operations. 
 
 
 
Figure 0-3; NATO's civil (blue) and military (green) structure, source: www.nato.int. JFCB 
(Joint Force Command Brunssum), JFCNP (Joint Force Command Naples), AIRCOM (Air 
Command), MARCOM (Maritime Command), LANDCOM (Land Command), CAOC (Combined 
Air Operations Command). ACT’s subordinate commands are not depicted here, neither are 
the signal battalions which have a more supporting then executive.  
                                                             
377 NATO, Ministerial Guidance MG06, quoted in Danish Institute for International 
Studies, NATO’s New Strategic Concept: A Comprehensive Assessment, 2011:02. 
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In NATO-led operations, SACEUR will appoint one of its subordinate 
headquarters to plan and execute the mission. One of the Joint Force 
Commands – in case of a smaller mission, the Maritime-, Land- or Air 
command, can establish a headquarters in the mission area that will be 
responsible for running of day-to-day operations. SACEUR will retain 
Operational Command (i.e. the authority to assign missions or tasks, to 
deploy units and to reassign forces)378 over the mission, while delegating 
Operational Control (i.e. the authority to direct forces assigned so that 
the commander may accomplish specific missions or tasks which are 
usually limited by function, time, or location) to the subordinate 
headquarters.  
 
 
Figure 2 Command and control of KFOR, ISAF and Operation Unified Protector. 
 
 
4.3 The Relationship between NATO and its Member States 
and the Decision-making Process  
 
There is considerable debate on the status of NATO in international 
law. Some view NATO as an organization independent from its 
members, capable of having a will of its own.379 Other studies consider 
NATO a trans-Atlantic forum where member States meet to discuss 
global security issues.380 As such, NATO is not capable of acting 
                                                             
378 AAP-6, NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions, 2010. 
379 Zwanenburg, M.C. (2005) Accountability of peace support operations, Netherlands: 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. 
380 Verhoeven, J. (2000) Droit international public. Larcier, p. 613. T. Gazzini, 
Personality of International Organizations, in Klabbers, J. and Wallendahl, A. 
(eds.) (2012) Research handbook on the law of international organizations, United 
Kingdom: Edward Elgar Publishing. 
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independently and would be deprived of international legal personality. 
The studies which hold the view that NATO is a forum or a mere 
Alliance of like-minded States rather than an independent international 
organization, base their arguments on the process in which member 
States take decisions in the North Atlantic Council (NAC). NATO takes 
decisions by consensus of all the member States and therefore there is 
no real autonomy of the organization. The consensus rule by itself is not 
an indicator of international legal personality. The measure by which 
the member States control the organization through this decision-
making procedure is a better indication of the existence of international 
legal personality.381 For this reason, the relationship between NATO and 
its member States and the degree in which member States control 
decisions made by NATO is examined. This chapter will focus on three 
areas, the consensus-rule in NATO’s decision making, the planning of 
operations and the contribution of forces to the Alliance. 
 
4.3.1 Consensus-rule 
NATO decisions are made by consensus, after discussion and 
consultation among member countries. 382 A decision reached by 
consensus is an agreement reached by common consent.  
It is important to differentiate between consensus and unanimity. 
Unanimity requires an actively stated vote in favour of a measure, 
which the Alliance does not seek. There is no voting at all in NATO’s 
decision-making process. Instead, decisions taken by consensus are 
reached when there is an absence of objection by any member State to a 
decision. Member States can express their objections either privately 
with the Secretary General, raise them during NAC meetings, or even 
go public with their disagreement.383 Of course, each choice comes at a 
political cost. Hence the role of the Secretary General is essential here 
to maintain the cohesion of the Alliance. To this end, the Secretary 
General may employ a tactic called the “silence-procedure”. This 
procedure allows States to reach consensus on those topics that are 
politically sensitive for some of the member States. It entails that a 
decision will be automatically passed by the NAC after a stated time 
period set by the Secretary General, unless a member State objects by 
sending a formal letter to the Secretary General thereby breaking the 
                                                             
381 White, P.N.D., Collins, R. and White, N.D. (eds.) (2010) International organizations 
and the idea of autonomy: Institutional independence in the international legal 
order, United Kingdom: Routledge, p. 68. 
382 http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49178.htm 
383 Hendrickson, R.C. (2006) Diplomacy and war at NATO: The secretary general and 
military action after the cold war, United States: University of Missouri Press, p. 
107. 
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silence.384 In some cases, the political cost for an opposing member 
State’s representative of openly being identified as blocking the decision 
may outweigh the benefit of seeing the proposed action stopped. In 
those cases, a member State may prefer not to block the decision but 
rather mitigate its concerns through caveats for its forces or to choose 
not to participate fully in the operation.  
The silence-procedure has proven useful in situations where domestic 
opposition exists in the member States for a certain military 
intervention. In Operation Allied Force, public disagreement would 
place NATO member States in a conflict before world media and would 
play in favour for President Milosevic. The silence procedure allowed 
Member States not needing to take a public position and permitted 
NATO to move forward.385 Similarly, the silence procedure provided 
Germany – which faced public opposition regarding a military 
intervention in Libya – also an opportunity to avoid to take publicly a 
position regarding the decision in favour of NATO‘s Operation Unified 
Protector.386  
The silence procedure shows that the Alliance functions even with the 
dissociation of one or more of the member States. The decision making 
procedure is not – by itself – an argument that NATO lacks autonomy 
and, hence, legal personality. As stated above, the autonomy depends on 
the degree of control that the member States exercise over the 
organization. The consensus procedure illustrates that there is no 
requirement for member States to exercise such control and thereby 
allowing the organization to enjoy a certain degree of autonomy. 
Member States are also free to choose which operations they prefer to 
participate in. In case a member State has concerns over a specific 
                                                             
384 Gallis, P. (2003) CRS report for congress NATO’s decision-making procedure 
background, available at: https://fas.org/man/crs/RS21510.pdf (Accessed: 14 May 
2016). Hendrickson, R.C. (2006) Diplomacy and war at NATO: The secretary 
general and military action after the cold war, United States: University of 
Missouri Press, p. 107, 2006. 
385 Hendrickson, R.C. (2006) Diplomacy and war at NATO: The secretary general and 
military action after the cold war, United States: University of Missouri Press, p. 
108, 2006. 
386 As a member of the UN Security Council, in the period 2011-2012, Germany 
abstained from voting for the UN Security Council resolution 1973(2011) to 
authorize a mandate to protect civilians under the threat of attack in Libya. While 
Germany did not contribute any troops to the operation, it did not withdraw 
German officers serving at the Joint Headquarters Naples responsible for the 
planning of the operation. Germany also allowed allies to use German territory as a 
logistical base for the operation. This issue is elaborated further in this chapter 
when examining the force generation process. Mayer, S. (ed.) (2014) NATO’s post-
cold war politics: The changing provision of security, United Kingdom: Palgrave 
Macmillan. 
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mission, it may decide not to participate in the mission with military 
forces and materiel while at the same time not to block any decision 
relating to the operation. 
In this regard it is also worth mentioning that in some situations, the 
States’ involvement in the decision making process is limited to the 
decision whether or not to participate with military forces, without 
having any role in the formulation of the political aspects of a mission.  
States which are not members of NATO may contribute with military 
forces to a NATO-led mission. NATO relies extensively on the 
contribution of forces from so-called “Non-NATO Contributing Nations 
(NNCN)”. These are States which are not parties to the Washington 
Treaty and are not members of NATO, but are willing to contribute 
forces to a NATO-led operation. From the earliest operations, NNCN 
have contributed to NATO operations in a substantial manner, notably 
Russia as the single largest contributor. As of September 2008, 
approximately 62,500 personnel were deployed in 5 NATO-led 
operations of which 4,300 personnel were provided by 16 NNCN.387 The 
Political Military Framework regulates the participation of NNCN in 
NATO operations. The process starts with an expression of interest by 
the NNCN in contributing to a specific NATO-led operation. 
Participation is dependent upon NAC approval, and, once approved, 
NNCN enter into technical agreements with NATO to work out 
security, technical and financial issues.388 NNCN will be consulted on all 
aspects of the operation, but do not have decision making power on e.g. 
the concept of the operation, rules of engagement and periodic mission 
reviews..389 In conclusion, NNCN do not have any political influence on 
the mission as they do not take part in the decision making process at 
the NAC. NNCN neither have command and control over their forces – 
other than the authority to redeploy into national command and 
adminstrive powers regarding their personnel (Full Command). 
Operational Command and Control normally rests with the SACEUR, 
after the transfer of authority of the NNCN. 
Even though the NAC enlarged the influence of NNCN in the 
operations they choose to participate in and are consulted and offered 
                                                             
387 NATO Parliamentary Assembly, 159 DSCFC 08 E Rev 1 – Contributions of Non-
NATO member to NATO operations, http://www.nato-pa.int/default.asp 
?SHORTCUT=1475 
388 Participation of partnership for peace countries and other partner nations in NATO 
operations are regulated by specific agreements, such as the Enhanced and More 
Operational Partnership (EMOP), Political-Military Framework for NATO-led PfP 
operations, and other documents. Decision-making, however, remains the sole 
prerogative of the NAC. 
389 NATO, Political Military Framework for Partner involvement in NATO-led 
Operations, Annex to PO(2011)0141, 13 April 2011. 
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the opportunity to put forward views on all relevant issues of the 
operations, NATO, however, retains the decision-making authority.390  
 
4.3.2 Planning Process of NATO Operations 
A second area where the specific nature of the relationship between 
NATO and the member States becomes apparent is during the 
operational planning process. 
It would be fair to conclude that NATO was effectively an instrument of 
the member States until the early 1990s. During the Cold War-period, 
the planning of operations was limited to the development of several 
regional standing defence plans against one potential aggressor. These 
plans were pre-approved by the NAC. The Defence Planning 
Committee391 set “Force goals” to which member States commit their 
forces for a period of 6 years. Member States annually reported on how 
they intended to meet these requirements.392 Overall, the decisions were 
taken at the capitals without much need of NATO’s involvement other 
than being a forum where discussions could take place. 
NATO relied on the same planning processes that existed during the 
Cold War for its first “non-article 5” operations in the early 1990s. And 
in fact, there was no real need to change the planning processes, as the 
first operations were fairly straightforward. They consisted of 
monitoring of an arms embargo (e.g. operation Maritime Monitor) or a 
no-fly zone (e.g. operation Sky Monitor). Neither, the IFOR, SFOR and 
KFOR required much involvement of NATO in the planning of the 
operation, as most of the forces were provided by a lead- or framework 
nation, which would take the responsibility for organizing the forces 
necessary in a specific sector. For instance, in implementing the Dayton 
Peace Agreement, Bosnia-Herzegovina was divided into 3 regions for 
which each a lead nation was assigned to carry out the operation.393  
The planning of ISAF and NTM-I operations was much more complex. 
These operations took place much farther away from NATO’s borders 
adding complexity in logistical planning and defence expenditure. They 
also took place in much less benign environments. Moreover, both 
operations went beyond the monitoring of a cease-fire and included 
                                                             
390 NAC, Political military framework for partner involvement in NATO-led 
operations, Annex to PO(2011)0141, 13 April 2011. 
391 The Defence Planning Committee was the former senior decision making body on 
matters relating to the integrated military structure of the Alliance. It has been 
dissolved in 2010 and its responsibilities have been absorbed by the NAC.  
392 Wendt, J.C. and Brown, N. (1986) Improving the NATO Force Planning Process, 
available at: https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/reports/2009/R3383.pdf 
(Accessed: 16 May 2016), p. 3.   
393 Multinational Division (MND) South-East, led by France, MND South-West, led by 
the UK and MND North, led by the US. 
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tasks such as counter-insurgency activities, reconstruction of civil 
infrastructure and mentoring of government officials.  
The increased complexity of the operations required a more 
sophisticated planning process than the pre-delegation model that was 
used in previous operations. In the current planning process, when 
tasked by the NAC, SACEUR will conduct a formal assessment of the 
identified crisis and will give considerations on the use of the NATO 
military instrument to assist with a situation resolution. The NAC may 
then task SACEUR to develop military response options. Subsequently, 
the NAC may decide whether SACEUR should provide a concept of 
operations within the political direction given by the Council.394 The 
member States rely heavily on the planning done by SACEUR’s staff, as 
its integrated system analysis, planning and assessment tools395, 
congregated databases on capabilities and availability of member 
States’ forces396 and doctrine397 provide planning capabilities that are not 
easily replicated in the national Ministries of Defense. 
The planning process does not alter the national autonomy of the 
member States or their ‘veto’ power at the NAC. The member States 
retain their authority to disapprove certain proposals and to halt or 
change a given course of action. However, the incremental decision-
making process and the unique planning capabilities of NATO makes it 
more difficult for member States to refuse participation on general 
grounds and discourages uncooperative behaviour.398 This observation 
leads to the conclusion that even though the member States retain 
sovereign control over NATO’s actions, the degree of control is limited 
on general political aspects of a mission and not on the specifics of each 
aspect of the operation.  
 
4.3.3 The Command and Control Relationship 
The third and the last area that is examined here with respect to the 
relationship between NATO and its member States is the command and 
control relationship. 
NATO does not have military forces assigned to the Organization 
permanently. When a mission is deemed necessary, NATO will request 
nations to contribute the required forces and materiel to the mission. 
                                                             
394 NATO, NATO’s Assessment of a crisis and development of response strategies. 
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_75565.htm?  
395 E.g. Tools for Operational Planning Functional Area Service (TOPFAS), Effective 
Visible Execution (EVE), Allied Deployment and Movement System (ADAMS), 
Coalition Reception, Staging and Onward Movement (CORSOM). 
396 E.g. Logistics Functional Area Services (LOGFAS) 
397 COPD, the Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive, version 2, 2013.  
398 Mayer, S. (ed.) (2014) NATO’s post-cold war politics: The changing provision of 
security, United Kingdom: Palgrave Macmillan, p. 203. 
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Nations will inform NATO on their contributions and transfer part of 
their authority over their forces to Alliance.399  
The degree of authority that each of the levels exercises is defined by 
the ‘command and control’ structure in place.400 ‘Command’ is the 
authority to direct, coordinate or control armed forces to achieve 
particular objectives. ‘Control’ is the authority to organize, direct and 
coordinate the activities of the forces assigned to implement orders and 
directives.  
NATO differentiates between three levels of command and control, 
ranging from (a) Full Command, (b) Operational Command and Control 
and (c) Tactical Command and Control. 
States normally retain “Full Command”, which is the authority that 
covers every aspect of military and administration. It is very uncommon 
for States to transfer Full Command to NATO or any other 
international organization or State. Full Command includes the 
authority to decide to participate in a certain mission and to withdraw 
from participation in accordance with the terms agreed to. It also 
includes the authority to take administrative and disciplinary measures 
against personnel of its own armed forces.401 As described in Chapter 2, 
the Commander of the Kosovo Force (COMKFOR) did not have the 
authority to take disciplinary measures against personnel that violated 
his order not to frequent prostitutes in Kosovo or to be engaged in the 
act of human trafficking. COMKFOR was dependent on the sending 
States to ensure that such regulations are enforceable through national 
disciplinary sanctions.402 
States that contribute forces to NATO operations normally will transfer 
“Operational Command and Control” to NATO. Operational Command 
is the authority to assign missions or tasks, to deploy units and to 
reassign forces.403 It is the authority needed to effectuate the overall 
strategic objectives of the whole operation. Operational Control is the 
authority to direct forces assigned so that the commander may 
                                                             
399 Similar to UN operations. D. Fleck, Legal Aspects of the Transfer of Authority in 
UN Peace Operations, 42 Netherlands Yearbook of International Law 2011, p. 39. 
400 Capstone Doctrine, Allied Joint Publication 01(D), Chapter 6 Command and 
Control of Operations. 
401 This authority is also referred to as Administrative Control (ADCON) and defined 
as the direction or exercise of authority over subordinate or other organizations in 
respect to administrative matters such as personnel management, supply, services, 
and other matters not included in the operational missions of the subordinate or 
other organizations, AAP-6(200), NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions. 
402 Amnesty International (2004) ‘So does it mean that we have the rights?’ Protecting 
the human rights of women and girls trafficked for forced prostitution in Kosovo. 
Available at: http://reliefweb.int/report/serbia/so-does-it-mean-we-have-rights-
protecting. 
403 AAP-6, NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions, 2010. 
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accomplish specific missions or tasks which are usually limited by 
function, time, or location. This includes the authority to issue binding 
directives for forces assigned to his command. For example, as 
illustrated in Chapter 2, the tactical directive issued by COMISAF that 
restrained the use of force by troops assigned to him is an example of 
operational control. COMKFOR similarly had the authority to limit the 
frequenting certain bars and locales by KFOR personnel is the exercise 
of operational control. 
‘Tactical Command’ is also transferred by TCNs to SACEUR. SACEUR 
usually delegates tactical command to subordinate command. Tactical 
Command is the authority to assign tasks to forces for the 
accomplishment of the mission, and Tactical Control is the detailed and 
local direction and control of movements or manoeuvres necessary to 
accomplish missions or tasks assigned. 
TCNs will ordinarily transfer Operational Command to NATO, while 
retaining Full Command – including Administrative Control – over 
their forces. The transfer follows a formal procedure, which entails the 
TCN sending SACEUR a ‘transfer of authority message’. This message 
describes which units are placed under command of NATO and which 
level of authority is being transferred. After the transfer of command to 
NATO, the nations are not able to exercise control over their forces 
anymore, except by re-assuming command and thereby effectively 
taking their forces out from the mission. States may, however, issue 
limitations and restriction on the use of their forces, i.e. so-called 
‘national caveats’ and ‘red-card holdership’.404  
In few instances, TCNs have re-assumed command over their forces 
during a NATO operation. As described in chapter 2 of this thesis, 
Canada reassumed command over its forces during ISAF, when it 
assessed that the transfer of detainees captured by Canadian forces to 
the government of Afghanistan would pose them to the risk of being 
tortured.  
The transfer of authority over forces from States to NATO has relevant 
consequences to the question of responsibility for wrongful conduct 
during NATO operations, in particular to the aspect of attribution. 
Attribution of a wrongful act to NATO depends on whether NATO has 
international legal personality and whether the wrongful act was under 
the effective control of NATO. These issues are examined more 
elaborately in chapters 5 and 7 of this thesis. It is relevant to note here 
that when TCNs place their forces at the disposal of NATO, they 
transfer the authority to assign missions or tasks, to deploy units and to 
reassign forces. This means that NATO exercises effective control over 
                                                             
404 Chapter 7 will go into further detail on the consequences that national caveats may 
have on the attribution of wrongful conduct to NATO. 
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these forces with respect to mission-related tasks. This effective control, 
however, may be undermined by the issuance of national caveats, 
limitations or interference by the TCN involved or when the TCN 
decides to re-assume command over its forces.  
NATO’s command and control relationship also illustrate the 
relationship that the Alliance has with its member States and other 
TCNs. Nations transfer the authority over their forces to NATO, which 
indicates that the Alliance has a large degree of autonomy, even if 
nations still retain the possibility to re-assume command over their 
forces and the fact that they can impose limitations and restrictions on 
the use of the forces.  
 
4.4 The Relationship between NATO and the UN 
 
NATO’s constituent document refers in several places to the UN, the 
UN Security Council and the UN Charter, showing the commitment of 
the founding members to the principles of the United Nations. Certain 
founding States even suggested to define NATO as a ‘regional 
arrangement’ in reference to Chapter VIII of the UN Charter.405 Under 
Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, the UN Security Council may utilise 
such arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its 
authority. This suggestion was, however, opposed406 as it could be 
interpreted as making NATO’s enforcement measures subject to a veto 
in the UN Security Council, rendering NATO’s existence absurd.407 Any 
reference to Chapter VIII of the UN Charter was therefore intentionally 
omitted leaving only Article 51 of the UN Charter as a basis for military 
action(s) of NATO under Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. NATO was 
not considered to become an organization that would be used to 
implement measures taken by the UN Security Council in accordance 
with Chapter VII of the UN Charter. 
The perception that NATO could not be a vehicle for the UN Security 
Council to implement its mandates, changed after the fall of the Soviet 
Union, when an institutionalized relationship between NATO and the 
UN started to emerge. The United Nations was involved in 
                                                             
405 Article 52, Charter of the United Nations, 1945, 1 UNTS XVI, 24 October 1945, 6 
June 1945. France made this suggestion during the negotiations on the 
establishment of NATO, D.A. Leurdijk, The UN and NATO: The logic of primacy, in 
M. Charles (ed.), The United Nations and Regional Security: Europe and Beyond, 
2003, p. 57. 
406 D.A. Leurdijk, The UN and NATO: The logic of primacy, in M. Charles (ed.), The 
United Nations and Regional Security: Europe and Beyond, 2003, p. 57. 
407 Oertel, J. (no date) The United Nations and NATO, paper prepared for the ACUNS 
21st Annual Meeting, Bonn, Germany, 5-7 June, p. 2. 
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peacekeeping operations since 1956,408 and saw an enormous increase in 
missions from 1989.409 These operations were entirely conducted under 
UN command and control, without participation of other international 
organization. Member States would be requested to provide troops and 
materiel to a UN-led mission. The personnel are placed at the disposal 
of the UN, which were characteristically identified as “blue-helmets”.  
With the increased demand for missions, the UN turned to lead nations 
and international organizations to take over some of the burden to plan 
and led peacekeeping and peace-enforcements missions. NATO became 
an important partner for the UN as it lacked the resources to 
implement its peace enforcement measures. NATO, on its turn, found 
the participation in the UN missions important as it was trying to 
redefine its tasks and activities and to transform its structure to meet 
the security challenges which occurred in the post-Cold War period.  
An important aspect determining the UN-NATO relationship in the 
context of peace operations is the fact that in its earlier resolutions the 
Security Council provided a detailed guidance regarding the mandate 
and the objectives to be achieved by an operation. The UN Security 
Council can authorize member States or international organizations410 
to implement a specific mandate. In earlier UN Security Council 
resolutions, this mandate contained detailed guidance on how the 
objectives were to be achieved. For instance, UNSCR 1244(1999) listed 
eight specific areas for which the NATO-led Kosovo Force was made 
                                                             
408 While the first UN mission was the United Nations Truce Supervision 
Organizations (UNTSO), 29 May 1948, the first ‘peacekeeping’ mission was the 
United Nations Emergency Force, established on 7 November 1956. 
409 Between 1948 and 1988, the UN mandated 15 peacekeeping operations. Between 
1989 and 2002 it increased to 39, A.T. Mays, Historical Dictionary of Multinational 
Peacekeeping, 2004, p. xlvii. 
410 IFOR, UNSCR 1031(1995), 15 December 1995, para. 14, “Authorizes the Member 
States acting through or in cooperation with the organization referred to in Annex 
1-A of the Peace Agreement to establish a multinational implementation force 
(IFOR) under unified command and control in order to fulfil the role specified in 
Annex 1-A and Annex 2 of the Peace Agreement”; 
SFOR, UNSCR 1088(1995, 12 December 1996, para. 18, “Authorizes the Member 
States acting through or in cooperation with the organization referred to in Annex 
1-A of the Peace Agreement to establish for a planned period of 18 months a 
multinational stabilization force (SFOR) as the legal successor to IFOR under 
unified command and control in order to fulfil the role specified in Annex 1-A and 
Annex 2 of the Peace Agreement;”  
KFOR, UNSCR 1244(1999), 10 June 1999, para. 7, “Authorizes Member States and 
relevant international organizations to establish the international security 
presence in Kosovo [...]” para 7. 
ISAF, UNSCR 1386(2001), 20 December 2001, para. 3, “Authorizes Member States 
participating in the International Security Assistance Force to take all necessary 
measures to fulfil its mandate” 
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responsible.411 However, recent UN Security Council resolutions leave a 
fair amount of discretionary power to the mandated entity to decide on 
how it will attain the objectives, basically authorizing to “take all 
necessary measures” to fulfil the mandate.412 The Security Council does 
not impose a specific command relationship or hierarchy between the 
UN and the mandated entity. However, in certain situations it requires 
the member States or international organization to coordinate with the 
UN Secretary General on the measures taken to implement the 
mandate or to report on the progress of the operation periodically.413 
NATO and the UN worked alongside successfully during operations in 
the Balkans. Initially, NATO enforced UN Security Council’s embargo 
on weapons in the Adriatic Sea414 and a no-fly zone over Bosnia-
                                                             
411 KFOR, UNSCR 1244(1999), 10 June 1999, para. 9, “Decides that the 
responsibilities of the international security presence to be deployed and acting in 
Kosovo will include: 
 a) Deterring renewed hostilities, maintaining and where necessary enforcing a 
ceasefire, and ensuring the withdrawal and preventing the return into Kosovo of 
Federal and Republic military, police and paramilitary forces, except as provided in 
point 6 of annex 2; 
b) Demilitarizing the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and other armed Kosovo 
Albanian groups as required in paragraph 15 below; 
c) Establishing a secure environment in which refugees and displaced persons can 
return home in safety, the international civil presence can operate, a transitional 
administration can be established, and humanitarian aid can be delivered; 
d) Ensuring public safety and order until the international civil presence can 
take responsibility for this task; 
e)Supervising demining until the international civil presence can, as appropriate, 
take over responsibility for this task; 
f) Supporting, as appropriate, and coordinating closely with the work of the 
international civil presence; 
g) Conducting border monitoring duties as required; 
h) Ensuring the protection and freedom of movement of itself, the international 
civil presence, and other international organizations;” 
412 ISAF, UNSCR 1386(2001), 20 December 2001, para. 3, “Authorizes Member States 
participating in the International Security Assistance Force to take all necessary 
measures to fulfil its mandate” 
413 Operation Unified Protector, UNSCR 1973(2011), 17 March 2011, para. 4, “requests 
the Member States concerned to inform the Secretary General immediately of the 
measures they take pursuant to the authorization conferred by this paragraph 
which shall be immediately report to the Security Council”, para 11, “Decides that 
the Member States concerned shall inform the Secretary General and the Secretary 
General of the League of Arab States immediately of measures taken in exercise of 
the authority conferred by paragraph 8 and above, including to supply a concept of 
operations”. 
ISAF, UNSCR 1386(2001), 20 December 2001, para. 9. “Requests the leadership of 
the International Security Assistance Force to provide periodic reports on progress 
towards the implementation of its mandate through the Secretary General”.  
414 Operation Maritime Monitor, 16 July 1992 – 22 November 1992, followed by 
Operation Maritime Guard, 22 November 1992 – 15 June 1993 and Operation 
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Herzegovina.415 Cooperation intensified when Alliance provided air 
support to United Nations Protection Force.416 Close air support 
provided by NATO was made conditional on the approval by the UN, 
which strained the relationship between the two organizations. 
Politically divergent views between the UN and NATO on the air 
support to UNPROFOR resulted in a time lag in the taking of decisions 
or resulted in no decisions at all. The observed difficulties led to future 
operations being more independent from each other. For instance, 
KFOR was placed outside UNMiK’s command and had a separate 
mandate.417 Subsequent operations also showed that NATO operations 
and UN operations in the same area have distinct mandates, tasks and 
command structure. In Iraq, the NATO Training Mission-Iraq (NTM-I) 
is separated from the UN Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) and in 
Afghanistan, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan – a 
peacekeeping mission focusing on recovery and reconstruction418 – was 
separate from ISAF’s more stand-alone character with its own mandate 
and its own command structure.419 
In 2005 the Alliance proposed a framework agreement with the UN to 
create a more structured relationship between the two organizations.420 
In September 2008, this proposal resulted in a Joint Declaration 
between the UN and NATO on their mutual cooperation, in particular 
in the field of information sharing and operational coordination and 
support.421 Paragraph 4 of the Declaration stipulates that:  
“Understanding that this framework should be flexible and evolving 
over time, we agree to further develop the cooperation between our 
organizations on issues of common interest, in, but not limited to, 
communication and information-sharing, including on issues pertaining 
to the protection of civilian populations; capacity-building, training and 
exercises; lessons learned, planning and support for contingencies; and 
                                                                                                                                                    
Sharp Guard, 15 June 1993 – 19 June 1996 (terminated 2 October 1996) under UN 
Security Council resolution 713(1991) 25 September 1991 and 757(1992) 30 May 
1992. 
415 Operation Sky Monitor, 15 October 1992 – 12 April 1993, followed by Operation 
Deny Flight, 12 April 1993 – 21 December 1995 under UN Security Council 
resolution 781(1992), 9 October 1992. 
416 United Nations Protection Force, UN Security Council resolution 743(1992), 21 
February 1992. Operation Deny Flight included close air support to UNPROFOR. 
417 United Nations Security Council resolution 1244(1999), 10 June 1999 
418 UNAMI, United Nations Security Council resolution 1500(2003), 14 August 2003, 
NTM-I, United Nations Security Council resolution 1546(2004), 8 June 2004. 
419 ISAF, United Nations Security Council resolution 1386(2001), 20 December 2001, 
UNAMA, United Nations Security Council resolution 1401(2002), 28 March 2002.  
420 http://www.nato.int/docu/update/2005/09-september/e0919b.htm 
421 Joint Declaration by the UN Secretary General and NATO’s Secretary General, 23 
September 2008. 
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operational coordination and support.”  
In conclusion, UN Security Council resolutions will – in broad terms – 
govern NATO’s non-article 5 operations, but the Alliance remains 
independent from the United Nations in aspects of command and 
control in NATO operations. The UN Security Council is the only 
institution to authorize the use of force to maintain or restore 
international peace and security. A UN Security Council resolution is 
the legal basis for NATO to conduct non-article 5 crisis response 
operations, that involve the use of force. The Security Council, however, 
does not have any authority regarding the command and control of 
forces in NATO-led operations. The UN can not assign missions or tasks 
to NATO personnel, to deploy units or to reassign the forces. This 
authority is vested in the commander that has Operational Command, 
which is SACEUR. This aspect is relevant to the question of 
responsibility of NATO for violations of international law and will be 
further examined in Chapter 7. 
 
4.5 Conclusions 
 
This chapter has described the institutional framework of NATO. 
Member States are represented in the North Atlantic Council (NAC), 
which is the highest political organ of the Alliance. Decisions on NATO 
operations are taken by the Council through consensus. The Secretary 
General of the Alliance is responsible for steering this process of 
consultation and has several tools at its disposal to achieve consensus, 
in particular the so-called ‘silence procedure’. Consensus and the silence 
procedure show that NATO enjoys a degree of autonomy from its 
member States, as the Alliance can function, even without full 
agreement of all of the members. 
The NAC, its supporting International Staff and the civilian agencies 
constitute the civilian structure of the Alliance. The military structure 
consists of the Military Committee, supported by the International 
Military Staff, the two Supreme Commands and international military 
headquarters subordinate to them. Supreme Allied Commander Europe 
commands NATO operations. SACEUR has “operational command and 
control” over the military forces assigned to him by the Troop 
Contributing Nations, which could either be member States or States 
that are not member to NATO (Non-NATO Contributing Nations). Two 
aspects are relevant to note here. First, States that participate in 
NATO-led operations, transfer a significant degree of control over 
military forces to NATO. Chapter 7 will examine in more detail whether 
the degree of control transferred to NATO by TCNs equates to ‘effective 
control’. If this is the case, conduct of military forces placed at the 
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disposal of the Alliance can be attributed to NATO. Secondly, it is 
relevant to note that the participation of NNCN in NATO-led operations 
show that NATO is a separate entity from its member States. NNCN do 
not take part in the decision-making process at the political level and 
neither have operational command and control over their forces once 
they are placed under the authority of SACEUR. This illustrates that 
NATO can act separately from its member States and enjoys a high 
degree of autonomy. This feature – further examined in chapter 5 – 
speaks in favour of the international legal personality of NATO. 
Finally, the relationship between NATO and the UN has been 
examined. The UN Security Council has the primary responsibility for 
the maintenance of international peace and security. Only the Security 
Council can authorize the use of force to maintain or restore 
international peace and security. As such, NATO non-article 5 crisis 
response operations that involve the use of force require authorization 
from the UN Security Council.  
The UN has no control over the conduct of military personnel placed at 
the disposal of the Alliance. TCNs do not transfer any authority over 
their forces to the UN. Other than authorizing the NATO non-article 5 
crisis response operations, the UN is not involved in the operation. The 
role of the UN in NATO operations is further examined in chapter 7, 
but on the foregoing, a preliminary conclusion can be made that the UN 
does not exercise ‘effective control’ over military personnel in NATO 
operations. 
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5.1 Introduction 
 
International legal personality is a concept of international law used to 
distinguish between entities that are relevant to the international legal 
system and those which are excluded from it.422 Entities that have 
international legal personality are subjects of international law and 
have rights and obligations under international law. Only subjects of 
international law can be held responsible for violations of breaches of 
international obligations. Without international legal personality an 
international organization cannot be held responsible under 
international law.423 For this reason, it is essential to determine whether 
NATO has international legal personality.  
The existence of NATO’s international legal personality has been 
debated in legal literature. Some authors deny NATO of having such 
status in international law.424 Gazzini, for example, states that “[f]or the 
time being, NATO remains an institutional union acting through 
common organs.”425 Others allocate a more relative international legal 
personality to NATO.426 Schermers and Blokker argue that closed 
organizations, such as NATO, have legal personality only with those 
who have recognised them explicitly.427 Most authors, including 
                                                             
422 Portmann, R. (2013) Legal personality in international law, United Kingdom: 
Cambridge University Press, p. 1. 
423 The ILC’s Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations 
explicitly limits responsibility under international law to those international 
organizations “possessing their own international legal personality”., ILC, Article 2, 
Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations, 2011. ILC, First 
report on responsibility of international organizations, A/CN.4/532, 26 March 2003, 
para. 15 “When considering a definition of international organizations that is 
functional to the purposes of the draft articles on responsibility of international 
organizations, one has to start from the premise that responsibility under 
international law arise only for a subject of international law”. 
424 I. Seidl-Hohenveldern, Liability of Member States for Acts or Omissions of an 
International Organization, in S. Schlemmer-Schulte & K-Y Tung (eds.), Liber 
Amicorum Ibrahim F.I. Shihata: International Finance and Development Law, 
2001, p. 91.  
425 Gazzini, T. (2001) ‘NATO coercive military activities in the Yugoslav crisis (1992–
1999)’, European Journal of International Law, 12(3), pp. 391–436. doi: 
10.1093/ejil/12.3.391, p. 425. 
426 Larsen states that NATO’s legal personality vis-à-vis non-member States and 
individuals is unresolved, K.M. Larsen The Human Rights Treaty Obligations of 
Peacekeepers, 2012, p. 99. 
427 Schermers, H.G. and Blokker, N.M. (2011) International institutional law: Unity 
within diversity, The Netherlands: Brill, 990-991. 
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Zwanenburg428, Pellet429, Reichard430 and Cohen-Jonathan431, consider 
that NATO does have international legal personality. Their arguments, 
as well as those arguments against the existence of NATO’s 
international legal personality will be examined in this chapter.  
The starting point for determining the indicia or characteristics of 
international organization that possess international legal personality 
is the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice in 
“Reparation for injuries suffered in the service of the United Nations”. 
Paragraph 5.2 examines the ICJ’s Opinion and related literature to 
establish the indicia of international legal personality and how they are 
applied to international organizations. 
Paragraph 5.3 will determine whether the indicia are present at NATO 
in order to reach a conclusion whether NATO has international legal 
personality. The observations made in chapter 3 on the key moments in 
the development of NATO are relevant here, as they explain that NATO 
has developed from an institutional union432 to an international 
organization separate from its member States. Also, reference is made 
to chapter 4 which has examined the tasks and powers of the various 
organs of NATO and illustrate the autonomy of NATO in relation to the 
member States.  
Paragraphs 5.4 and 5.5 examine whether jurisprudence and State 
practice confirm the existence of international legal personality of 
NATO. A direct affirmation of the international legal personality in 
international jurisprudence, as the ICJ did with respect to the 
international personality of the United Nations in its Advisory Opinion 
in the Reparations case, would resolve the question whether NATO has 
such status in international law. Unfortunately, such explicit 
confirmation is not (yet) available, but there are some decisions that 
indirectly touch upon the subject, in particular before the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY). Paragraph 5.5 
analyses the practice of States and international organizations with 
respect to the international legal personality of the Alliance. The 
practice of States and international organizations is relevant to 
examine, as the extent and the consequences of international legal 
                                                             
428 Zwanenburg, M.C. (2005) Accountability of peace support operations, The 
Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, p. 66. 
429 A. Pellet, L’imputabilité d’éventuels actes illicites – Responsabilité de l’OTAN ou 
des Etats membres, inTomuschat, C. (ed.) (2001) Kosovo and the international 
community: A legal assessment, The Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff, p. 198. 
430 Reichard, M. (2004) ‘Some Legal Issues Concerning the EU-NATO Berlin Plus 
Arrangement’, Nordic Journal of International Law, (73), p. 52.  
431 Cohen-Jonathan, G. (2000) ‘Cour européenne des droits de l’homme et droit 
international général’, Annuaire français de Droit International, (46), p. 631. 
432 Gazzini, T. (2001) ‘NATO coercive military activities in the Yugoslav crisis (1992–
1999)’, European Journal of International Law, 12(3), pp. 391–436. doi: 
10.1093/ejil/12.3.391, p. 425. 
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personality depend on the acceptance by other international actors to 
engage with NATO.433 
Lastly, paragraph 5.6 will end the chapter with a conclusion on the 
existence of NATO’s international legal personality. 
 
5.2 Indicia of the Existence of International Legal Personality 
 
Whether an international organization could be subject of international 
law was examined for the first time in 1949 when the ICJ gave an 
advisory opinion on the question whether the UN could bring an 
international claim against a non-member State to obtain reparation for 
damages caused to the UN or to the victim.434 Prior to that opinion, 
scholars had been sceptical to the idea that international organizations 
could be bearers of international rights and duties.435 
Explicit reference to the international legal personality of the UN was 
carefully avoided in the UN Charter as it was considered a politically 
sensitive topic. Instead, the Commission dealing with this topic at the 
time considered that it would be “superfluous to make this the subject of 
a text. In effect, it will be determined implicitly from the provisions of 
the Charter taken as a whole.”436  
In its Advisory Opinion, the ICJ examined the powers of the UN that 
indicate the existence of international legal personality. The Court 
noted that the founders had equipped the Organization with organs 
with special and broad ranging tasks, such as the maintenance of 
international peace and security. The Court went on to point out that 
the Charter defined the relationship between the Organization and its 
members; “by requiring them to give it every assistance in any action 
undertaken by it, and to accept and carry out the decisions of the 
Security Council; by authorizing the General Assembly to make 
recommendations to the Members; by giving the Organization legal 
capacity and privileges and immunities in the territories of each of its 
Members; and by providing for the conclusion of agreements between 
the Organization and its Members.”437 Based on these considerations, 
the ICJ determined that the UN had international legal personality. 
                                                             
433 Larsen, K.M. (2014) The human rights treaty obligations of Peacekeepers, United 
Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, p. 98-99. 
434 International Court of Justice, Reparations for Injuries suffered in the Service of 
the United Nations, (1949), ICJ Reports 1949, 174. 
435 Klabbers, J. (2009) An introduction to international institutional law, United 
Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, p. 42. Malanczuk, P. (2011) Akehurst’s 
modern introduction to international law, 7th edn. London: Taylor & Francis, p. 92. 
436 Documents of the United Nations Conference on International Organization, San 
Francisco (1945), Vol. XIII (Commission IV, Judicial Organization), p. 710. 
437 International Court of Justice, Reparations for Injuries suffered in the Service of 
the United Nations, (1949), ICJ Reports 1949, 174, p. 8 and 9. 
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The ICJ remained vague on exactly how the UN had acquired those 
powers. The Opinion contained a circular argument by stating that the 
UN had the power to bring a claim against its own members, if it had 
international legal personality, while the presence of international legal 
personality was proven by the fact that it had these powers since they 
could “only be explained on the basis of the possession of a large 
measure of international legal personality”.  
This ambiguity gave rise to two main theories on how international 
legal personality originates: the subjective and the objective theory.438 
The subjective theory revolves around the – implicit or explicit439 – 
intention or “will” of its founders to endow the organization with such 
capacity. The will of the founders can be expressed in the constituent 
document of the international organization, by explicitly stating that 
the organization has international legal personality. More often, 
however, founding member States do not include such explicit reference. 
The existence of international legal personality may then be inferred – 
according to the subjective theory – from the powers that the founding 
members have endowed the organization that indicate international 
legal personality. In either case, whether explicit or implicit, 
international legal personality is the product of the intention of the 
founders.  
However, the theory has some limited practical use, in particular when 
non-members do not recognize the organization having such a status in 
international law. If non-members refuse to enter into obligations with 
the international organization, there is little support to maintain that 
the organization has legal personality, even if this was the “will” of the 
founders. Another problem with the subjective theory is that it 
presumes that the organization will function as intended by its 
founders. In certain cases the constituent document refers to 
international legal personality, such as Article 4(1) of the Statute of the 
International Criminal Court440, but the organization has not acted (yet) 
upon the international level, which leaves the question open whether 
the organization is a subject of international law. 
The objective theory puts the emphasis on the second part of the ICJ’s 
                                                             
438 T. Gazzini, Personality of international organizations, in Klabbers, J. and 
Wallendahl, A. (eds.) (2012) Research handbook on the law of international 
organizations, United Kingdom: Edward Elgar Publishing, pp. 33-56. 
439 The trend to avoid mentioning international legal personality in the constituent 
documents seems to reverse. The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 
contains in article 4 explicit reference to the personality of the Court. The same 
applies to the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and the International Seabed 
Authority.  
440 Article 4(1) Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 2002, 2187 UNTS 
90, 1 July 2002, “The Court shall have international legal personality. It shall also 
have such legal capacity as may be necessary fort he exercise of its functions and 
the fulfilment of its purposes.” 
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argumentation, where it suggests that the UN has acquired 
international legal personality, simply because it possessed certain 
attributes. The powers of the organization are not derived from the 
constitution but from common law, which is developed in practice as 
customary international law.441 The existence of international legal 
personality therefore is – according to the objective theory – not 
dependent on the intentions that the founders might have had with the 
organization. Rather, legal personality exists when the organization has 
met certain factual characteristics.442 The most important characteristic, 
according to Seyersted, is that the organization must possess a distinct 
will of its own.443 The drawback of this theory is that it remains 
inconclusive on how the organization can have a distinct will – or 
volonté distincte – if the organization is not empowered to take decision 
binding its membership by a mere majority. Unanimous decision 
making, after all, can always be traced back to its member States.444  
The practical differences between two theories on international 
personality may be of minor importance.445 Both the intention of the 
founding members (“the Organization was intended to exercise and 
enjoy [...]”) and the practice of the organization (“[it] is in fact exercising 
and enjoying, functions and rights”) are relevant and cannot be seen 
completely separate from each other.446 A pragmatic approach is quoted 
by Klabbers as “presumptive personality”.447 If an organization performs 
acts that can only be explained on the basis of international legal 
personality, it must be presumed to have such personality. The theory is 
                                                             
441 Seyersted, F. (1964a) ‘International Personality of Intergovernmental 
Organizations. Do Their Capacities Really Depend upon Their Constitutions’, 
Indian Journal of International Law, 4(4), p. 53.  
442 Seyersted, F. (2008) Common law of international organizations, The Netherlands: 
Martinus Nijhoff, p. 43. 
443 The concept of volonté distincte is largely encapsulated by the concept of 
international legal personality but the two terms are conflated to a significant 
degree. While the existence of a separate will is embodied in the concept of 
international legal personality, the extent of that will is to be found in the nature of 
the elements which presume international legal personality, “for instance in the 
presence of majority voting in the organs; width and purposes; the intrusiveness of 
powers; the nature of decision-making; and the depth of membership.” White, N.D. 
(2005) The law of international Organisations, United Kingdom: Manchester 
University Press, p. 30. 
444 Klabbers, J. (2009) An introduction to international institutional law, United 
Kingdom: Cambridge University Press p. 48. 
445 Zwanenburg, M.C. (2005) Accountability of peace support operations, The 
Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, p. 66. Muller, A.S. (1995) International 
organizations and their host states: Aspects of their legal relationship, The 
Netherlands: Brill, p. 75. 
446 Schermers, H.G. and Blokker, N.M. (2003) International institutional law: Unity 
within diversity, The Netherlands: Brill, p. 1568. 
447 Klabbers, J. (2002) An introduction to international institutional law, United 
Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, p. 55. 
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supported by the passage in the ICJ Reparation case stating: “that fifty 
States, representing the vast majority of the members of the 
international community, had the power, in conformity with 
international law, to bring into being an entity possessing international 
legal personality, and not merely personality recognized by them alone, 
together with the capacity to bring claims”,448 leaving unspecified 
whether the members actually wanted to create an entity with 
international legal personality.449 The founders may have endowed the 
organization with certain powers to perform acts, which would explain 
the existence of international legal personality, it is not the only decisive 
factor. 
There are several indicia of international legal personality. The list of 
indicia is not exhaustive, which means that there may be other indicia 
that could lead to the presumption that an organization has 
international legal personality. Neither does an international 
organization need to mark all of the indicia to be presumed as having 
legal personality.  
The indicia are generally recognised by academic literature as 
including: (1) the power to bring and (2) receive international claims,450 
(3) the power to conclude international agreements451 and (4) the 
enjoyment of immunities and privileges.452 Other indicia that are 
mentioned in legal literature are status under municipal law; express or 
implied recognition; jurisdiction over organs; accreditation of missions 
or representatives.453  
It is important to emphasise here that it is not necessary that an 
international organization meets all indicia in order to ascertain that it 
has international legal personality. The indicia are derived from the 
functions and powers that States have, who are the primus inter pares 
of subjects of international law. If international organizations are 
empowered to conclude treaties, bring and receive claims, enjoy 
immunities, exchange diplomats and mobilise forces, as States do, then 
how would they not be considered as having international legal 
                                                             
448 International Court of Justice, Reparations for Injuries suffered in the Service of 
the United Nations, (1949), ICJ Reports 1949, 174, p. 185. 
449 Klabbers, J. (2002) An introduction to international institutional law, United 
Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, p. 56. 
450 Klabbers, J. (2002) An introduction to international institutional law, United 
Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, pp. 38-40. 
451 Klabbers, J. (2002) An introduction to international institutional law, United 
Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, pp. 40-41. 
452 Klabbers, J. (2002) An introduction to international institutional law, United 
Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, pp. 41-43. 
453 Meijknecht, A.K. and Meijknecht, A. (2001) Towards international personality Vol. 
10: The positions of minorities and Indigenious peoples in international law, 
Antwerp: Intersentia Uitgevers N V, p. 35,   
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personality.454 This does not mean that international organizations and 
States are the same. The ICJ noted that the UN is not the same as a 
State, nor that its personality and rights and duties are the same as 
those of a State.455 International organizations may possess only certain 
powers that States may have and still be considered subjects of 
international law. 
Some authors include in this list of indicia that the organization needs 
to be a permanent association of states, or other organizations, with 
lawful objects, equipped with organs. This seems to refer to elements of 
the definition of an international organization, rather than an indicator 
of international legal personality.456 NATO is a permanent association of 
States with the lawful aim to safeguard the freedom, common heritage 
and civilisation of their peoples.457 It can therefore be concluded that 
NATO fulfils this criterion, but it is doubtful whether these are 
indicators of legal personality as almost every international 
organization is an association of States or other organizations with 
lawful objects and equipped with organs.  
The next paragraph will examine whether NATO has the indicia of 
international legal personality as mentioned earlier. By applying the 
theory of presumptive personality it can be held that NATO possesses 
international legal personality. 
 
5.3 The International Legal Personality of NATO  
 
The international legal personality of NATO has been a frequent topic 
in legal literature. Various authors have examined whether NATO has 
international legal personality, but only to a marginal extent and often 
coming to complete opposite conclusions. The divergence in opinions 
may be explained by the period that scholars have looked at the 
Alliance. In its earlier years, NATO may not have exercised its powers 
and shown the characteristics of international legal personality. After 
the transformation described in chapters 3 and 4 in the period after the 
Cold War, NATO developed itself into a considerable more independent 
and autonomous organization.  
There is no explicit answer given by the founders of the Alliance, 
whether the organization should have international legal personality. 
                                                             
454 H.G. Schermers, N.M. Blokker, International Institutional Law, 195, para. 1566. 
455 International Court of Justice, Reparations for Injuries suffered in the Service of 
the United Nations, (1949), ICJ Reports 1949, 174, pp. 179-180. 
456 J. Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law, 2008, p. 169, C.F. 
Amerasinghe, Principles of the Institutional Law of International Organizations, 
2005, p. 82.  
457 North Atlantic Treaty, preamble, 4 April 1949 and Strategic Concept for the 
Defence and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 
19-20 November 2010. 
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NATO’s constituent document does not give a clear indication whether 
the founding members had the intention to give the organization status 
under international law. The Washington Treaty does not contain any 
explicit reference to international legal personality of the Alliance. The 
“Agreement on the status of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 
National Representatives and International Staff” (Ottawa Agreement) 
includes a provision that the Alliance possesses juridical personality 
and has the capacity to conclude contracts, acquire and dispose of 
movable and immovable property and to institute legal proceedings.458 
This, however, refers to the legal personality of NATO within the 
domestic systems of its member States and not to a personality on the 
international level. Similarly, the “Protocol on the Status of 
International Military Headquarters Set Up Pursuant to the North 
Atlantic Treaty” (Paris Protocol) ensures that the two Supreme 
Headquarters of NATO have legal personality within the legal domestic 
framework of its member States, but it does not refer to an 
international legal personality.459 
The founding fathers have endowed the Alliance with certain powers 
that would explain the existence of international legal personality. The 
Paris Protocol and Ottawa Agreement give the Alliance the power to 
conclude international agreements.460 NATO has entered into various 
international agreements with its member States hosting its 
headquarters on their territory.461  The Alliance has also concluded 
                                                             
458 Article IV, Agreement on the Status of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 
National Representatives and International Staff, 1951, 200 UNTS 3, 20 September 
1951. 
459 Article X, Protocol on the Status of International Military Headquarters Set Up 
Pursuant to the North Atlantic Treaty, 28 August 1952. 
460 Art. XVI Protocol on the Status of International Military Headquarters Set Up 
Pursuant to the North Atlantic Treaty, 28 August 1952, Art. XXV, Agreement on 
the Status of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, National Representatives 
and International Staff, 1951, 200 UNTS 3, 20 September 1951. 
461 E.g. Agreement concerning the application of Part IV of the Agreement on the 
Status of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, National Representatives and 
International Staff, signed at Ottawa on 20 September 1951, to the officials of 
NATO civilian bodies located on the territory of the United States of America, 3 
March 1981. United States of America and Headquarters of the Supreme Allied 
Commander Atlantic under the North Atlantic Treaty, Agreement (with exchange 
of letters) regarding the Headquarters of the Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic, 
22 October 1954. Treaty between the Kingdom of Spain and the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization represented by the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers 
Europe on the special conditions applicable to the establishment and operation on 
Spanish territory of international military headquarters, 28 February 2000. 
Notawisseling houdende een verdrag tussen het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden en de 
Noord Atlantische Verdragsorganisatie (NAVO) betreffende de privileges en 
immuniteiten van het personeel van de NATO Consultation, Command and Control 
Agency (NC3A) en hun gezinsleden, 29 September 2009. United States of America 
and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Agreement concerning the application 
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international agreements with non-Member States. In broad terms, 
NATO entered into international agreements for cooperation in the 
defence field462 and mission-related Status of Forces Agreements.463 For 
                                                                                                                                                    
of Part IV of the Agreement on the Status of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization, national representatives and international staff, signed in Ottawa on 
20 September 1951, to the officials of NATO civilian bodies located on the territory 
of the United States of America, 3 March 1981. Exchange of letters on the status of 
the deployable CIS module in Haderslev in the future NATO Command Structure, 
10 February 2012. Also; Exchange of letters on the status of the deployable CIS 
module in Izmir in the future NATO Command Structure, 2 February 2012; 
Exchange of letters on the status of the Combined Air Operations Centre in 
Torrejon in the future NATO Command Structure, 30 January 2012; Exchange of 
letters on the status of the NATO Signal Battalion in Bydgoszcz in the future 
NATO Command Structure, 6 February 2012; Exchange of letters on the status of 
the NATO Signal Battalion, the Deployable Communication and Information 
System Modules and their Support Units in Wesel and Elmpt and the Combined 
Air Operations Centre in Uedem in the future NATO Command Structure, 26 
September 2012; Exchange of letters on the status of the NATO Signal Battalion 
and four of its Deployable CIS modules in Grazzanise and the Deployable Air 
Command and Control Centre in Poggio Renatico in the future NATO Command 
Structure, 16 February 2012; Exchange of letters on the status of Allied Joint Force 
Command Headquarters moving to Lago Patria and the future Joint Force 
Headquarters Naples in Lago Patria in the future NATO Command Structure, 26 
March 2012, Exchange of letters on the status of the International Submarine 
Escape and Rescue Liaison Office (Ismerlo) in the future NATO Command 
Structure, February 2012. 
462 An example of the former category is the NATO-Russia agreement of 1997, which 
sets out a framework for cooperation between the two parties Founding Act on 
Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian 
Federation, Paris, 27 May 1997. The agreement led to the establishment of a new 
organ, the NATO-Russia Council. Other various agreements between NATO and 
third parties have been concluded to enhance cooperation in one way or another. 
There is the NATO-Ukraine agreement (Charter on a Distinctive Partnership 
between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Ukraine, 9 July 1997). The 
Charter is supplemented by the “Declaration to Complement the Charter on a 
Distinctive Partnership between NATO and Ukraine”, 21 August 2009. The 
Charter establishes a new decision body called the “NATO-Ukraine Commission”, 
responsible for developing the NATO-Ukraine relationship and for directing 
cooperative activities and providing a forum for consultation between the Allies and 
Ukraine on security issues of common concern the coordination and consultation of 
activities. Another example of an agreement with non-member States are the so-
called “Partnership for Peace” agreements. This agreement sets out an individual 
partnership and cooperation programme agreed between the participating State 
and NATO. The members take part in the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, 
which is a multilateral forum for dialogue and consultation on political and 
security-related issues among Allies and Partner countries. The EAPC consists of 
28 NATO members and 22 Partner Countries. The framework arrangements have 
led on their turn to various implementing agreements between NATO and the host 
nation to regulate specifics on tax privileges, immunities and other aspects relating 
to the status of NATO personnel. The Mediterranean Dialogue is formally not an 
agreement but a decision by the NAC to cooperate with non-NATO countries in the 
Mediterranean region. The countries involve Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, 
Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia. The countries and NATO focus on agreed priority 
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instance, NATO has extended the existent Status of Forces Agreement 
with the government of Afghanistan through an exchange of letters 
between the NATO Secretary General and the Afghan Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, to the NATO-led ISAF operation.464 For its subsequent 
mission in Afghanistan (Resolute Support), NATO concluded a bilateral 
Status of Forces Agreement with the Afghan government on 30 
September 2014.465 NATO has also entered into agreements with other 
international organizations, such as the EU,466 UN467 and, more recently, 
Interpol.468  
Solely on the fact that NATO has been given the power to conclude 
international agreements and that the organization indeed exercised 
such powers, leads to the plausible conclusion that NATO possesses 
international legal personality.469 But NATO meets even more indicia of 
legal personality, confirming the existence of such status. 
Immunity is another indication of international legal personality. It is 
traditionally seen as a prerequisite for international organization to 
                                                                                                                                                    
areas enumerated in the Mediterranean Dialogue Work Programme. NATO’s 
Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI) was launched at the Summit meeting of 2004. 
The ICI consists of 4 countries; Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar and the United Arab 
Emirates. 
463 IFOR: Agreement on the Military Aspects of the Peace Settlement Appendix B to 
Annex 1 A of the General Framework Agreement, between the Republic of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 30 November 1995. 
NTM-I: Exchange of letters between the National Security Advisor of the 
government of Iraq and NATO’s Secretary General, 21/23 December 2008. 
Pakistan Earthquake Relief operation: Exchange of Letters between the 
Government of Pakistan and NATO, 4 November 2006. 
464 Exchange of letters between the NATO Secretary General and the Afghan Minister 
of Foreign Affairs, 5 September 2004 and 22 November 2004. 
465 Referred to in UNSCR 2189(2014), 12 December 2014, “Noting the signing of the 
Security and Defence Cooperation Agreement between the United States of 
America and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (Bilateral Security Agreement) on 
30 September 2014, and welcoming the signing of the Status of Forces Agreement 
between the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and NATO on 30 September 2014 and 
as ratified by the Parliament of Afghanistan on 27 November 2014, Noting that the 
bilateral agreement between NATO and Afghanistan and the invitation of the 
Government of Afghanistan to NATO to establish Resolute Support Mission provide 
a sound legal basis for Resolute Support Mission.” 
466 The Berlin Plus Agreements are a package of agreements concluded on 16 
December 2002. See also www.nato.int/shape/news/2003/shape_eu/se030822a.htm 
467 Joint Declaration by the UN Secretary General and NATO’s Secretary General, 23 
September 2008. 
468 This is an initiative launched by Interpol in 2012 to share counter-piracy 
information between NATO and Interpol. Interpol has developed a database to 
analyze Somali piracy networks and streamline intelligence, which information is 
intended to be shared with the Alliance. Interpol Press release, “Interpol and NATO 
cooperation set to boost global efforts against maritime piracy”, www.interpol.int, 6 
October 2012. 
469 J. Voetelink, Status of Forces: Criminal Jurisdicition over Military Personnel 
Abroad, 2015, p. 177. 
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enable them to carry out their tasks in an independent fashion.470 Often, 
constitutional documents contain a basic clause providing for privileges 
and immunities in the member States.471 The Ottawa Agreement 
accords immunity to NATO and certain categories of its personnel, 
including national representatives and officials of the organization.472 
The immunity has also been tested on occasion, most recently when a 
Belgian court dismissed a claim for compensation for adamages by an 
Egyptian citizen in Libya caused by NATO during Operation Unified 
Protector, due to the immunity of NATO HQ in Brussels.473 
NATO’s International Military Headquarters and its personnel enjoy a 
slightly less favourable status. Immunity is limited to the official 
documents and archives of the International Military Headquarters.474 
Jurisdiction over the personnel of the International Military 
Headquarters is regulated by Article IV of the Paris Protocol in 
conjunction with the NATO SOFA.475 Personnel working in the 
International Military Headquarters do not enjoy immunity in the host 
State. Instead, in most cases concurrent jurisdiction of both the host 
State and sending State exist.  
The 1951 Ottawa Agreement and 1952 Paris Protocol are geographically 
limited to the trans-Atlantic region476, but even beyond NATO’s 
geographical area, the Alliance enjoys certain privileges and immunities 
via the conclusion of bilateral agreements.477 As a standard practice, 
                                                             
470 A. Reinisch, Privileges and Immunities, in Klabbers, J. and Wallendahl, A. (eds.) 
(2012) Research handbook on the law of international organizations, United 
Kingdom: Edward Elgar Publishing, p. 132.  
471 White, N.D. (2005) The law of international Organisations, United Kingdom: 
Manchester University Press, p. 42. 
472 Respectively article V, XII and articles XVIII and XXI Agreement on the Status of 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, National Representatives and 
International Staff signed in Ottawa, 20 September 1951. 
473 Tribunal of First Instance of Brussels, El Hamidi & Chlih v. NATO, R.G. no. 
11/9647/A, 21 October 2012. 
474 Article XII, Protocol on the Status of International Military Headquarters set up 
pursuant to the North Atlantic Treaty, 28 August 1952 (Paris Protocol). 
475 Agreement between the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty regarding the Status 
of their Forces, 19 June 1951 (NATO SOFA). 
476 Agreement on the Status of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, National 
Representatives and International Staff, 1951, 200 UNTS 3, 20 September 1951, 
refers to privileges and immunities to the territory of the member States. The 
preamble of the Protocol on the Status of International Military Headquarters Set 
up Pursuant to the North Atlantic Treaty limits the applicability to the “North 
Atlantic Treaty area”. The North Atlantic Treaty Area is delimited by the territory 
in Europe and North America as well as islands under the jurisdiction of any party 
in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer (Appendix 3 to the North 
Atlantic Treaty). This would exclude for instance Greece and Turkey, but were 
included through a modification done by article 2, subparas. i. and ii. of the 22 
October 1951 Accession Protocol.  
477 The status of NATO military headquarters and personnel in the territory of States 
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NATO missions enjoy immunity in the host States through the 
conclusion of SOFAs with the receiving State. The privileges and 
immunities for the IFOR-, and later SFOR-mission, are stipulated in 
the General Framework Agreement for Peace.478 The KFOR mission has 
been granted absolute immunity, while its personnel have immunity 
from Kosovar courts.479 Similarly, ISAF and its personnel enjoy 
immunity in Afghanistan through the conclusion of the Military 
Technical Agreement and subsequent exchange of letters between 
NATO and Afghanistan.480 Immunity in the host State, however, does 
not preclude criminal prosecution in other States. However, there are 
no known instances where NATO personnel have been prosecuted for 
criminal acts by third states. In one instance, NATO’s Secretary 
General, SACEUR and other high ranking military leaders were 
prosecuted and convicted in absentia by a district Court in Belgrade, 
but this has to be regarded as a more political symbolic prosecution 
than a proper example of criminal jurisdiction exercised by a third 
State.481  
The Ottawa Agreement regarding NATO HQ and civilian agencies482 as 
well as the Paris Protocol regarding international military 
headquarters483 state that the Alliance can bring and receive claims. The 
provisions, however, refer to the legal standing before domestic courts of 
the member States, which is not in itself an indication of international 
                                                                                                                                                    
participating in the Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme is regulated in a 
protocol to the Ottawa Agreement adopted in 1995 which extends the provisions of 
the Ottawa Agreement to PfP countries.  Further Additional Protocol to the 
Agreement among the States Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty and the other 
States participating in the Partnership for Peace regarding the Status of their 
Forces, 19 December 1995. 
478 Art. 2, Appendix B to Annex 1A of the General Framework Agreement for Peace, 21 
November 1995. 
479 UNMiK Regulation UNMiK/REG/2000/47, 18 August 2000. 
480 Military Technical Agreement between the International Security Assistance Force 
(ISAF) and the Interim Administration of Afghanistan (‘Interim Administration’), 4 
January 2002; Exchange of letters between the Secretary General of NATO and the 
Afghan Minister of Foreign Affairs, 22 November 2004. It is important to note that, 
although reference is made to the UN Convention on the Privileges and Immunities 
of the United Nations of 13 February 1946, the immunities of ISAF troops is 
expanded to absolute immunity from jurisdiction of the host State – not only 
functional – in favour of the jurisdiction of the sending State. Almost all SOFAs – 
including UN mission SOFAs – expand the immunity of military personnel to such 
extent that the sending State has exclusive jurisdiction over its forces. 
481 A. Laursen, NATO, the War over Kosovo, and the ICTY Investigation, American 
University International Law Review, Vol. 17, Issue 4, 2002, p. 770. 
482 Art. IV Agreement on the Status of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 
National Representatives and International Staff, 1951, 200 UNTS 3, 20 September 
1951. 
483 Article Protocol on the Status of International Military Headquarters Set Up 
Pursuant to the North Atlantic Treaty, 28 August 1952. 
106
THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PERSONALITY OF NATO 
 
legal personality of the organization. Until now, NATO has not received 
from or brought international claims against any State, including 
NATO member States. In fact, there has been an occasion where the 
Alliance could have received a claim from China regarding the bombing 
of its Embassy during Operation Allied Force. Instead, the US chose to 
take responsibility for the mistake in targeting and compensated China 
for the damage and injury caused. No other examples are known where 
a claim has been brought against NATO by a State or other 
international entity, nor are there instances known where NATO has 
brought a claim against other international subjects.  
In summary, NATO has concluded a variety of international 
agreements, enjoys immunity and privileges in relation to the national 
jurisdiction of its member States as well as in certain third States with 
whom it has concluded Status of Forces Agreements. This capacity and 
performance of acts on the international level can only be explained on 
the basis of international legal personality. The fact that the Alliance 
has not brought or received international claims yet does not negate the 
existence of international legal personality. There is general consensus 
in academic literature that it is not required that an international 
organization fulfils all the indicia of international legal personality in 
order to conclude that it has such status. It would be almost impossible 
for an international organization to meet all indicia that pertain to 
statehood.484 International legal personality is presumed once it 
performs acts that can only be explained on the basis of international 
legal personality, which – in the case of NATO – must be presumed. 
This presumption may be rebutted with evidence of e.g. contrary 
practice. The following two paragraphs will examine whether the 
existence of international legal personality of NATO is supported by the 
jurisprudence of (international) tribunals and courts and by the practice 
of States and other international organizations.  
 
5.4 Jurisprudence of International Courts and Tribunals 
 
There is no jurisprudence of international courts or tribunals that has 
established the existence of NATO’s international legal personality. 
There are cases in which claims were brought against individual 
member States of NATO, but not against NATO itself. This is due to the 
fact that NATO has no locus standi before any international court. It’s 
an understandable choice to submit applications against NATO member 
State(s), so to avoid the risk that the case would be declared 
inadmissible since NATO is not a party to international agreements 
                                                             
484 U. Fastenrath, B. Simma, From Bilateralism to Community Interest:Essays in 
Honour of Judge Bruno Simma, 2011, p. 41. 
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that have judicial remedies included485 and since NATO is immune from 
legal process the organization is excluded to become a party in a 
contentious case.486 This is illustrated in cases before the International 
Court of Justice and before the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR) relating to the bombing of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
in 1999. NATO does not have locus standi before the ICJ and – 
therefore – the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (subsequently Serbia 
and Montenegro) “had to go to great lengths in arguing that the 
bombing [during Operation Allied Force against Serbia in 1999] was the 
responsibility of every single NATO member State”487 Serbia maintained 
that the NATO-led Operation Allied Force was a violation of several 
international obligations binding upon the defendant States, in 
particular the violation of the obligation not to use force against another 
State and not to intervene in the internal affairs of another State, as 
contained in Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter. Yugoslavia filed 
individual, but identical, complaints against Belgium, Canada, France, 
Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, the United Kingdom 
and the United States of America. Equally, before the ECtHR, Bankovic ́ 
et al, who were victims and relatives of victims of a NATO airstrike on 
23 April 1999 on the main State Radio and Television station (Radio 
Televizije Srbije (RTS)), turned to the individual member States of 
NATO instead of NATO itself.488 
The issue of international legal personality of NATO has been touched 
upon indirectly by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY). Article 29 of the ICTY Statute states that “States 
shall co-operate with the International Criminal Tribunal in the 
investigation and prosecution of persons accused of committing serious 
violations of international humanitarian law. [...]”. In Simić et al.,489 the 
Trial Chamber concluded that this obligation also applied to SFOR as 
an international organization.490 According to Larsen, the only deduction 
                                                             
485 Article 59 ECHR states: (1) This Convention shall be open to the signatories of the 
member of the Council of Europe. It shall be ratified. Ratifications shall be 
deposited with the Secretary General of the Council of Europe. (2) The European 
Union may accede to this Convention. [...]” 
486 Art. 34 ICJ Statute, “Only States may be parties in cases before the Court”. 
487 K. Schmalenbach, Dispute Settlement, in Klabbers, J. and Wallendahl, A. (eds.) 
(2012) Research handbook on the law of international organizations, United 
Kingdom: Edward Elgar Publishing, p. 257. 
488 European Court of Human Rights, Vlastimir and Borka Bankovic and others v. 
Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, 
Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, 
Turkey and the United Kingdom, Application no. 52207/99, 12 December 2001. 
489 ICTY, Trial Chamber, Decision (Defence motion for judicial assistance to be 
provided by SFOR and others), IT-95-9, Simić and others, 18 October 2000, para. 
48.  
490 K.M. Larsen, The Human Rights Treaty Obligations for Peacekeepers, 2014, p. 96. 
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possible is that the ICTY considers NATO to possess international legal 
personality separate from that of its member States, otherwise the 
order would have been addressed to the individual member States.491 
 
5.5 State Practice and Practice of International 
Organizations 
 
There is considerable practice of States and international organizations 
that relate to the existence of international legal personality of NATO. 
States and international organizations have argued that the Alliance 
possesses international legal personality. This paragraph provides an 
overview of their views and considerations. 
The Alliance’ members have – at a time convenient for them – either 
acknowledged or denied that the Alliance has legal personality,492 but 
the prevalent opinion of the members is that NATO possesses 
international legal personality. In the Use of Force cases before the ICJ, 
the defendant States maintained that NATO is an international 
organization with international legal personality and that the actions 
regarding the use of force against the former Yugoslavia are 
attributable to NATO, instead of the individual nations. The 
Netherlands submitted that Operational Allied Force493 and KFOR494 are 
“NATO operations” initiated by the NAC and that its actions are 
attributable to the Alliance. Portugal and France, similarly, submitted 
that NATO is an international organization with legal personality and 
consequently bears responsibility for actions taken during the 
operation.495 Portugal stated that NATO is an international organization 
with international legal personality and, consequently “assumes full 
responsibility under international law for its actions in Kosovo, and not 
its member States.”496 According to Portugal, the Former Republic of 
                                                             
491 K.M. Larsen, The Human Rights Treaty Obligations for Peacekeepers, 2014, p. 96. 
492 G. Gaja, Second report on responsibility of international organizations, 3 May – 4 
June and 5 July – 6 August 2004, A/CN.4/541, at 3-4, para. 7.  
493 ICJ, Case Concerning Legality of Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. Netherlands), 
Preliminary objections of the Kingdom of The Netherlands, para. 7.2.5, 5 July 2000. 
494 ICJ, Case Concerning Legality of Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. Netherlands), 
Preliminary objections of the Kingdom of The Netherlands, para. 7.2.7, 5 July 2000. 
495 ICJ, Legality of the use of force, Preliminary objections of the Portuguese Republic, 
p. 38, 5 July 2000. ICJ, Legality of Use of Force, Preliminary objections of the 
French Republic, 5 July 2000, Chapter II, para 40, “The establishment of the North 
Atlantic Council [...] brought into being a genuine international organization [...] 
having organs, given special tasks and enjoying legal capacity and privileges and 
immunities. All of these are elements which led the [ICJ] in its Advisory Opinion of 
11 April 1949 concerning Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the 
United Nations to conclude, in the case of the United Nations, that the 
Organization was an “international person”.  
496 ICJ. Legality of the use of force, Preliminary objections of the Kingdom of Portugal, 
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Yugoslavia should have directed its claims against NATO. France, 
similarly, objected to the claims being directed to the member States 
instead of NATO and argued that the Former Republic of Yugoslavia 
proposition “fails to allow for the fact of international legal personality, 
which precludes a State being held liable for an organization’s acts 
simply because the State is a member”.497  
In the Bankovic et al. case, NATO member States argued that the 
European Court of Human Rights could not decide on the merits of the 
case as it would be determining the rights and obligations of the United 
States and Canada and of NATO itself, thereby implying that NATO 
has the capacity to carry international obligations and hence has 
international legal personality.498 France raised the issue that “the 
bombardment was not imputable to the respondent States but to NATO, 
an organisation with an international legal personality separate of the 
respondent States”.499  
Some authors argue that the compensation paid by the US to China for 
the damage and injury caused by the bombing of the Chinese Embassy 
in Serbia during the NATO operation Allied Force show that the US 
denies the existence of international legal personality of NATO.500 This 
conclusion is not entirely accurate. According to the US the aircrew 
involved in the attack was given the wrong target by the CIA. A 
committee was set up by the ICTY Prosecutor to assess allegations and 
evidence, and it recommended that no action be taken against the 
aircrew since they had been given the wrong target, or against senior 
leaders in NATO since they had been provided with wrong information 
by officials of another agency.    
In 2011 the former Chinese president Jiang Zemin has admitted in an 
unpublished memoir that Serbian military intelligence units were 
hiding inside the Chinese embassy in Belgrade when NATO bombed it 
in 1999. The diplomatic bargain appeared to be that the Americans 
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saved China's face by apologizing for a "mistake" and the Chinese 
allowed the street rage to cool off without serious violence. In the view 
of the US, the actions, including the intelligence that identified the 
target and the use of US aircraft, were attributable to the US, rather 
than to NATO. Whether the assessment of the US is correct or whether 
there were other political motives for the US to compensate China is not 
relevant to examine here further. What is important is that the 
compensation paid by the US is not by itself an indication that the US 
denies the existence of international legal personality of the Alliance.  
International organizations have also been confronted with the question 
of international legal personality of NATO. The UN Human Rights 
Council investigated alleged violations of international human rights 
law in Libya, perpetrated by NATO.501 It established an International 
Commission of Inquiry and NATO exchanged several letters regarding 
incidents that have occurred during Operation Unified Protector. The 
International Commission of Inquiry addressed NATO – instead of the 
individual troop contributing nations – alluding to the assumption that 
NATO has a separate legal status from its member States under 
international law.502  
NATO itself initially maintained that it has international legal 
personality. NATO’s Secretary General has on various occasions alluded 
to the existence of an international legal personality of NATO.503 
Furthermore, in the submittal of NATO’s observations on the ILC’s 
work on the responsibility of international organizations, the Alliance 
mentions that NATO does have legal personality.504 On other occasions, 
NATO has been ambivalent to accept the existence of international 
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legal personality. A NATO legal adviser to the Secretary General held 
an ambiguous opinion on whether NATO is a subject of international 
law, maintaining that “[...] it is the individual member States who have 
legal obligations. States’ own legal officials must ensure their 
participating forces’ compliance with international law.” This statement 
renounces the existence of NATO’s legal personality.505 The same legal 
office on another occasion has admitted that NATO is a subject of 
international law and has international legal personality.506 
 
5.6 Conclusions 
 
This chapter examined the existence of international legal personality 
of NATO. Legal personality is relevant to the responsibility of NATO 
and its personnel during military operations. Without international 
legal personality, NATO cannot be responsible.  
Unfortunately, there is little jurisprudence on the concept of 
international legal personality. In 1949, the ICJ formed an opinion on 
the personality of the UN, but remained vague on how this was 
determined. This resulted in various theories on how legal personality 
is acquired. The two mainstream theories in academic literature are the 
‘subjective theory’ and ‘objective theory’, which both give well argued 
explanations on how international legal personality can be determined 
to exist, but also have received some criticism. The practical approach of 
Klabbers’ ‘presumptive personality’ reconciles to some degree both 
theories and seems to be well-accepted as well.507 This theory presumes 
the existence of international legal personality of an international 
organization if it performs acts that can only be explained on the basis 
of international legal personality. This chapter has examined NATO’s 
legal personality on the basis of the two mainstream theories, but also 
inclined towards the ‘presumptive theory’ to give a practical answer. 
Some authors doubt whether the Alliance has legal personality.508 These 
authors argue that NATO has not acted on the international level, for 
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instance when the US compensated China, instead of NATO, for the 
damages suffered during NATO’s intervention in Kosovo. Other 
arguments denying the international legal personality of NATO is the 
fact that NATO takes its decision by consensus, leading to believe that 
the Alliance does not have any “will” of its own.  These doubts would be 
to some degree valid, if the focus was on the earlier years of the NATO. 
During the Cold War – and probably during its first non-article 5 
operation – it may have been difficult to consider that the Alliance has 
international legal personality. NATO’s static defence operations 
against the former Soviet Union did not require an autonomous role 
separate from its member States. The member States were fully capable 
to independently devise military plans and coordinate these with each 
other. The establishment of SACEUR in 1952, which integrated 
military forces marked the beginning of a transformation, but NATO 
started to evolve into an organization with legal personality only after 
the Cold War.  
Since then, the Alliance has gone through a significant transformation, 
as described in chapters 3 and 4. Based on the acts that it has 
performed, since it has undertaken non-article 5, out-of-area operations, 
the organization has developed into a more autonomous organization. It 
concluded international agreements with States and other international 
organizations. NATO and its personnel enjoy privileges and immunities 
in its member States, but also in Afghanistan, Iraq, in the States of the 
former Yugoslavia and in other mission areas. It should not be ruled out 
that the Alliance will bring and receive international claims in the 
future if the exercise of the jurisdiction by the courts would be made 
possible. 
It is not required that an international organization show all the indicia 
of international legal personality. If this were the case, barely any 
international organization would have such status in international law. 
NATO is presumed to have international legal personality on the basis 
of the fact that it has concluded international agreements and that the 
organization and its personnel enjoy privileges and immunities. This 
presumption may be rebutted if there is evidence to the contrary. 
Practice of States and international organizations, as well as the 
jurisprudence of international courts and tribunals, confirm the 
presumption that NATO has international legal personality. 
The military intervention in the former Yugoslavia gave rise to several 
claims for damages resulting from NATO military operations. 
Yugoslavia filed complaints against several member States of NATO, 
while individuals turned their claims for damages to individual member 
States of NATO instead to NATO itself.509 The respondent States in both 
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113
CHAPTER 5 
cases argued that the claims should have been filed against NATO – on 
the basis of that it had international legal personality – instead of the 
individual nations. These early cases are not indicative of either the 
existence or non-existence of international legal personality, but of the 
absence of NATO’s locus standi in the courts. The former Yugoslavia 
and individuals may have chosen to file their claims against individual 
States, so to avoid the claim being non-admissible. Equally the member 
States may have had their reasons to argue that NATO and not the 
nations were responsible for the damages. 
International courts and tribunals have confirmed NATO’s legal 
personality. Both the ICTY and the ICC came to this conclusion in 
relation to operations in respectively the Balkans and Libya. 
International organizations, including the UN, have addressed NATO 
in relation to alleged breaches of international obligations binding upon 
the organization. The International Commission of Inquiry, established 
by the UN Human Rights Council, addressed NATO regarding several 
airstrikes in Libya that may have caused incidental loss of civilian life 
and damage to civilian infrastructure.510 Finally, the UN’s ILC has 
confirmed NATO’s legal personality in its commentary to the Articles on 
Responsibility of International Organizations, where it stated that 
“NATO is an international organization within the meaning of draft 
article 2(a) of the draft articles, and as such a subject of international 
law. It possesses international legal personality as well as treaty-
making power”.511  
The scepticism regarding the international legal personality of NATO 
that existed diminished gradually from the 1990s. Academic writers, 
States and international organization increasingly state that the 
Alliance has international status. Even NATO itself had to become 
convinced of its personality. The out-of-area operations required the 
conclusion of Status of Force Agreements (SOFAs) with third States. 
NATO aptly took the initiative and concluded SOFAs with Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Afghanistan, Libya and other countries.  
In conclusion, NATO has certainly some aspects / indicia of 
international legal personality as is evidenced by its performance of 
actions on the international level, notably treaty-making power and 
privileges and immunities. The existence of international legal 
personality is in a way also confirmed by the practice of States and 
other international organizations. Recent academic literature supports 
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this conclusion.  
The consequences of NATO’s international legal personality are that the 
organization can bear international rights and obligations and under 
certain circumstances can be held responsible for breach of those 
obligations. A consequence is also that certain conduct can be attributed 
to NATO as an organization and not to its individual member States. A 
practical consequence of that would be, for example, that there would be 
no requirement for Troop Contributing Nations to issue national 
caveats for their contribution to NATO operations, since it is the 
Alliance that will be held responsible and not the individual member 
States. Certainly, member States could circumvent their obligations by 
taking advantage of the organization’s competence with respect to that 
obligation.512 There is a difference between deliberately evading 
responsibility and the issue of caveats. Similarly, there would neither 
by a need to conclude individual transfer agreements regarding the 
treatment of detainees, rather NATO may conclude a single overarching 
agreement with the host nation in order to ensure abidance to its 
international obligations for the same reason above.  
The following question would then be: to which international obligations 
is the Alliance bound? The following chapter will examine this aspect.  
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Chapter 6  
Binding International Obligations Relevant to 
NATO’s Operations  
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
Chapter 5 concluded that NATO must be considered to be an 
international organization with international legal personality. A 
consequence of international legal personality is that the organization 
can bear international rights and obligations. This chapter will examine 
which binding international obligations exist in so far as they are 
relevant to NATO’s operations. An analysis of binding international 
obligations is important to the topic of this thesis, since a breach of such 
an obligation entails a wrongful act, which, as a general principle of 
international law, gives rise to the responsibility of NATO.513  
In general, international organizations are bound by a variety of 
international norms originating from various sources, such as general 
international law, their constitutions or international agreements.514 
There are five categories of international obligations that can be 
distinguished by their sources or origin.515 While other categorizations 
may equally be valid, the only intention here is to give an overview of 
existing international obligations that might be binding upon NATO. 
Distinguishing between categories of obligations based on their origin or 
source, i.e. the character of the primary rule containing the obligation, 
seems to be the most obvious choice. The sources are: (1) NATO’s 
constitutional documents, (2) the UN Charter and UN Security Council 
resolutions, (3) international conventional law, in particular 
international humanitarian law (IHL) and international human rights 
law (IHRL), (4) international customary law, again with a particular 
focus on IHL and IHRL and (5) rules of internal and external law of 
NATO. Paragraphs 6.2 to 6.6 will respectively examine the obligations 
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under each of these categories.  
Obligations that pertain primarily to garrison support activities are not 
considered here for the reasons mentioned earlier in the introductory 
chapter of this thesis. Examples of such unrelated obligations is the 
obligation to request diplomatic clearance for overflight of State aircraft 
under the Chicago Convention516 or obligations to refrain from releasing 
pollutants into water resources under customary international 
environmental laws.  
After an examination of the international obligations binding upon 
NATO in paragraphs 6.2 to 6.6, paragraph 6.7 will provide final 
observations and conclusions.  
 
6.2 International Obligations under NATO’s Constitutional 
Documents 
 
The Washington Treaty establishes NATO as an international 
organization. As such, this treaty could be considered the only 
constituent treaty of the Alliance. Other agreements, like the NATO 
Status of Forces Agreement, the Ottawa Agreement and the Paris 
Protocol regulate important aspects of the organizations, but are not per 
sé constituent documents of the Alliance. These aspects include the 
status, privileges and immunities of the NATO Headquarters in 
Brussels and other civilian headquarters, including their personnel, 
regulated by the Ottawa Agreement. Similarly, the Paris Protocol 
regulates the same issues for NATO International Military 
Headquarters and their personnel. The NATO SOFA, finally, regulates 
the status of forces and civilian component stationed in another NATO 
member State. For reasons of inclusiveness, his thesis has grouped all 
of these agreements within the definition of constituent documents of 
NATO. 
The Washington Treaty – partially due to its relative conciseness – does 
not contain a wealth of international obligations. The prevalent 
obligation is the reference to the UN Charter. The Washington Treaty 
states that the (member) States will settle disputes by peaceful means 
and refrain in its “international relations from the threat or use of force 
in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations”.517 
The UN Charter prohibits the threat or use of force against the 
territorial integrity or political independence of any State.518 The only 
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exceptions to this rule are the right of (collective) self-defence against 
an armed attack by another State and the use of force in accordance 
with the authorization of the UN Security Council.519 The member 
States require of the Alliance that – in the exercise of collective self-
defence of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty – it will do such within 
the limits of Article 51 of the UN Charter and that it will terminate an 
action taken on this basis when the UN Security Council has taken the 
measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and 
security.  
As stated in Chapter 3 of this research, when NATO transformed from a 
pure collective self-defence organization to include collective security 
tasks it broadened its tasks well beyond Article 5. Through the adoption 
of the Strategic Concept of 1999, NATO now undertakes non-article 5 
crisis-response operations. These operations – by reference to the UN 
Charter in the Washington Treaty – are equally undertaken in 
accordance with the UN Charter and specifically Article 42.520  
However, it is important to emphasize that the source of the obligation 
to adhere to the UN Charter is the Washington Treaty. An action that 
entails a violation of the principles of the UN Charter results in a 
violation of the Washington Treaty and will trigger – under certain 
conditions – the responsibility of NATO. This paragraph does not 
examine whether NATO is bound directly to the UN Charter or to those 
norms of the UN Charter which are customary in nature. Paragraphs 
6.3 and 6.5 which follow below, will analyse respectively whether NATO 
is bound to the UN Charter directly and to international customary law. 
This paragraph deals only with the international obligations binding 
upon NATO under its constitutional documents. 
It seems that in the past NATO violated the self-imposed obligation to 
adhere to the principles of the UN Charter in one particular instance. 
Operation Allied Force conducted in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
(Serbia and Montenegro) did not have a clear UN Security Council’s 
mandate, which would be required as the legal basis to use force in 
Kosovo. According to NATO, the operation was conducted in response to 
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a humanitarian crisis that was ongoing by halting Serbian attacks on 
civilians in Kosovo in 1999. Some of the NAC members asserted that 
each Ally was responsible for justifying their own participation, but 
stated that the military intervention in Kosovo did not establish any 
precedent. This language stresses the binding obligations of NATO 
under the Washington Treaty to adhere to the provisions of the UN 
Charter.521  
Other important documents of NATO, such as the NATO SOFA, Paris 
Protocol and Ottawa Agreement, create obligations for the Alliance as 
well. The NATO SOFA contains obligations with respect to the exercise 
of jurisdiction by the member States of the Alliance. Article VII of the 
NATO SOFA regulates the exercise of jurisdiction by either the host- or 
sending State over members of a force or civilian component and their 
dependents. The sending State has the primary right to exercise 
jurisdiction in certain specific cases, for instance when an offence has 
been committed by a member of the force against the person of another 
member of the force of the sending State.522 In one situation, the primary 
right to exercise jurisdiction has been the subject of dispute between 
two NATO member States.523 In a case where the Dutch military police 
arrested a US service member – Staff Sergeant Short – for the murder 
of his wife, the US requested the extradition of Short in order to 
exercise criminal jurisdiction. On the basis of the NATO SOFA, the US 
would have the primary right to exercise jurisdiction, however, this 
right was denied by the Dutch authorities, based on the argument that 
the surrender to the US would violate human rights obligations to 
which the Netherlands is bound, as the suspect would likely face capital 
punishment. The Supreme Court of the Netherlands acknowledged the 
conflict between international human rights obligations and the 
obligation enshrined in the NATO SOFA. The Court finally decided in 
favour of the human rights obligations, and consequently required the 
Dutch government to violate the provision of the NATO SOFA and not 
to allow the US to exercise its primary right to exercise jurisdiction.524  
From the wording of the obligation to allow the sending State to 
exercise jurisdiction, it is apparent that the obligation rests upon the 
member States, not upon NATO itself. As such, the NATO SOFA 
doesn’t create a direct binding international obligation for NATO. 
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Nevertheless, NATO would be affected by a breach by one of the 
member States, as it would undermine the very nature of the Alliance. 
NATO has an indirect obligation to protect the interests of its members 
as well as of the organization itself and to intervene whenever the 
provisions of the NATO SOFA are violated. A breach of the NATO 
SOFA would result not only in an action taken by the State whose 
rights are violated but also by the other NATO members and by NATO 
itself. However, it would go too far to conclude that the NATO SOFA 
creates international legal obligation(s) for NATO as its primary 
addressee of the obligations contained therein are explicitly States. 
The Paris Protocol imposes several international obligations upon 
NATO. Article II obliges International Military Headquarters (IMHQs) 
to respect the laws of the host nation.525 Article VI of the Paris Protocol 
imposes the obligation upon the IMHQ to waive claims against the 
member States if damage was caused by member States’ employees or 
military property to the IMHQ.526  
The Ottawa Agreement establishes the immunity of NATO’s civilian 
headquarters – a feature that NATO’s military headquarters do not 
have.527 Personnel serving at international civilian headquarters528 
equally enjoy immunity from jurisdiction of the host State in so far the 
as is necessary for the exercise of their functions.529 Article XXII of the 
Ottawa Agreement stipulates that immunity needs to be waived if it 
would impede the course of justice and can be waived without prejudice 
to the interests of the Organization.530 The immunity for personnel 
working at NATO headquarters within the NATO member States’ 
territory is of apparently of relative little importance for this thesis on 
the responsibility of NATO operations as the operations that take place 
outside the territory of the member States. The Ottawa Agreement and 
Paris Protocol only apply within the NATO area, where other status of 
forces agreements apply. However, many of the strategic and political 
decisions are taken at NATO Headquarters in Brussels, Belgium or at 
one of the operational headquarters leading the operation. Therefore, 
the immunity of, and the exercise of jurisdiction over, NATO personnel 
is relevant to mention. 
Article XXII does not impose an international obligation to waive 
immunity, even though the formulation “the duty to waive immunity” of 
the Article seems to imply such. In deciding about the waiver of 
immunity, the Alliance should determine whether the immunity 
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impedes the course of justice, balanced against the interests of the 
organization. As contrary it may seem, international crimes may be 
committed within the context of official activities and, as such, the 
perpetrator may enjoy immunity from criminal jurisdiction.531 In those 
cases NATO may consider whether the immunity would impede the 
course of justice and waive immunity when required and if it would not 
prejudice the interests of NATO. As the Alliance expresses in various 
policy documents and status agreements that its personnel shall 
conduct its operations with full respect for the principles and rules of 
international law, it would not be consistent with this posture to waive 
immunity in case of crimes committed by NATO personnel. A more in-
depth analysis of immunity of NATO personnel is given in chapter 8 
relating to the responsibility of NATO for criminal conduct of its 
personnel. 
In summary, NATO’s constituent documents do not include a wealth of 
international obligations. The Washington Treaty obliges the Alliance to 
adhere to the principles of the UN Charter. The NATO SOFA, Paris 
Protocol and Ottawa Agreement contain obligations resting upon 
member States with respect to the exercise of jurisdiction over NATO 
personnel. There is only one specific obligation binding upon the 
Alliance, which is the obligation to waive immunity over NATO 
personnel employed at NATO international civilian headquarters, if the 
immunity impedes the course of justice. 
 
6.3 International Obligations under the UN Charter and the 
UN Security Council Resolutions  
 
Treaties do not create obligations or rights for third States or third 
international organizations without the consent of that State or of that 
international organization.532 For this reason, the Charter of the United 
Nations cannot create binding obligations for NATO, as the Alliance is 
not a party to the Charter.533 Neither is NATO bound to resolutions 
adopted by the UN Security Council. Most UN Security Council 
resolutions relating to NATO-led operations do not address the Alliance 
directly, rather the troop contributing nations participating in the 
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532 Art. 34, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and 
International Organizations or between International Organizations, 21 March 
1986 
533 Whether or not NATO is bound by the prohibition of the threat or use of armed 
force as embodied in article 2 of the UN Charter on the basis that this provision has 
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missions.534 Where the Security Council does address NATO, it often 
does not impose any international obligations.535 Three UN Security 
Council resolutions, UNSCR 827(1993, UNSCR 1244(1999) and UNSCR 
1851(2008), address NATO directly and seemingly impose international 
obligations upon it. This perception, however, is incorrect.  
UN Security Council resolution 1244(1999) demands “full cooperation 
by all concerned, including the international security presence, with the 
International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia”.536 The international 
security presence in the former Yugoslavia is NATO’s Implementation 
Force (IFOR) and subsequent Stabilisation Force (SFOR). This 
obligation stems from the earlier UN Security Council resolution 
827(1993), which imposes the obligation upon States to cooperate fully 
with the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia.537 
Clearly, Resolution 827(1993) addresses States and not international 
organizations, such as NATO. But the obligation has led to several 
requests to the Tribunal to order SFOR (NATO) to provide documents 
and witnesses for use in evidentiary hearings. The ICTY did not have 
the opportunity to examine whether NATO could be obliged to disclose 
this information, as the applicant withdrew its request.538 In Ojdanić, 
the Tribunal was presented with another opportunity to examine the 
extent of the obligation for NATO to cooperate. The Appeals Chamber 
first examined and concluded that NATO is an international 
organization, presumably with international legal personality.539 Since 
NATO is not a party to the UN Charter it is beyond the reach of the 
Tribunal’s authority to order the Alliance to disclose information.540 
UNSCR 1244(1999) included a similar obligation to cooperate with the 
Tribunal and even went further to include “all concerned” instead of 
                                                             
534 E.g. ISAF: para. 4, UNSCR 1510(2003),13 October 2003, “Authorizes the Member 
States participating in the International Security Assistance Force to take all 
necessary measures to fulfil its mandate.” Operation Unified Protector: para. 4, 
UNSCR 1973(2011), 17 March 2011,” Authorizes Member States that have notified 
the Secretary General, acting nationally or through regional organizations or 
arrangements, and acting in cooperation with the Secretary General, to take all 
necessary measures, notwithstanding paragraph 9 of resolution 1970 (2011), to 
protect civilians […]” 
535 E.g. Operation Resolute Support, UNSCR 2189(2014), 12 December 2014.  
536 UNSCR 1244(1999), 10 June 1999, para. 14. 
537 UNSCR 827(1993), 25 May 1993, para. 4. 
538 ICTY, Trial, Simić, Case no. IT-95-9-PT, Decision on Motion for Judicial Assistance 
to be Provided by NATO and Others, 18 October 2000, para. 54.  
539 ICTY, Appeal, Milutinović et al., Case no. IT-05-87-PT, Decision on the Second 
Application of Dragoljub Ojdanić for Binding Orders Pursuant to Rule 54bis, 17 
November 2005, paras. 48-49 
540 ICTY, Appeal, Milutinović et al., Case no. IT-05-87-PT, Decision on the Second 
Application of Dragoljub Ojdanić for Binding Orders Pursuant to Rule 54bis, 17 
November 2005, paras. 36-37. J. d’Aspremont (ed.), Participants in the 
International Legal System, 2011, p. 194. 
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referring to States.541 Nevertheless, this does not change the conclusion 
that NATO cannot formally be bound to UN Security Council 
resolutions.  
Debate also existed on whether NATO was obliged in operations IFOR 
and SFOR to search and arrest war criminals in the former Yugoslavia 
on the basis of UN Security Council resolution 827(1993). The 
Resolution addressed States to execute arrest warrants and to cooperate 
with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia.542 
Even though the obligations rested upon the States contributing forces 
and not NATO, certain scholars argued that the multinational force was 
required to implement the UN Security Council resolutions. 543 It is 
questionable whether IFOR and SFOR were under such obligation. 
UNSCR 827(1993) addresses States, not NATO. Moreover, the Dayton 
Peace Agreement specifically puts the obligation on the Republic of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and 
the Republika Srpska to comply with “any order or request from the 
International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia for the arrest, 
detention, surrender of [...] who are accused of violations within the 
jurisdiction of the Tribunal”.544 If one of the Parties would not comply 
with this obligation, NATO (IFOR) has the authority to take such 
actions as required, e.g. the detention of war criminals.545 However, no 
obligation rests upon the organization to do so. In 1996, NATO 
concluded a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the ICTY on 
the procedures for cooperation between IFOR and the ICTY, but it did 
not create any legal obligation on the part of NATO.546 Therefore, the 
                                                             
541 UNSCR 1244(1999), 10 June 1999, para. 4: “Demands full cooperation by all 
concerned, including the international security presence, with the International 
Tribunal fort he Former Yugoslavia.” 
542 United Security Council resolution 827(1993), 25 May 1993, para. 4; “Decides that 
all States shall cooperate fully with the International Tribunal and its organs in 
accordance with the present resolution and the Statute of the International 
Tribunal and that consequently all States shall take any measure necessary under 
their domestic law to implement the provisions of the present resolution and the 
Statute, including the obligation of States to comply with requests for assistance or 
orders issued by a Trial Chamber under Article 29 of the Statute”.  
543 J.R.W.D. Joines, The Implications of the Peace Agreement for the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 7 EJIL (1996), N. Figà-Talamanca, 
The Role of NATO in the Peace Agreement for Bosnia and Herzegovina, 7 EJIL 
(1996) 171. 
544 Articles IX(g) and X Annex 1A, Military Aspects of the Peace Settlement and 
Appendices to Annex 1A to The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, 14 December 1995. 
545 Article 1(2)(b), Annex 1A, Military Aspects of the Peace Settlement and Appendices 
to Annex 1A to The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, 14 December 1995. 
546 Memorandum of Understanding between the International Criminal Tribunal for 
the Former Yugoslavia and The Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe 
Concerning Practical Arrangements for the Detention and Transfer to the Tribunal 
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States participating in IFOR and SFOR did not have any obligation to 
search and arrest indicted war criminals, nor did there rest such 
obligation on IFOR and SFOR forces. In any case, the obligation 
certainly did not rest on NATO itself, as NATO was not explicitly 
addressed in the resolution.547  
There has also been debate whether KFOR is bound by IHRL through a 
UN Security Council’s mandate. UN Security Council resolution 
1244(1999) states that one of the main responsibilities of the 
international civil presence in Kosovo is to protect and promote human 
rights.548 The Resolution does not oblige KFOR explicitly to adhere to 
international human rights standards when conducting its mission, 
neither its mandate included protection and promotion of human rights. 
Certain authors argue that since KFOR was deployed in support of 
UNMiK, it was bound to support the protection and promotion of 
human rights as well.549 The construction that KFOR, in support of 
UNMiK, was bound to comply with these norms is somewhat far sought. 
KFOR and UNMiK were completely separated in command, authority 
and mandate. KFOR’s mandate seemed to override applicable law and 
no other authority was placed above KFOR other than NATO. The 
scepticism that an obligation for NATO to abide by human rights law 
could be construed through the UN Security Council resolution 
1244(1999) is shared by other authors.550 
In that respect the Security Council resolution 1244(1999) if different 
from, for example, the UN Security Council resolution 1851(2008) on 
the establishment of an anti-piracy mission in the Horn of Africa which 
requires States and regional organizations to adhere to applicable IHL 
and IHRL standards.551 This Resolution, however, does not contain any 
additional obligation to NATO than those that may or may not exist 
under international IHL or IHRL, which will be examined in paragraph 
                                                                                                                                                    
of Persons Indicted for War Crimes by the Tribunal, 9 May 1996. 
547 P. Gaeta, Is NATO Authorized or Obliged to Arrest Persons Indicted by the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia? European Journal of 
International Law 9 (1998). 
548 United Nations Security Council resolution 1244(1999), 10 June 1999, para 11(j). 
549 J. Cerone, Outlining KFOR Accountability in Post-Conflict Kosovo, American 
Society of International Law, October 2000. J. Cerone, Minding the Gap: Outlining 
KFOR Accountability in Post-Conflict Kosovo, 12, European Journal of 
International Law, no. 3, 2001. 
550 D. Pacquée, S. Dewulf, International Territorial Administrations and the Rule of 
Law: The Case of Kosovo, Essex Human Rights Review Vol. 4 No. 1, February 2007, 
p. 5. 
551 UN Security Council resolution 1851(2008), 16 December 2008, para. 6; “[...] decides 
that [...] States and regional organizations cooperating in the fight against piracy 
and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia [...} may undertake all necessary 
measures that are appropriate [...], provided, however, that any measures 
undertaken pursuant to the authority of this paragraph shall be undertaken 
consistent with applicable humanitarian and human rights law”. 
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6.4 and 6.5. 
The abovementioned examples show that the UN Security Council has 
not formulated any obligations addressed to NATO. It is also unlikely 
that it will do that in the future as the Security Council is not able to 
bind a non-party to the UN Charter.  
Even though NATO is not bound by the UN Charter or its decisions, all 
of its 28 member States are. All NATO Member States are party to the 
UN Charter and therefore bound by its provisions. With respect to the 
binding nature of UN Security Council resolutions, Article 25 of the UN 
Charter obliges member States to “accept and to carry out the decisions 
of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter”. 
Additionally, Article 103 of the UN Charter provides a primacy of the 
Charter in case of a potential conflict between obligations of the UN 
member States under the Charter and their obligations under any other 
international agreement.  
The question then arises whether NATO is bound – indirectly – by the 
UN Charter because of the fact that its member States are party to it. 
The European Court of Justice (ECJ) considered this question with 
regards to the European Commission.552 In the Kadi case, the Court of 
First Instance held that the UN Charter imposes binding obligations on 
its Member States, which must therefore take all measures necessary to 
ensure that the UN Security Council resolution is put into effect.553 The 
EC itself is not directly bound to the UN Charter and is therefore not 
required, as an obligation under public international law, to accept and 
carry out the Resolution.554  
Nevertheless, the member States were bound by the obligations of the 
UN Charter prior to the creation of the EC, and by concluding a treaty 
between them they could not transfer more powers to the EC or 
withdraw from obligations under the Charter.555 In so far as under the 
EC Treaty the Community has assumed powers previously exercised by 
Member States in the area governed by the Charter of the United 
Nations, the provisions of that Charter have the effect of binding the 
Community.556 Therefore, the Court argued, when the EC implements 
the UN Security Council resolution, the “Community is to take due 
                                                             
552 ECJ (Grand Chamber), European Commission et al v. Yassin Abdullah Kadi, 
Appeal, Joined Cases 584/10, C-593/10, C-595/10, 18 July 2013.   
553 Court of First Instance, Kadi v Council of the European Union and Commission of the 
European Communities, Judgment, Case T-315/01, 21 September 2005, para. 189. 
554 Court of First Instance, Kadi v Council of the European Union and Commission of the 
European Communities, Judgment, Case T-315/01, 21 September 2005, para. 192. 
555 Court of First Instance, Kadi v Council of the European Union and Commission of the 
European Communities, Judgment, Case T-315/01, 21 September 2005, para. 193-
195. 
556 Court of First Instance, Kadi v Council of the European Union and Commission of the 
European Communities, Judgment, Case T-315/01, 21 September 2005, para. 203. 
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account of the terms and objectives of the resolution concerned and of 
the relevant obligations under the Charter of the United Nations”.557  
In other words, NATO is not directly bound to the Charter of the United 
Nations, nor do the UN Security Council resolutions impose any 
international obligation for the Alliance. However, since the members of 
NATO are bound to the UN Charter, the Alliance would need to take 
due account of the terms and objectives of the UN Security Council 
resolutions and of the relevant obligations under the Charter. Hence, it 
is concluded that the UN Charter and UN Security Council resolutions 
are indirectly binding upon NATO.  
 
6.4 International Obligations under Conventional law 
 
6.4.1 Conventional International Humanitarian Law and International 
Human Rights Law 
IHL is a term that encapsulates both international treaties and 
customary rules. Regarding the treaties, it includes the four 1949 
Geneva Conventions,558 the 1977 Additional Protocols559 and various 
specialized agreements such as the 1980 Convention on Certain 
Conventional Weapons and its five Protocols, the 1993 Chemical 
Weapons Convention and the 1997 Ottawa Convention Banning Anti-
Personnel Landmines. The current conventions on IHL do not provide 
the possibility for accession of international organizations.  
Similarly, the conventions on international human rights law neither 
provide the possibility for international organizations to accede to the 
conventions. Regional Human Rights Conventions include the 1950 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR),560 the 1969 American Convention on 
                                                             
557 ECJ (Grand Chamber), Kadi v Council of the European Union and Commission of 
the European Communities, Judgment, action for annulment, appeal, Case C-
402/05 P, [2008] ECR I-6351, [2009] AC 1225, 3 September 2008, para. 296.  
558 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick 
in Armed Forces in the Field, opened for signature 12 August 1949, (Geneva 
Convention I); Geneva Convention of the Amelioration of the Condition of the 
Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea 12 August 1949 
(Geneva Convention II); Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners 
of War, 12 August 1949 (Geneva Convention III); Geneva Convention Relative to 
the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (Geneva Convention IV), 1949, 75 
UNTS 287, 12 August 1949, (Geneva Convention IV). 
559 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to 
the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, 1977, 1125 UNTS 3, 8 
June 1977, (Additional Protocol I); Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions 
of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International 
Armed Conflicts, 1977, 1125 UNTS 609, 8 June 1977 (Additional Protocol II). 
560 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, 4 November 1950. 
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Human Rights (ACHR)561 and the 1986 African Charter on Human and 
People’s Rights (ACHPR)562 Universal conventions include the 1966 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)563 and the 
1984 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT).564  
The ECHR refers to “High Contracting Parties”565, while the ICCPR 
refers to “The States Parties to the present Covenant”.566 The 
terminology does not need to be an absolute obstacle for international 
organizations to accede to these treaties. It would be possible for 
international organizations to accede to these conventions if adequate 
legal documents are adopted. For instance, the States Party to the 
ECHR, by adopting Article 17 of Protocol No. 14 to the Convention for 
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, amending 
the control system of the Convention, made it possible for the EU – but 
not any other international organization – to accede to the ECHR.567 
However, practice shows that international organizations have not 
shown readiness to find the ways to accede to IHL and IHRL 
conventions.568 Even if it would be possible, NATO has not shown any 
preparedness to enter in any IHL or IHRL agreement.569  
It is therefore concluded that NATO is not formally bound by those 
human rights treaties. However, in as far as human rights law is also 
customary law, or even jus cogens, NATO is bound by it. The 
international obligations under international customary law is 
examined in paragraph 6.5.  
 
6.4.2 Mission-SOFAs between NATO and the Host State 
NATO can enter into international agreements with States or other 
international organizations. These international agreements may 
                                                             
561 American Convention on Human Rights, 22 November 1969. 
562 African Charter on Human and People’s Rights, entered into force 21 October 1986. 
563 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 16 December 1966. 
564 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, entered into force 26 June 1987. 
565 Art. 1, European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, 4 November 1950. 
566 Preamble, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 16 December 1966. 
567 Protocol No. 14 to the Convention fort he Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, Amending the Control System of the Convention, 13 May 
2004, entered into force 1 June 2010. 
568 With regard to the EU: F. Naert, International Law Aspects of the EU’s Security 
and Defence Policy, 2010, p. 527. Regarding the UN: Zwanenburg, M.C. (2005) 
Accountability of peace support operations, Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, p. 141.  
569 Letter of M.S. Johnson, Jr., the Legal Advisor to the Supreme Allied Commander in 
Europe (SACEUR) to Amnesty International, 12 March 1996. According to Johnson, 
IFOR should not be equated to a State in terms of international obligations, thereby 
likely referring to the obstacle for IFOR or NATO to accede to IHL instruments. 
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contain international obligations binding upon NATO. The following 
paragraph will examine binding obligations contained in mission Status 
of Forces Agreement (mission-SOFAs). 
Mission-SOFAs regulate more or less the same topics in every operation 
and regardless the international organization that is conducting the 
operation. The EU570 and the UN571 utilize a model-SOFA, which forms 
the blueprint for international agreements between their organization 
and the host nation. NATO does not have a model-SOFA, but its 
mission-SOFAs have a certain degree of similarity. The Alliance itself 
has concluded two mission SOFAs to date, which concerned the 
operations IFOR/SFOR and ISAF.572 NATO did not need to conclude a 
mission-SOFA for ISAF as this was already in place, prior to the change 
of command over the ISAF mission to NATO in 2005. In 2003, ISAF was 
conducted by a coalition of States, which concluded in January 2002 the 
necessary Status of Forces arrangements with the interim government 
of Afghanistan.573 The Alliance did expand the existing SOFA through 
an exchange of letters with the Interim Government of Afghanistan, to 
include NATO forces and contractors.574 In 2014, NATO entered into a 
bilateral SOFA with Afghanistan for its follow-up mission Operation 
Resolute Support.575 
A recurring theme in mission-SOFAs is the obligation of mission 
personnel to respect host nation laws, which correlates with the 
functional immunity from host nation jurisdiction accorded to 
personnel.576 Whether or not the term involves the duty to obey local 
                                                             
570 Council of the European Union, Draft Model Agreement on the status of the 
European Union-led forces between the European Union and a Host State, 
11894/07, 20 July 2007.  
571 United Nations General Assembly, Model Status-of-Forces-Agreement for Peace-
keeping Operations, A/45/594, 9 October 1990. 
572 The legal status of the KFOR mission is regulated by the Military Technical 
Agreement between the International Security Force (“KFOR”) and the 
Governments of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia, 9 
June 1999. Since UN Security Council 1244(1999) mandated UNMiK to administer 
the territory of Kosovo, a mission SOFA with the host nation was not a preferred 
option and would impinge on the competence of the UN-led mission. Instead 
UNMiK issued regulation 2000/47, which constitutes in fact a mission-SOFA. 
573 Military Technical Agreement between the International Security Assistance Force 
(ISAF) and the Interim Administration of Afghanistan (‘Interim Administration’), 4 
January 2002. 
574 Exchange of letters between the Secretary General of NATO and the Afghan 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, dated 5 September 2004 and 22 November 2004. 
575 Status of Forces Agreement between the Afghan government and NATO, signed 30 
September 2014. 
576 UN: United Nations General Assembly, Model Status-of-Forces-Agreement for 
Peace-keeping Operations, A/45/594, 9 October 1990, para IV(6), “[...]The United 
Nations peace-keeping operation and its members shall respect all local laws and 
regulations”. EU: Council of the European Union, Draft Model Agreement on the 
status of the European Union-led forces between the European Union and a Host 
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laws or a duty to take them into consideration has been a subject of 
many legal discussions.577 The view held here is that the duty to respect 
does not imply that NATO is bound by the legislation of the host State. 
Rather, a violation of domestic laws by mission personnel would 
constitute a breach of the duty laid down in the mission SOFA. NATO 
formulates the obligation to respect local laws the same way as other 
international organizations engaged in peace support operations. For 
instance the SOFA with Bosnia Herzegovina regulating the status of 
SFOR and its personnel states that mission personnel shall “respect the 
laws of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina insofar as it is 
compatible with the entrusted tasks/mandate and shall refrain from 
activities not compatible with the nature of the Operation.578 If a 
member of the mission would deliberately deposit waste outside the 
military compound in violation of domestic environmental laws, this 
could entail a breach – not of the host nation laws – but of obligation 
under the mission-SOFA as well as the obligation to compensate the 
host nation for the damages caused.  
In conclusion, NATO mission-SOFAs are a relevant source of 
international obligations binding upon NATO, in particular when the 
international agreement refers to the obligation to respect domestic 
laws of the host Nation.  
 
6.4.3 Memoranda of Understanding between NATO and TCNs 
Memoranda of understanding (MOUs) are a common used type of 
agreements in military operations that may regulate a variety of topics, 
ranging from logistic support, financial regulations, command and 
control and many other issues. MOUs are concluded between the 
international organization conducting the operation and the Troop 
                                                                                                                                                    
State, 11894/07, 20 July 2007, article 2(1), “EUFOR and EUFOR personnel shall 
respect the laws and regulations of the Host State and shall refrain from any action 
or activity incompatible with the objectives of the mission.” NATO, e.g. Annex A to 
the Military Technical Agreement between the International Security Assistance 
Force (ISAF) and the Interim Administration of Afghanistan (‘Interim 
Administration’), 4 January 2002, para. 2, “All ISAF and supporting personnel, 
including liaison personnel, enjoying privileges and immunities under the 
Arrangement will respect the laws of Afghanistan, insofar as it is compatible with 
the UNSCR (1386) and will refrain from activities not compatible with the nature of 
the mission.” 
577 S. Lazereff, Status of Military Forces under Current International Law, 1971, p. 
100-101. R. Batstone, Respect for the Law of the Receiving State in Fleck, D. (ed.) 
(2001) The handbook of the law of visiting forces, United Kingdom: Oxford 
University Press, p. 61, A. Sari, Status of Forces and Status of Mission Agreements 
under the ESDP: The EU’s Evolving Practice, 19 European Journal of International 
Law 1, 2008, p. 67-100. 
578 General Framework Agreement for Peace, 10 November 1995, Appendix B to Annex 
1A “Agreement between the Republic of Bosnia Herzegovina and the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO) Concerning the Status of NATO and its Personnel” 
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Contributing Nations (TCNs) as well as between the international 
organization and the host nation.  
Each international organization uses their own format for the drafting 
of MOUs. When States contribute forces to an UN-led mission, the 
“Revised Draft Model Memorandum of Understanding between the 
United Nations and Troop Contributing Countries” stipulates the 
delineation of responsibilities between the UN and the TCN.579 The 
MOU regulates the command and control relationship of the UN and 
TCN over the contributed forces and, by concluding the MOU, the TCN 
agrees to respect the local laws of the host nation, the standards of 
conduct of the UN and to respect a number of IHL conventions.580 The 
UN sees the conclusions of these MOU as an efficient tool to ensure 
responsibility for conduct of forces contributed by TCNs. After incidents 
regarding sexual exploitation and abuse by UN peacekeepers, the UN 
used the MOU to implement various measures in order to prevent 
further incidents and to ensure accountability of personnel for criminal 
behaviour. The UN considers the model MOU a binding agreement 
between the UN and Troop Contributing Country. It is questionable 
though how such an agreement can create international obligations, 
when the intention of an MOU is to create only a political commitment. 
The linguistic features of MOUs is to avoid creating a binding 
document. 
NATO does not consider that MOUs are binding legal documents. 
NATO and its member States have the practice to avoid terms used in 
the MOU that may reflect a possible legally binding nature.581 
NATO concluded MOUs with troop contributing nations to regulate 
financial and logistical aspects of a mission.582 NATO may also conclude 
                                                             
579 UN, Model MOU, Letter Dated 11 January 2006 from the Chairman of the 2004 
Working Group on Contingent-Owned Equipment to the Chairman of the Fifth 
Committee, UN Doc A/C.5/60/26, 11 January 2006 annex “Manual on Policies and 
Procedures concerning the Reimbursement and Control of Contingent-Owned 
Equipment of Troop/Police Contributors Participating in Peacekeeping Missions”. 
Revised Draft Model MOU, Report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping 
Operations and Its Working Group on the 2007 Resumed Session, UN Doc A/61/19 
(Pt III), 12 June 2007 annex “Revised Draft Model Memorandum of 
Understanding”. 
580 Article 28 of the Model MOU: The UN peacekeeping mission “shall observe and 
respect the principles and spirit of the general international convention applicable 
to the conduct of military personnel. The international convention referred to above 
include the four Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and their Additional 
Protocols of 8 June 1977 and the UNESCO Convention of 14 May 1954 on the 
Protection of Cultural Property in the event of armed conflict. [TCNs] shall 
therefore ensure that the members of its national contingent serving with {the UN 
peacekeeping operation] be fully acquainted with the principles and spirit of these 
Conventions”.  
581 NATO Legal Deskbook, Second Edition, 2010, p. 127-128. 
582 AJP-4.9, Modes of Multinational Logistic Support, November 2005. 
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MOUs with the host nation to stipulate the conditions of support 
delivered by the host nation to the mission. More recently, MOUs cover 
a variety of other topics. The topics may also include issues such as 
gathering of intelligence in the host nation or the sharing of information 
between the host nation and NATO. One particular practice that 
emerged that is relevant to the topic of responsibility of NATO during 
its operations is the conclusion of an MOU with the host nation to 
receive diplomatic assurances on the treatment of detainees that are 
transferred by the mission to the host nation. As described in Chapter 2 
on the detention operations by Canada in ISAF, several TCNs have 
concluded such MOUs with the Afghan government. The majority of 
writers argue that such diplomatic assurances contained in MOUs are 
not legally binding and hence to not absolve the transferring State from 
its obligation under IHRL.583 
NATO did not conclude a single overarching MOU with the government 
of Afghanistan as each TCN may have different international 
obligations under IHRL. The various bilateral MOUs between TCNs 
and Afghanistan led to differences in the handling of detainees and, at 
times, constituted a hindrance to effective military cooperation.584 NATO 
tried to conclude an overarching MOU, but the political differences 
between the nations impeded this initiative. 
In conclusion, MOUs are politically binding documents, but do not 
contain any legally binding international obligations for NATO. For this 
reason, MOUs are not a relevant source of international obligations to 
NATO even if the content of such documents contain references to 
international human rights law and international humanitarian law. 
 
6.5 International Obligations under Customary Law 
 
This paragraph will examine whether the rules of customary law are 
binding upon NATO. In general, international organizations that have 
international legal personality are bound by international customary 
law insofar the organization is able, by its nature and powers, to apply 
these rules.585 The fact that an international organization partakes as a 
subject of international law in international relations means that the 
                                                             
583 J.K. Kleffner, Operational Detention, in T. Gill, D. Fleck (eds.), The Handbook of 
the International Law of Military Operations, 2010, p. 469. UNHCR, Note on 
Diplomatic Assurances and International Refugee Protection, Aug 2006, 
http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/44dc81164.pdf. Human Rights Watch, “Diplomatic 
 Assurances” against Torture, http://www.hrw.org/sites/ default/files/ 
related_material/ecaqna1106web.pdf 
584 J. Hartmann, The Copenhagen Process: Principles and Guidelines, EJIL Talk, 3 
November 2012. 
585 Schermers, H.G. and Blokker, N.M. (1995) International institutional law: Unity 
within diversity, The Netherlands: Brill, p. 824-825. 
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organization is, ipso facto, bound by the relevant rules of international 
customary law. In other words, with powers to act on the international 
level comes responsibility to abide by international law. Denying the 
existence of such obligations would be denying the existence of legal 
personality.586  
On the basis of this premise, it is held that NATO is bound by 
customary international law. NATO itself has not expressly 
acknowledged the applicability of international customary law to its 
actions. The strongest wording it has used is that NATO respects 
international customary law as a matter of principle, not as a matter of 
a binding international obligation resting upon the Alliance.587 NATO’s 
point of view that it is not bound to international customary law is 
predominantly grounded in the belief that NATO is not able, by its 
nature and powers, to apply these rules of customary IHL and IHRL. 
NATO lacks the disciplinary and criminal powers that States possess 
over their armed forces, which would preclude them to implement and 
enforce these provisions.588 However, the absence of criminal and 
disciplinary powers would not need to stand in the way to consider that 
NATO is bound by the customary norms of laws of armed conflict. The 
lack of such powers does not relate to the binding nature of 
international obligations found in customary international law per sé, 
rather to the extent of binding obligations under international 
customary law.589 
 
6.5.1 International Obligations under Customary IHL 
In their ICRC study Customary International Humanitarian Law, 
Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck inventoried the norms of IHL that have 
gained customary status.590 The authors identified 161 rules of 
customary international humanitarian law. The majority of rules of the 
1949 Geneva Conventions, including common Article 3, are considered 
                                                             
586 ICJ, Advisory Opinion, Interpretation of the Agreement of 25 March 1951 between 
the WHO and Egypt, 20 December 1980, pp. 89-90. 
587 M. Matthee, B. Toebes, M. Brus (eds.), Armed Conflict and International Law: In 
Search of the Human Face, 2013, p. 21. 
588 See also the argument of the UN that it cannot comply with the provisions of IHL 
as it lacks the competence to conduct prosecution of peacekeepers, F. Naert, 
International Law Aspects of the EU’s Security and Defence Policy, 2010, p. 533-
534. Scholars have rejected this argument as the UN could have the competence to 
conduct prosecution of peacekeepers, through e.g. the establishment of an 
international tribunal that could prosecute UN peacekeepers if it wishes so. 
589 The lack of disciplinary powers and criminal jurisdiction may be of importance tot 
he question of ‘effective control’, but not to the question of the binding nature of 
international customary norms of NATO. Effective control is required to attribute 
wrongful conduct of personnel that is placed at the disposal of an international 
organization. This aspect will be examined in chapter 7 of this thesis. 
590 J-M. Henckaerts, L. Doswald-Beck (eds.), Customary International Humanitarian 
Law, 2005. 
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to be customary law, as well as the 1907 Hague Regulations.591 Other 
treaties, such as the 1977 Additional Protocols, also contain provisions 
of customary nature. 
This paragraph does not intend to replicate the work of the ICRC by 
identifying here relevant customary norms of IHL to NATO operations. 
Rather, the intent is to analyse whether customary IHL is a source of 
international obligations binding to NATO. There are two questions 
which need to be answered to come to that conclusion. Firstly, is 
international customary IHL applicable to international organizations, 
as these norms are addressed to States primarily, and secondly, since 
IHL only applies to participants to an armed conflict, it must be 
assessed whether NATO can be seen as such. This paragraph will 
analyse these two questions in order to come to a conclusion whether 
the Alliance is bound, and to what extent it is bound, to customary IHL. 
 
a. The addressee of the norms of IHL 
The IHL treaties were designed with States as the addressees in mind, 
which is apparent from the form and content of the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions and the 1907 Hague Regulations. The Conventions speak 
of “the territory of the High Contracting Parties”592 and use terms as 
“States” and “Governments”.593  
This raises the question whether international humanitarian law can be 
applicable – by analogy and where appropriate – to international 
organization.594 International organizations do not resemble to States. 
They do not have a territory, nor is the concept of sovereignty 
meaningful to them. These attributes are closely connected to the norms 
of international humanitarian law.  
Nevertheless, some authors argue that the application of international 
humanitarian law to international organizations seems to be “less 
revolutionary than the application of many other international rules”.595 
The norms are applicable to non-state actors, such as armed opposition 
groups, as well. Zwanenburg596 and Zegveld597 even suggest that some 
                                                             
591 J-M. Henckaerts, L. Doswald-Beck (eds.), Customary International Humanitarian 
Law, 2005. 
592 Common Article 2 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, “[...] The Convention shall also 
apply to all cases of partial or total occupation of the present Convention. [...]”. 
593 E.g. Article 4 and 6, 1907 Hague Regulations, “Prisoners of war are in the power o 
the hostile Government [...]”, “The State may utilize the labour of prisoners of war 
according to their rank and aptitude [...].” 
594 D. Shraga, The United Nations as an Actor Bound by International Humanitarian 
Law, 5 International Peacekeeping 64, 1998, p. 65. 
595 Zwanenburg, M.C. (2005) Accountability of peace support operations, Netherlands: 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, p. 165 
596 Zwanenburg, M.C. (2005) Accountability of peace support operations, Netherlands: 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, p. 165 
597 L. Zegveld, Accountability of armed opposition groups in international law, 
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international organizations could fit the definition of “organized armed 
groups”.598 The essential criterion of organized armed groups is the 
existence of a responsible command, which certain international 
organizations, and in particular NATO, have. Zwanenburg does not 
suggest that NATO should be equated to an organized armed group. 
Instead, since IHL can be applicable to non-State actors, the view that 
international organizations could be bound by this body of law is not 
that far sought than thought at first glance.599  
 
b. The qualification of an armed conflict in which NATO participates 
An international armed conflict is an armed conflict between two 
States. An armed conflict between an international organization and a 
State would be defined as non-international, as the latter is not a State. 
However, this literal interpretation is not the prevailing view. 
International organizations are, like States, subjects of international 
law and, if two subjects of international law come into armed conflict 
with another, the conflict is considered international because it is 
regulated by the same international regime.600 
The situation becomes slightly more complicated with regard to non-
international armed conflicts. A non-international armed conflict is an 
armed conflict which takes place in the territory of a State between its 
armed forces and organized armed groups, or between such groups.601 As 
such, an armed conflict between NATO and a non-State actor would be 
a non-international armed conflict, as both entities are not States. 
Other authors maintain that the intervention of an international 
organization in an armed conflict would render the conflict 
automatically international, because of the fact that an international 
organization is made up of States.602 This view disregards, however, that 
international organizations may have international legal personality 
and should be seen separate from the member States.  
It is held here that the intervention of an international organization in 
support of an armed group fighting against the government would 
render the conflict international, while an intervention in support, or at 
                                                                                                                                                    
Cambridge studies in international and comparative law, 2002. 
598 ICTY, Trial Chamber, Judgment, Prosecutor v. Boškoski and Tarulovski, IT-04-82-
T, 10 July 2008, para. 17. 
599 Zwanenburg, M.C. (2005) Accountability of peace support operations, Netherlands: 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, p. 165. 
600 Zwanenburg, M.C. (2005) Accountability of peace support operations, Netherlands: 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 195-196, C. Greenwood, International Humanitarian 
Law and United Nations Military Operations, 1 Yearbook of International 
Humanitarian Law 3, 1998, p. 25, C. Emanuelli, Les Actions Militaires de l’ONU et 
le Droit International Humanitaire, 1995, p. 34. 
601 Common article 2 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions.. 
602 M. Milanovic, What Exactly Internationalizes an Internal Armed Conflict, 
EJIL:Talk, 7 May 2010.  
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least with the consent, of a State against such a group will not render 
the conflict international. Instead, it remains a non-international armed 
conflict. Some authors define such a conflict as an “internationalised” 
non-international armed conflict, but the term has no further legal 
relevance, other than to express the circumstance that other States or 
international organization participate in the conflict in support of the 
State in whose territory the conflict takes place.603  
In conclusion, an international armed conflict exists when there is an 
armed conflict between a State and NATO. A non-international armed 
conflict exists when there is a conflict between NATO – either in 
support or with the consent of the State in which the conflict takes place 
– and an organized armed group.604 The next paragraph will examine 
the conditions to determine when NATO is a party in the armed 
conflict. 
 
c. The conditions to determine when NATO becomes a party to an armed 
conflict 
The next step is to establish the conditions which determine whether 
NATO becomes a party to an armed conflict, since IHL is only 
applicable to the parties of the conflict. The deployment of NATO into a 
conflict zone does not automatically mean that NATO has become a 
party to an armed conflict, unless certain conditions are met. IHL sets 
different conditions for international and non-international armed 
conflicts, both situations will be examined in the following paragraph. 
The applicability of IHL (jus in bello) is not dependent on the norms 
pertaining to the right to engage in hostilities (jus ad bellum). The 
norms on the conduct during armed conflict are strictly separated from 
the norms regulating the legality of engaging into armed conflict. In 
theory, the legal basis upon which an operation is conducted is not 
determinative to whether NATO is a party to an armed conflict.  
The strict separation between the legal basis to use force and the 
application of IHL is on occasion blurred, in particular when forces are 
deployed in so-called peacekeeping operations, authorized under 
Chapter VI or so-called Chapter “VI and a half”605 of the UN Charter.606 
                                                             
603 H.P. Gasser, Internationalized Non-international armed conflicts: Case Studies of 
Afghanistan, Kampuchea and Lebanon, American University Review, Vol. 33/1, 
1983, pp. 145-161. ICRC  
https://www.icrc.org/casebook/doc/glossary/internationalized-internal-armed-
conflict-glossary.htm 
604 ICTY, Decision on the defence motion for interlocutory appeal on jurisdiction, 
Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, 2 October 1995, paras. 66-70. 
605 UN, Question considered by the Security Council at its 749th and 750th meetings 
held on 30 October 1956: 2nd and final report of the Secretary General on the plan 
for an emergency international United Nations force requested in the resolution 
adopted by the General Assembly on 4 November 1956, A/3302, 1956.  
606 United Nations, Secretary General's Bulletin, ST/SGB/1999/13, 6 August 1999. 
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The neutral position that peacekeepers take in the armed conflict gives 
the impression that these forces will not become a party, but the 
participation in armed conflict is not dependent on the formal 
characterisation of the forces, but on factual circumstances.607 If the UN 
mandate limits the use of armed force to invididual or unit self-defence 
actions, the peacekeeping mission maintains its neutral position and 
will not become a party to the armed conflict. However, if the mission 
goes beyond the initial peacekeeping mandate and resorts to offensive 
force, the mission will become a party to the armed conflict. Military 
forces in operations based on (collective) self-defence and peace 
enforcement operations based on respectively articles 51 and 42 of the 
UN Charter are likely to use armed force, but this is neither pre-
determined. If the mission does not perform any offensive actions, it will 
not become a party to an armed conflict. Therefore, it is not possible to 
determine on the basis of jus ad bellum whether NATO will or is to 
become a party to an armed conflict. 
NATO becomes a party to an international armed conflict if it resorts to 
armed force against another State. As soon as the Alliance detains 
prisoners or has control over a part of the territory of another State, 
then the norms of IHL pertaining to international armed conflict 
apply.608 A minimal transgression, which expresses belligerent intent of 
one party is sufficient.609  
An international armed conflict exists insofar there is evidence of 
belligerent intent of one party against the other. Belligerent intent 
exists when there is interference with another’s ‘sphere of 
sovereignty’.610 This intent is deduced from factual circumstances and is 
deemed to exist when a party is involved in military operations or any 
other hostile act aimed at neutralising the enemy’s personnel or 
resources, hampering its military operations, subduing it or inducing its 
change in actions.611 The temporal and geographical scope of the armed 
                                                                                                                                                    
Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associate Personnel, 9 December 
1994. 
607 Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associate Personnel, 9 December 
1994. 
608 H.P. Gasser, International Humanitarian Law: an Introduction, in: H. Haug (ed.), 
Humanity for All: The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, 1993, 
p. 510- 511. 
609 N. Melzer, Targeted Killing in International Law, 2008, p. 250. T. Ferraro, The 
Applicability of International Humanitarian Law to Multinational Forces, 
International Review of the Red Cross, 2013, no. 95, Multinational Operations and 
the Law, p. 575-576. 
610 N. Melzer, Targeted Killing in International Law, 2008, p. 250. 
611 T. Ferraro, The Applicability of International Humanitarian Law to Multinational 
Forces, International Review of the Red Cross, 2013, no. 95, Multinational 
Operations and the Law, p. 575-576. 
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conflict extends beyond the exact time and place of the hostilities.612 If 
NATO is involved in any of the situations as described here, it can be 
considered involved in an international armed conflict.   
The conditions when an entity becomes a party to a non-international 
armed conflict are found in the 1949 Geneva Conventions, 1977 
Additional Protocol II and jurisprudence, in particular that of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. Basically 
there are two conditions for non-international armed conflict to exist: (1) 
the fighting occurs between parties demonstrating a certain level of 
organization and (2) the fighting has reached a certain threshold of 
intensity. The level of organization is assessed by the existence of a 
command and control structure, the ability to conduct coordinated 
military operations, evidence of a certain level of logistics and the 
ability to respect and ensure respect for IHL.613 
The intensity is measured by taking into account the number, duration 
and intensity of individual confrontations, types of weapons and 
equipment used, number and calibre of the munitions employed, 
number of forces and individuals involved in the conflict, the extent of 
destruction, the number of civilians fleeing, the number of casualties, 
the spread of the conflict.614  
Given the structure of NATO as depicted in Chapter 4, the Alliance 
easily meets the criteria of organization.615 The next question would 
then be whether there the conflict has reached the threshold for non-
international armed conflict. Certainly, if NATO deploys in an already 
existent non-international armed conflict in support of a State, NATO 
will automatically become a party to the conflict and the norms of IHL 
pertaining to non-international armed conflict will apply.616 The 
following paragraphs will examine whether NATO is a party to an 
international or non-international armed conflict during its mission in 
the Balkans, Afghanistan and Libya, reflecting the cases mentioned in 
Chapter 2. 
 
d. Application of the conditions to NATO operations 
The abovementioned conditions can be applied to determine whether 
                                                             
612 ICTY, Appeals Chamber, Decision on the Defence motion for interlocutory appeal 
on jurisdiction, Prosecutor v. D. Tadić, IT-94-I, 2 October 1995, paras. 66-70. 
613 ICTY, Trial Chamber, Judgment, The Prosecutor v. Tadić, IT-94-I-T, 7 May 1997, 
paras. 561-568.  
614 ICTY, Trial Chamber, Judgment, The Prosecutor v. Boškoski, IT-04-82-T, 10 July 
2008, paras. 177-193. 
615 T. Ferraro, The Applicability and Application of International Humanitarian Law 
to Multinational Forces, International Review of the Red Cross, vol. 95, no. 891/892, 
2013, p. 577. 
616 T. Ferraro, The Applicability and Application of International Humanitarian Law 
to Multinational Forces, International Review of the Red Cross, vol. 95, no. 891/892, 
2013, p. 578. 
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NATO has been a party in armed conflicts during its operations in the 
Balkan, Afghanistan and Libya.  
 
OPERATIONS IN THE BALKANS 
The Alliance has been active in the Balkans since June 1992, initially 
performing monitoring tasks,617 which later expanded to embargo 
enforcement activities618 and the enforcement of a no-fly zone.619 These 
operations continued throughout the international armed conflict in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina between the Socialist Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia and the Republic of Croatia, at least until 19 May 1992.620 
After the independence of Bosnia-Herzegovina in May 1992, the armed 
conflict remained international between the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia – effectively controlling – the Bosnian-Serb Army (VRS) and 
forces of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
NATO’s operations expanded throughout the development of the 
ongoing international armed conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The 
Alliance conducted close-air support operations in support of 
UNPROFOR and targeted e.g. command and control facilities.621 From 
                                                             
617 Monitoring tasks:  
 Operation Maritime Monitor, 16 July - 22 November 1992, NATO warships 
patrolled the Adriatic Sea to monitor the United Nations Security Council’s 
embargo on weapons to the warring parties during the fighting in Former 
Yugoslavia.  
Operation Sky Monitor, 15 October 1992 - 12 April 1993, NATO aircraft monitored 
the No-Fly Zone declared by the United Nations Security Council against flights by 
military aircraft of the warring factions over Bosnia during the fighting in Former 
Yugoslavia. 
618 Operation Maritime Guard, 22 November 1992 - 15 June 1993. Following a decision 
taken at a joint session of the North Atlantic Council and the Western European 
Union (WEU) Council, the separate NATO and WEU operations in the Adriatic Sea 
to enforce the United Nations’ maritime embargo of weapons imports by the 
warring factions in Former Yugoslavia were combined into a single operation, 
Operation SHARP GUARD, 15 June 1993 - 2 October 1996. 
619 Operation Deny Flight, 13 April 1993 – 20 December 1995. In contrast to Operation 
Sky Monitor, NATO was authorized in Operation Deny Flight to use “all necessary 
means” to enforce the no-fly zone. 
620 ICTY, Appeals Chamber, Decision on the Defence motion for interlocutory appeal 
on jurisdiction, Prosecutor v. D. Tadić, IT-94-I, 2 October 1995, para. 72. 
621 Operation Deny Flight, 12 April 1993 - 21 December 1995, Subsequent additions to 
the operation included Close Air Support to UN peacekeepers and air strikes in 
support of UN resolutions. On 28 February 1994 NATO engaged in the first combat 
operations in its history when NATO aircraft shot down four Bosnian Serb fighter-
bombers conducting a bombing mission in violation of the No-Fly Zone. Operations 
Deadeye and Deliberate Force, 30 - 31 August 1995 & 5 - 14 September 1995, After 
a mortar attack caused heavy loss of life at a marketplace in Sarajevo, UN 
peacekeepers requested NATO airstrikes, which began on 30 August against 
Bosnian Serb air defences (Operation Deadeye). When a bombing pause failed to 
result in Bosnian Serb compliance with the UN’s demands to withdraw, Operation 
Deliberate Force targeted Bosnian Serb command & control installations and 
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1995, after the signing of the Dayton Peace Accord and the cessation of 
hostilities, the Alliance deployed military personnel in Bosnia-
Herzegovina to conduct peacekeeping operations named subsequently 
IFOR622 and SFOR.623  
The ICTY established that an international armed conflict existed in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina from 1991 until 1995. NATO’s operations from 
1992 until 1995 were aimed at contributing to a peace settlement by 
enforcing the UN mandated embargo, no-fly zone and close air support. 
In doing so, NATO has used armed force, demonstrating belligerent 
intent against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia as well as the 
Republic of Croatia. It is concluded that the Alliance has been a party to 
an international armed conflict from 1992 until 1995. After the 
conclusion of the Dayton Peace Agreement on 14 December 1995, the 
hostilities ceased and – in spite of the belief of the international 
community that violence would flare up again – no armed conflict re-
emerged in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In the absence of hostilities, NATO did 
not continue as a party to any armed conflict during its operations 
IFOR and SFOR.624  
NATO also deployed military personnel in Kosovo. From 1998, The 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) violently 
opposed an ethnic Albanian minority. This minority formed the Kosovo 
Liberation Army (KLA) with the aim to separate from the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia. After attempts to reach a peace accord failed, 
NATO conducted an air campaign under the name “Operation Allied 
Force” against primarily positions of the armed forces of the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro).625 NATO’s intervention 
                                                                                                                                                    
ammunition facilities. These airstrikes were a key factor in bringing the Serbs to 
the negotiating table and ending the war in Bosnia. 
622 Operation Joint Endeavour (Implementation Force, IFOR), 20 December 1995 - 20 
December 1996, NATO’s first peacekeeping operation – IFOR – which had the 
mission of implementing the military aspects of the peace agreement for Bosnia 
(separation of warring factions and creating safe and secure conditions for the other 
tasks associated with the peace agreement). Approximately 60,000 troops from the 
16 NATO members and 17 non-NATO countries including Russia participated in 
IFOR initially. 
623 Operation Joint Guard (Stabilisation Force, SFOR), 20 December 1996 - 20 June 
1998. Following the end of Operation Joint Endeavour and the completion of the 
initial military tasks for implementing the peace agreement, NATO continued 
leading the international peacekeeping operation in Bosnia with a new focus and a 
smaller force now bearing the name SFOR instead IFOR. 
624 Zwanenburg, M.C. (2005) Accountability of peace support operations, Netherlands: 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, p. 193. 
625 Operation Allied Force, 24 March - 20 June 1999, NATO’s air campaign against the 
Former Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY: Serbia & Montenegro) and its forces deployed 
in Kosovo. During this operation NATO used a wide range of aircraft and naval 
weapons against the FRY including submarine-launched cruise missiles, fighters, 
fighter bombers, air defence aircraft and AWACS. NATO also assembled a ground 
force in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) led by the ACE 
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was conducted without authorization by the UN Security Council. The 
Operation Allied Force was not part of a peacekeeping mission like 
IFOR and SFOR, rather NATO was directly engaged in an international 
armed conflict against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.  
A peace settlement followed and NATO initiated Kosovo Force (KFOR) 
to implement the agreement.626 The operation is still ongoing in 2016. It 
is clear that NATO was in an international armed conflict with the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) during the 
period of Operation Allied Force. It has expressed belligerent intent by 
its bombing campaign on military objectives of the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia. After the peace settlement, the international armed conflict 
ended. While an armed conflict in Kosovo did not re-emerge, one could 
state that KFOR acted as an occupying force and that the customary 
norms of IHL pertaining to international armed conflict were 
applicable.627  
 
NATO’S OPERATION ISAF IN AFGHANISTAN 
The nature of the conflict in Afghanistan has been extensively debated 
in literature.628 The conflict is generally viewed as an international 
armed conflict between a US-led coalition of States and Afghanistan 
from 1 October 2001 until 5 December 2001, on which date the Bonn 
Agreement was signed and an interim-government was established in 
Afghanistan. The US-led Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) 
continued, but since the operations were not directed against – and with 
consent of – the new Afghan government, the conflict changed into a 
non-international armed conflict. In parallel, another mission started on 
                                                                                                                                                    
Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) headquarters. This force served as a confidence- 
building measure for the FYROM authorities and eventually became the Kosovo 
Force (KFOR) 
626 Operation Joint Guardian, 12 June 1999 – Present (KFOR) The NATO-led KFOR 
(Kosovo Force) deployed into Kosovo to implement the peace settlement, which 
included the Military Technical Agreement signed by Serbia and the undertaking 
by the Kosovo Liberation Army (UCK) to demilitarise and transform itself. KFOR’s 
mission was to establish a military presence, deter renewed hostilities, verify and if 
necessary enforce the terms of the MTA and UCK undertaking, establish a secure 
environment for the return of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees and 
international organisations, provide immediate basic life support to IDPs in Kosovo, 
provide initial basic civil administration and other non-military functions pending 
the arrival of international organisations and control the borders of the FRY in 
Kosovo with Albania and FYROM. On 28 April 2005 the KFOR operation became 
part of OPLAN 10501 Joint Enterprise for the Entire Balkan Operation Area.  
627 Zwanenburg, M.C. (2005) Accountability of peace support operations, Netherlands: 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, p. 181. 
628 ICRC, Conflict in Afghanistan II, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 93, 
No. 881, March 2011. Y. Arai-Takahashi, Disentangling legal quagmires: the legal 
characterisation of the armed conflicts in Afghanistan since 6/7 October 2001 and 
the question of prisoner of war status, in, H. Fischer, A. McDonald, Yearbook of 
International Humanitarian Law, 2002, p. 61. 
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20 December 2001 called the International Security Assistance Force 
(ISAF) mandated by the UN Security Council to assist the Afghan 
government to maintain security in the country. In 2003, NATO 
assumed command of ISAF.  
ISAF supported the Afghan government in maintaining the security in 
areas of Afghanistan.629 By 2003, the intensity and duration of the 
conflict between the Afghan government, ISAF and the insurgency 
composed of both Al Qaida and Taliban members had reached the 
threshold of a non-international armed conflict. 
There are divergent opinions regarding the status of the conflict 
between NATO and the Taliban. Some States have argued that there is 
no armed conflict in the region where their forces are operating,630 or 
maintained that their activities do not involve the use of force and 
hence would not become a party to a non-international armed conflict.631 
These views disregard NATO’s command relationship constituting 
effective control over the forces deployed in ISAF. As long as the forces 
act under the effective control of NATO, the Alliance as an international 
organization is a party to the non-international armed conflict with the 
Taliban insurgency. 
In 2014, the ISAF operation was terminated, but NATO continued to 
remain active in Afghanistan with a small training and mentoring 
mission under the name “Operation Resolute Support”. The non-
international armed conflict is still ongoing, although NATO cannot be 
considered a party to it any more as it does not participate with armed 
force to the conflict. 
 
NATO OPERATION UNIFIED PROTECTOR IN LIBYA 
During the NATO-led operation Unified Protector in Libya, NATO was 
a party to an international armed conflict with the Libyan government. 
The implementation of the no-fly zone required the destruction of 
Libyan air defence systems, such as surface-to-air missile sites and 
radar installations. In the execution to protect civilians under a threat 
of attack, NATO destroyed command and control centres, mobile rocket 
launchers, bunkers and ammunition sites.632 There are some views that 
maintain that NATO is a party to an international armed conflict with 
Libya. Sweden adopted the position that “the state or the organisation 
                                                             
629 UNSCR 1510(2003), 13 October 2003, para. 1.  
630 J.F.R. Boddens Hosang, Aandachtspunten in de ISAF ROE vanuit het strategisch-
juridisch kader, Militair Rechtelijk Tijdschrift, no. 5, 2009, p. 219-226. P. Ducheine, 
E. Pouw, ISAF Operaties in Afghanistan, 2010, p. 40. 
631 E. Wilmshurst (ed.), International Law and the Classification of Conflicts, 2012, p. 
254. 
632 Press Briefing by the NATO Spokesperson and Brigadier General Mark van Uhm, 
Chief of Allied Operations, Allied Command Operations (SHAPE), 19 April 2011, 
www.nato.int. 
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that exercises the factual control over the operation may become a party 
to the armed conflict if the operation is involved in hostilities with 
governmental forces.”633 Norway adopts a similar position.634 
Intergovernmental organizations, such as the UN Human Rights 
Commission and non-governmental organizations,635 such as Amnesty 
International,636 also view NATO in this case as a party to the 
international armed conflict.  
NATO has used force against the armed forces of the Libyan 
government. The use of force against Libyan forces interferes with the 
Libyan ‘sphere of sovereignty’ and therefore expresses a belligerent 
intent. The conditions to determine whether NATO is a party to an 
international armed conflict are therefore met. It means that from the 
moment it has become a party of an armed conflict the question of the 
application of IHL becomes relevant. 
 
6.5.2 International Obligations under Customary IHRL 
International Human Rights Law (IHRL) is the body of law designed to 
promote and protect human rights of individuals. IHRL formulates 
obligations for States in their conduct towards individuals under their 
jurisdiction. IHRL does not only oblige States to refrain from certain 
conduct, but also to actively prevent and suppress violations of 
international human rights. The ICCPR, Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (UDHR), ECHR, and others include basic human rights, 
such as the right of self-determination637 and the right to life638, the 
prohibition of torture,639 discrimination640, arbitrary arrest641 and 
slavery.642  
While these norms can undoubtedly be seen as having customary law 
status, a comprehensive list describing the exact content of customary 
norms of IHRL – similar to the study done by the ICRC in relation to 
the customary status of IHL – is not (yet) available for IHRL. NATO is 
bound by customary IHRL, including positive human rights obligations, 
                                                             
633 O. Engdahl, Multinational Peace Operations Forces, in K.M. Larsen, C.G. Guldahl 
Cooper, G. Nystuen (eds.), Searching for a ‘Principle of Humanity’ in International 
Law, 2013, p. 257. 
634 O. Engdahl, Multinational Peace Operations Forces, in K.M. Larsen, C.G. Guldahl 
Cooper, G. Nystuen (eds.), Searching for a ‘Principle of Humanity’ in International 
Law, 2013, p. 258. 
635 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on 
Libya, A/HRC/19/68, 2 March 2012 
636 Amnesty International, The Forgotten Victims of NATO Strikes, March 2012, p. 18 
637 Article 1, ICCPR,  
638 Article 6 ICCPR, article 2 ECHR, article 3 UDHR. 
639 Article 7 ICCPR, article 3 ECHR, article 5 UDHR. 
640 Article 2 and 3 ICCPR, article 14 ECHR, article 7 UDHR. 
641 Article 9 ICCPR, article 5 ECHR, article 9 UDHR. 
642 Article 8 ICCPR, article 4 ECHR, article 4 UDHR. 
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i.e. the obligation to actively prevent and suppress human rights 
violations, in so far as these are art of international customary law and 
in as far as NATO is able to execute these obligations. The latter issue – 
regarding the capability of NATO to implement positive IHRL 
obligations in further examined in Chapter 9 with respect to the 
prevention and suppression of international crimes. 
This paragraph examines whether customary IHRL is applicable to 
NATO during its operations. The first question to be answered in this 
regard is – similar to the question in relation to the norms of IHL – 
whether NATO can be an addressee of IHRL norms. Human rights 
norms require an entity that is capable to exercise jurisdiction. States 
can exercise jurisdiction, which is an inherent part of their sovereignty. 
Paragraph (a) will examine whether international organizations may 
also be able to exercise jurisdiction, even in absence of being sovereign.  
The second question regards the applicability of customary 
international human rights law during military operations, in 
particular NATO operations. While IHRL applies during peacetime as 
well as armed conflict, some of these norms may collide with norms of 
IHL. In these cases, it is relevant to examine which set of norms apply 
during activities that NATO may undertake. NATO conducts both 
operations involving the use of military force as well as operations that 
resemble law enforcement activities. Paragraph (b) will address the 
question whether IHRL applies during NATO operations. 
The third and last issue that has to be resolved is the applicability of 
customary IHRL and IHL during occupation. Occupation is a special 
situation in which a wide range of obligations under IHL and IHRL 
become applicable. Occupation is traditionally not associated with 
international organisations, rather with States occupying other State’s 
territory. However, recent practice of military operations conducted by 
international organizations, including NATO, shows that international 
organizations are capable of becoming an occupying force and, hence, 
are bound by norms of IHL and IHRL relevant to that situation.  
Paragraph (c) will therefore examine the applicability of IHRL to NATO 
during occupation. 
 
a. The element of jurisdiction as a condition for applicability of customary 
IHRL. 
All major IHRL conventions contain a clause that make their 
applicability conditional to the exercise of jurisdiction. For instance, 
Article 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) states that “The High Contracting 
Parties shall secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and 
freedoms defined in Section I of this Convention”. Article 1 of the 
American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR) similarly notes that 
the Parties “undertake to respect the rights and freedoms recognized 
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herein and to ensure to all persons subject to their jurisdiction the free 
and full exercise of those rights and freedoms”.643  
The term ‘jurisdiction’ is not defined in conventional human rights law, 
but the ICJ644, ECtHR and the UN Human Rights Committee645 have 
made attempts to come to a definition. The ECtHR has provided by far 
the most jurisprudence on the subject. There are two strands of 
interpretation of the word jurisdiction. The first strand is the so-called 
“spatial model of jurisdiction”.646 The spatial model interprets 
jurisdiction as a situation when one State exercises effective control 
over an area of another State. An example in this regard is the 
occupation of Northern Cyprus by Turkey.647 The second model is the 
“personal model of jurisdiction”. This model construes the existence of 
jurisdiction when one State exercises authority and control over an 
individual residing in another State. An example is a case were German 
State agents lured a German national residing in France to Germany.648 
The exercise of jurisdiction is not a prerogative of States alone. 
International organizations can equally exercise jurisdiction, even 
though they do not possess a territory or have their own ‘nationals’. For 
instance, NATO has exercised effective control over the territory of 
Kosovo during KFOR – albeit as part of the interim-administration of 
the UN under UNMiK.649 Similarly, NATO has exercised jurisdiction 
over individuals by detaining persons during ISAF and targeting 
individuals during its NATO operation Unified Protector in Libya. 
The ECtHR abandoned the strict adherence to the application of the 
ECHR to the espace juridique of the State Parties650 and leaned towards 
                                                             
643 American Convention on Human Rights, 22 November 1969. 
644 ICJ, Advisory Opinion, Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the 
Occupied Palestinian Territory, 9 July 2004, p. 181. ICJ, Judgment, Democratic 
Republic of the Congo v. Uganda, Case Concerning Armed Activities on the 
Territories of the Congo, 19 December 2005, p. 80. 
645 ICJ, Advisory Opinion, Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the 
Occupied Palestinian Territory, 9 July 2004. 
646 M. Milanovic, Al-Skeini and Al-Jedda in Strasbourg, 23 European Journal of 
International Law, No. 1, 2012, p. 122. 
647 ECtHR, Grand Chamber, Judgment, Loizidou v. Turkey, Application no. 15318/89, 
18 December 1996. ECtHR, Grand Chamber, Judgment, Cyprus v. Turkey, 
Application no. 25781/94, 10 May 2001, ECtHR, Grand Chamber, Judgment, Ilascu 
et al. v. Moldova and Russia, Application no. 48787/99, 8 July 2004. 
648 ECtHR, Stocke v. Germany, Application no. 28/1989/188/248, 12 October 1989, Ser. 
A, Vol 199, 24, para. 166.  
649 In Bankovic the ECtHR concluded that NATO did not exercise jurisdiction over 
Kosovo during Operation Allied Force, ECtHR, Decision of the Grand Chamber on 
admissibility, Vlastimir and Borka Bankovic and others v. Belgium, the Czech 
Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Turkey and the 
United Kingdom, 52207/99, 12 December 2001, para. 82. 
650 ECtHR, Judgment, Grand Chamber, Al-Skeini et al v UK, Application no. 55721/07, 
7 July 2011, para. 142.  
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the “State agent authority model”, but limited that model to situations 
in which the State exercises public powers.651 The case concerned six 
individuals killed by British armed forces in Basra, Iraq. One Iraqi 
citizen was shot during a British patrol, another three were killed 
during a house search. A further two Iraqi individuals died during 
detention by British armed forces. 
The Court confirmed the spatial model by maintaining that a State can 
exercise jurisdiction outside its national territory, if it exercises effective 
control over that territory.652 The Court confirmed the personal model by 
affirming the possibility for a State to exercise jurisdiction if it has 
physical authority and control over the person in question.653 The Court 
added, however, an extra condition to the personal model: the physical 
authority and control need to be part of public powers normally 
exercised by a State, thereby introducing some sort of control over a 
territory.654 The house searches and patrols executed by the British 
armed force considered by the ECtHR were not only part of the exercise 
of authority and control, but also the exercise of public authority. The 
activities was an exercise of UK jurisdiction, but only because of the 
occupation of Iraq and relevant UN Security Council resolutions.655 
International organizations may also exercise jurisdiction based on the 
personal model, with the limiting principle of the exercise of public 
powers mentioned by the ECtHR in Al-Skeini. There are some instances 
where NATO personnel have exercised physical power and control over 
an individual, as part of a public function. For example, during KFOR, 
NATO has detained individuals as part of its public functions under the 
UNMiK interim-administration in Kosovo. Arguably, NATO exercised 
public functions – with the consent of the Afghan government – in 
Afghanistan.656 The High Court of England and Wales held that NATO 
exercised jurisdiction in Afghanistan, but the Court did not put much 
emphasis on the “public powers” condition as mentioned by the ECtHR 
in Al-Skeini.657 It is held here that NATO did exercise public powers in 
Afghanistan – on behalf and upon the request of the Afghan 
                                                             
651 ECtHR, Judgment, Grand Chamber, Al-Skeini et al v UK, Application no. 55721/07, 
7 July 2011, para. 149-150. 
652 ECtHR, Judgment, Grand Chamber, Al-Skeini et al v UK, Application no. 55721/07, 
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655 M. Milanovic, Foreign Surveillance and Human Rights, Part 3: Models of 
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656 Annex I to the Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending 
the Re-establishment of Permanent Government Institutions, 5 December 2001. 
657 High Court of England and Wales, Serdar Mohammed v. Ministry of Defence, 2014, 
EWHC 1369, OB. 
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government – and has exercised physical power and control over e.g. 
individuals detained during its operations. As illustrated in Chapter 2, 
ISAF has detained – for a short period – individuals that posed a threat 
to the mission and transferred those to the Afghan government. 
Customary IHRL is, on the basis of the abovementioned circumstances, 
applicable to the detention and transfer of these individuals. 
It is hard to maintain that NATO exercised physical control over 
individuals in Libya as part of public powers normally to be exercised by 
a State.658 Indeed, NATO has exercised physical control by targeting 
individuals during an extensive air campaign, but it did not do so as 
part of exercising public powers in Libya. Similarly, Operation Allied 
Force in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), 
NATO did not exercise jurisdiction. As pointed out above, in Bankovic, 
the ECtHR held that the control over the airspace could not be 
considered territorial control and hence NATO did not have jurisdiction. 
If the criteria in Al-Skeini are applied, the same conclusion is reached, 
but the argument is slightly different. The actions of NATO, although 
constituting physical control over individuals during its air campaign, 
was not an exercise of public powers and therefore the individuals did 
not fall within its jurisdiction. 
 
b. The scope of obligations of IHRL during NATO-led operations 
NATO operations frequently take place during situations of armed 
conflict. In these situations, the norms of IHL predominantly regulate 
the conduct of hostilities. The norms of IHRL do not cease to apply 
during armed conflict, although some of its provisions may be derogated 
from in time of emergency.659 Being both applicable and regulating often 
the same topic, the relationship between both sets of norms is complex. 
It is relevant to the topic of this thesis to examine this relationship as it 
affects the extent of obligations to NATO applicable during armed 
conflict. 
It has been held that in case of contradictory norms of IHL and IHRL, 
the issue should be resolved by reference to the principles of lex 
specialis derogat legi generalis. Often IHL has been seen as the lex 
specialis as it regulates a specific situation: that of armed conflict.660 
The prevailing view currently is that both norms can apply in a given 
situation at the same time and can complement and reinforce each 
other. They complement each other especially during non-international 
armed conflicts, in which IHL does not regulate the conflict in such 
                                                             
658 ECtHR, Judgment, Al-Skeini and others v. United Kingdom, Application no. 
55721/07, 7 July 2011, paras. 149-150. 
659 ICJ, Advisory Opinion, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, ICJ 
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detailed manner as it does in international armed conflicts, IHRL 
norms will take a more prominent role to fill in the gaps left open by 
IHL. Illustrative in this regard is the treatment of internees during 
non-international armed conflict. IHL is fairly silent on the conditions 
of internment during non-international armed conflicts, so that IHRL 
can provide additional guidance where possible. 
The norms can also reinforce each other, mainly where both 
instruments seek to protect persons from abusive behaviour by those in 
whose power they are.661 For example, both IHL and IHRL prohibit 
torture, which, as mentioned above, is a jus cogens norm. There is no 
definition of torture other than in the Convention Against Torture and 
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.662 This 
definition can be used in interpreting the norms of IHL.663 IHL also 
expands the prohibition so that it does not only apply to “public officials 
or other person acting in an official capacity”664 but to any party to the 
conflict including armed opposition groups.  
There are few instances where the norms of IHL and IHRL collide. 
Obviously the right to life enshrined in Article 2 ECHR, Article 4(1) 
ACHR, Article 6 ICCPR and Article 4 ACHPR will conflict with the 
right to use lethal force under IHL. In the event that a IHRL norm is in 
conflict with an IHL norm, the norm that regulates the matter more 
specifically (lex specialis) supersedes the more general norm, (lex 
generalis). As IHL regulates a specific situation to use lethal force in a 
situation of armed conflict, it is seen as the lex specialis of IHRL, which 
applies generically and at all times. But, the rule that IHL functions as 
lex specialis to human rights law in times of armed conflict is not 
absolute.665 The relationship varies from case to case. Kleffner, Sassoli 
and Melzer argue that human rights law may, in certain cases, contain 
more specific standards in times of armed conflict, “notably the case in 
situations that, while occurring during an armed conflict, closely 
resemble those for which human rights standards have been developed. 
Examples include the use of force in relatively calm situations of 
occupation for the purpose of maintaining public order and safety or in 
areas under the firm control of State authorities in times of non-
                                                             
661 C. Droege, Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law in Situations 
of Armed Conflict, Israeli Law Review, Vol. 40, No.2, pp. 337, 2007. 
662 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, 26 June 1987. 
663 Article 31, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969. 
664 Article 10, Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment, 26 June 1987. 
665 J.K. Kleffner, Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law, in T. Gill, D. 
Fleck (eds.), The Handbook of the International Law of Military Operations, 2010, 
p. 74. 
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international armed conflict.”666 
For instance, if military forces are confronted with looting of individuals 
that do not pose a direct threat to the mission, the paradigm of law 
enforcement – which is governed by primarily IHRL – is applicable. 
This means that lethal force is only permissible in very exceptional 
circumstances, aimed at preventing an unlawful attack, necessary for 
the achievement of this purpose and minimizing to the greatest extent 
possible the recourse to lethal force. These prerequisites are based on 
primarily human rights norms. 
Instead, if the military units use force to adversely affect the military 
operations or military capacity of the enemy, the paradigm of conduct of 
hostilities – which is governed primarily by IHL – is applicable.667 Lethal 
force is permissible when it is directed against a lawful object of attack, 
planned to avoid or minimize incidental civilian harm and not expected 
to cause civilian harm that would be excessive in relation to the 
concrete and direct military advantage anticipated. These conditions 
are derived from IHL. 
There are at least two examples of NATO conducting law enforcement 
tasks during its operations. The first example are the counter-narcotics 
efforts in Afghanistan. Upon request of the Afghan government, the 
NAC agreed in October 2008 to act – in concert with the Afghan 
authorities – against drug facilities and facilitators.668 Drug traffickers 
that were linked to the insurgency would be considered legitimate 
military targets, while others would be regarded as criminals and 
treated in accordance with the law enforcement paradigm.669 If there 
was a nexus between the narcotics producer and the insurgency, the 
individuals and the facilities could be attacked as a military objective on 
the basis of IHL. If no nexus existed, the paradigm of law enforcement 
applies.670  
The second example is the law enforcement task by KFOR forces. KFOR 
was engaged in the restoration and maintenance of public safety and 
                                                             
666 J.K. Kleffner, Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law, in T. Gill, D. 
Fleck (eds.), The Handbook of the International Law of Military Operations, 2010, 
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order and the supervision of demining activities.671 In this regard it was 
often not engaged directly in the conduct of hostilities, rather with law 
enforcement activities. Therefore, the norms of IHRL apply, rather than 
the rules of IHL. 
 
c. IHL and IHRL Rules Applicable during Occupation 
The previous two paragraphs examined the applicability of IHL and 
IHRL during armed conflict. This paragraph examines the applicability 
of the rules of IHL and IHRL during occupation. An occupation exists 
when a territory is actually placed under the authority of a hostile 
army.672 For the application of the law of occupation it is irrelevant 
whether an occupation has received Security Council approval, what its 
aim is or whether it is called an ‘invasion’, ‘liberation’, ‘administration’, 
or ‘occupation’.673 Article 42 of the 1907 Hague Regulations define an 
occupation as a territory that is “actually placed under the authority of 
the hostile army”.674  
Occupation brings along a plethora of obligations to the occupying 
party. The occupant is obliged to take all measures in its power to 
restore and ensure, as far as possible, public order and civil life.675 
Occupation also triggers the application of the Geneva Conventions of 
1949,676 which impose further obligations on the occupant, primarily 
embodied in the Fourth Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of 
Civilian Persons in Time of War and Protocols I and II additional to the 
1949 Geneva Conventions. Furthermore, during occupation certain 
parts of IHRL are also applicable.  
The question whether international organizations can occupy a territory 
is answered in the positive by several authors dealing with peace 
support missions.677 It is hard to equate a UN mandated military 
                                                             
671 UN Security Council resolution 1244(1999), 10 June 1999, para. 9. 
672 Article 42 Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and 
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presence as an “authority of the hostile army”. The term occupation 
therefore may be inappropriate for these operations. Examples of UN 
missions exercising functions and powers over a territory that could be 
compared to those assigned to an occupant are the missions in Cyprus, 
Cambodia, Eastern Slavonia, East Timor, Kosovo and the Congo in the 
1960s.678 International organizations could occupy territory other than 
pursuant to a UN Security Council resolution, but examples are scarce; 
only the EU operation in Mostar, Bosnia and Herzegovina, was based 
on a decision or the EU Council and not on a UN mandate.679 The 
difference between a traditional occupation and an international 
administration mandated by the UN Security Council is that the powers 
of the UN occupational force is limited by the mandate given by the UN 
Security Council.680  
Another difference is that occupation by peace support operations might 
be conducted with the consent of the host State, whereas in traditional 
occupations the consent is likely to be lacking. One could argue that an 
occupation with consent of the host State cannot be regarded as a 
belligerent occupation and that therefore the 1907 Hague Regulations 
and 1949 Geneva Convention do not apply. This is not to say that every 
occupation by a UN peace support missions are consensual. For 
example, in the case of the Democratic Republic of Congo, the consent of 
Kinshasa did not include the consent by warlords in the Eastern Congo 
for MONUC. Kosovo was administrated by UNMiK, in which NATO 
fulfilled the security tasks (KFOR). Although the host nation (the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia) did consent with the occupation, this 
consent was procured by the use of force during Operation Allied Force 
and the consent given should be regarded void according to Article 52 of 
the Vienna Convention of the law of Treaties. Whether or not an 
occupation is belligerent or consensual is relevant for the question of jus 
ad bellum rather than jus in bello. In other words, applicability of IHL 
and IHRL rules does not depend on the legitimacy of the occupation, but 
on the fact that there is an occupation.  
Practice reveals that NATO considers the rules of IHL and IHRL 
applicable during occupation, at least in principle. KFOR policy 
documents refer to Articles 42 and 78 of the 1949 Fourth Geneva 
                                                                                                                                                    
Security and Defence Policy, with a Particular Focus on the Law of Armed Conflict 
and Human Rights, 2010.  
678 ICRC Report, Expert Meeting; Occupation and Other Forms of Administration of 
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Convention relating to the powers of an occupant.681 Similarly, NATO 
avoided language that could result in the perception that it was an 
occupying force in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Nevertheless, the detention 
policies of IFOR and SFOR contains language equivalent to that of the 
Fourth 1949 Geneva Convention regulating the detainment of persons 
in occupied territory.682  
 
6.6 Internal and External Rules of NATO 
 
The 1986 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and 
International Organizations or between International Organizations 
defines internal rules of the organization as “the constituent 
instruments, decisions and resolutions adopted in accordance with 
them, and established practice of the organization.”683  
Decisions of an international organization can create rights and 
obligations for the organization, to the extent that the act can be 
regarded as an obligation under international law. In other words, the 
internal rules of the organization may have external effect so to become 
binding international obligations for the organization. Purely 
administrative measures do not have any external effect. The most 
important internal rules with external effect are rules adopted for their 
own operational activities.684  
In order for decisions to have external effect, they have to be formulated 
in such a manner that the intention to bind the organization is 
sufficiently clear.685 For instance, NATO Standard Operating 
Procedures, which state that the detention of individuals during NATO 
operations will be conducted in accordance with the principles of 
international humanitarian law, do not create international obligations 
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for the Alliance. From the text it is not sufficiently clear whether the 
Alliance’s intent is to be bound to IHL norms. 
Another factor that precludes the binding nature of internal rules of 
NATO is the classification of decisions. Most NATO rules relating to 
operational matters are classified and as such they are not publicly 
available. This does not mean that classified rules cannot bind the 
Alliance, rather these breaches of rules will likely not become under 
much scrutiny, as the content of these rules is not publicly available. If 
these classified rules become publicly available – e.g. the temporary 
restrictions on detention in ISAF as illustrated in Chapter 2 of this 
research – breaches of these rules may be subject to inquiry. The above-
discussed incident of the attack on the fuel trucks in Kunduz is 
illustrative in this regard. While the attack may or may not have been a 
breach of (customary) IHL, it may have constituted a breach of certain 
operational directives or ROE, precluding NATO forces to attack 
militant forces when not under direct threat. Because the ROE and 
operational directives are classified they are considered purely internal 
documents without external effect.  
 
6.7 Conclusions 
 
Chapter 5 examined the international legal personality of NATO. 
International legal personality is relevant to the question of 
international responsibility, because without it, an international 
organization cannot carry international obligations. The previous 
chapter concluded that NATO possesses such international legal 
personality. Having concluded that NATO possesses international legal 
personality and that it therefore can bear international rights and 
obligations, this chapter examined to which international obligations 
NATO is exactly bound. The chapter concentrated on four potential 
sources of international obligations: NATO’s constitutional documents 
(paragraph 6.2), the UN Charter and UN Security Council resolutions 
(paragraph 6.3), conventional and customary international law relevant 
to NATO-led military operations (paragraphs 6.4 and 6.5) and the 
internal and external rules of NATO (paragraph 6.6). 
The North Atlantic Treaty imposes the obligation upon the 
Organization to act in accordance with the UN Charter. It is important 
to note that, in this respect, a violation of the UN Charter is a breach of 
NATO’s constitutional document rather than a direct breach of the UN 
Charter. Whether the UN Charter and the decisions of the UN Security 
Council impose international obligations directly, is examined 
separately. In one occasion, NATO has violated the provisions of the 
North Atlantic Treaty by intervening with armed force in Kosovo during 
Operation Allied Force, without a UN Security Council’s mandate. The 
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member States acknowledged that the operation constituted a breach of 
Article 2(4) of the UN Charter and therefore it had breached Article 1 of 
the North Atlantic Treaty.686 The violation gave rise to claims submitted 
by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia against several member States of 
the Alliance, but not directly against NATO itself.687 It is submitted here 
that NATO can be held responsible for the violation of the Treaty, as 
the operation was a breach of the North Atlantic Treaty.  
Other important documents, such as the NATO SOFA, Paris Protocol and 
Ottawa Agreement, contain very few international obligations for NATO. 
There is one obligation that is of relevance to the Alliance, which is the 
obligation to waive immunity of NATO personnel, if immunity would 
impede the course of justice without prejudice to the interests of the 
Alliance. This obligation, contained in Article XXII of the Ottawa 
Agreement, relates solely to international civilian staff working at 
international civilian headquarters such as NATO Headquarters in 
Brussels.  
Since NATO is not a party to the UN Charter, the Alliance cannot be 
bound to its provisions. Nevertheless, the UN Charter plays a central 
role in the activities that NATO pursues. Its very creation relied upon a 
provision of the Charter, i.e. the right to take collective defensive action 
against an armed attack. The Washington Treaty makes ample 
reference to the UN Charter, which shows the commitment of the 
founding members to ensure that the UN Charter is adhered to when 
undertaking activities through the Alliance. Since all member States of 
NATO are also party to the UN Charter and, therefore, bound to its 
provisions as well as to the UN Security Council resolutions, NATO is 
indirectly bound to the UN Charter and to the UN Security Council 
resolutions. The Alliance needs to take due account of the terms and 
objectives of the UN Charter and resolutions of the Security Council, 
but it is not directly bound to them. 
In similar fashion, NATO is not bound to conventional international 
human rights law or international humanitarian law, because it is not a 
party to these bodies of law. In theory, it would be possible for the 
Alliance to become a party to the European Convention on Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms if the required amendments to the 
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convention would be made. However, NATO has not expressed (yet) any 
intention to accede to treaties relating to international humanitarian 
law or international human rights law. 
NATO has entered into international agreements with States. The 
majority of these agreements regard the status of military forces. 
Mission SOFAs create few international obligations for NATO. One 
particular recurring theme is the respect of host nation law by NATO 
forces. Similar to obligations contained in NATO’s constituent document 
relating to the UN Charter, the host nation laws are not directly a 
binding obligation to NATO, rather indirectly through the provisions of 
the mission SOFA. 
Another international instrument commonly used between NATO and 
other international entities are Memoranda of Understanding (MOU). 
MOU can cover a range of topics including the gathering of intelligence, 
diplomatic assurances relating to the transfer of detainees, as well as 
financial regulations and host nation support arrangements. It is 
concluded that MOUs are politically binding documents and do not 
impose legally binding obligations. Therefore, MOUs are not a relevant 
source of binding international obligations to the Alliance.  
In conclusion, the sources of international conventional law – including 
the constituent documents of NATO – are of relative minor relevance as a 
source of binding international obligations to NATO. The Alliance only 
bears the indirect international obligation to adhere to the UN Charter 
and UN Security Council, because of the circumstance that all its 
member States are bound to them. With regard to the constituent treaty, 
Paris Protocol, Ottawa Agreement, mission SOFA and other agreements, 
contain barely any significant international obligations for the Alliance.  
The situation is different with respect to international customary law. 
International customary law is an important source of international 
obligations for NATO. Customary international humanitarian law (IHL) 
and human rights law (IHRL) are of particular relevance to the 
international responsibility of NATO during its operations.  
This chapter concluded that even though customary IHL and IHRL 
norm are directed to States and not to international organizations as 
such, there is no reason why international organizations would not be 
bound to these norms. International organizations can become a party 
to an international or non-international armed conflict and hence are 
obliged to abide by the norms of international customary humanitarian 
law. NATO has become a party to an international armed conflict in the 
former Yugoslavia against Serbia and in Libya against the Libyan 
government. The Alliance has been part to a non-international armed 
conflict in Afghanistan against the Taliban-led insurgency. As such, 
NATO is bound to customary IHL in these conflicts. For instance, the 
Alliance is obliged to protect the civilian population and civilian objects 
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and to refrain from an attack which may cause incidental loss of civilian 
life, injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects or a combination 
thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct 
military advantage anticipated.688 In the case of the Kunduz strike 
described in chapter 2, if NATO could have expected that the attack 
would result in excessive loss of civilian life and therefore the Alliance 
violated the provisions of international customary IHL. NATO allegedly 
breached the international obligations to take precautionary measures 
to spare the civilian population, civilians and civilian objects in the 
course of the air strikes in Libya.689 
Customary IHRL is another source of binding international obligation(s) 
on NATO. IHRL is only applicable when an international organization 
exercises jurisdiction. From the outset it may look impossible for an 
international organization to be able to exercise jurisdiction, as this is a 
feature particularly pertinent to States. NATO is able to exercise 
jurisdiction over individuals or over a territory. One example of that are 
the activities conducted during KFOR operations as part of the public 
function under the UNMiK interim administration of Kosovo. Similarly, 
NATO exercised jurisdiction in Afghanistan in support of the Afghan 
government, when it detained insurgents for a limited period of time. 
During these activities, the norms of customary IHRL are applicable to 
the Alliance.  
The last source of international obligations for NATO that has been 
examined in this chapter are the rules of NATO other than the 
constituent documents. The Alliance takes decisions and drafts rules for 
its own operational activities. The binding nature of these decisions and 
rules depend on the intent of the Alliance to bind itself. Most decisions, 
policy and rules, by their formulation, are not binding. Others are purely 
internal without any external effect. The most problematic feature that 
inhibits enforcement of rules of the organization is the fact that most of 
them are classified, which also indicates the internal nature of these 
rules. Therefore, the rules of the organization do not present any 
significant source of international obligations binding the Alliance. 
 
 
                                                             
688 Article 51(4), 52 and 57, Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 
August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed 
Conflicts, 1977, 1125 UNTS 3, 8 June 1977. Protocol I is applicable to international 
armed conflicts, but the customary norms are equally applicable to non-
international armed conflicts. Henckaerts, J.-M. and Doswald-Beck, L. (2005) 
Customary international humanitarian law: V. 1: Rules. United Kingdom: 
Cambridge University Press. 
689 Article 57, Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and 
relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, 1977, 1125 
UNTS 3, 8 June 1977. 
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Attribution of Wrongful Acts to NATO 
 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
Responsibility of NATO arises when a breach of an international 
obligation is attributed to the organization. The previous two chapters 
examined the international legal personality of NATO and the 
international obligations binding on the organization. This chapter 
examines the conditions under which an act constituting a breach of an 
international obligation committed by an individual participating in 
NATO operations will be attributable to the Alliance. 
International organizations are legal entities that act in the physical 
world through individuals. Individuals carry out the actions of the 
organization. Attribution is the link between the act of the individual to 
the international organization. In 2004, the International Law 
Association (ILA)690 prepared a study on the responsibility of 
international organizations and in 2011, the International Law 
Commission (ILC)691 codified the practice of States and international 
organizations and existent jurisprudence692 and formulated rules on the 
responsibility of international organization, in particular on the 
attribution of wrongful conduct of agents and organs to the 
organization. 
This chapter will rely primarily on the codification efforts of the ILC for 
the reasons mentioned in the introductory chapter of this thesis. The 
ILC has a special status as it is directly tasked by the international 
community to codify and develop international law. When there is little 
available State practice and jurisprudence, it is important to receive 
agreement or at least acquiescence from States and international 
                                                             
690 International Law Association, Berlin Conference (2004) Accountability of 
International Organisations, Final Report of the Committee established by the 
International Law Associations, 2004 
691 International Law Commission, Draft Articles on the Responsibility of 
International Organizations, 2011. 
692 International Court of Justice, Reparations for Injuries suffered in the Service of 
the United Nations, (1949), ICJ Reports 1949, 174. European Court of Human 
Rights, A. Behrami against France, application no. 71412/01 and R. Saramati 
against France, Germany and Norway, application no. 78166/01, Decision of 2 May 
2007. UK, Opinions of the Lords of Appeal, R (on the application of Al-Jedda) v 
Secretary of State for Defence, 12 December 2007, UKHL 58. European Court of 
Human Rights, Vlastimir and Borka Bankovic and others v. Belgium, the Czech 
Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Turkey and the 
United Kingdom, Applicatino no. 52207/99, 12 December 2001.  
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organizations that the rules represent a degree of opinio juris. 
Additionally, domestic and international courts and tribunals frequently 
refer to the ILC’s Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International 
Organizations, affirming that the ILC’s work is an authoritative source. 
The ILC differentiates between three categories of individuals through 
whom an international organization acts and for which different 
conditions of attribution apply. The first category are individuals that 
pertain to an organ of the organization and has such a status in 
accordance with the rules of that organization. The second category 
consists of officials and other persons or entities, other than organs, who 
are charged by the organization with carrying out, or helping to carry 
out, one of its functions, and thus through whom the organization acts. 
These are defined by the ILC as agents of the organizations. The third, 
and last, category are organs of a State or an organ or agents of an 
international organization that are placed at the disposal of another 
international organization. 
Below, the discussion on the attribution of conduct of NATO personnel 
will take place following the rules as established by the ILC’s Draft 
Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations. The 
analysis will follow the same outline like the ILC’s Articles. Paragraph 
7.2 will examine the attribution of wrongful acts of agents and organs of 
NATO, followed by the analysis of attribution of wrongful acts of agents 
and organs placed at the disposal of NATO in paragraph 7.3. These two 
paragraphs reflect on the rules established in Articles 6 and 7 
respectively in the Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International 
Organizations. Paragraph 7.4 discusses multiple attribution of wrongful 
conduct to both the States that participate in NATO-led operations and 
to NATO itself. Paragraph 7.5 will end this chapter with conclusions. 
 
7.2 Attribution of Wrongful acts of Agents and Organs of 
NATO 
 
Wrongful acts of individuals are attributable to an international 
organization if there is a link between the individual and the 
international organization. The existence of such a link can easily be 
proven if there is an institutional relationship with the organization, i.e. 
the status or position of the individual is formalized by the rules of the 
organization. Such an institutional or ‘organic’ link with the 
international organization exists with ‘organs of the international 
organizations’. The ILC defines organs as “any person or entity which 
has that status in accordance with the rules of the organization”693 and 
                                                             
693 Article 2(c), ILC, Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations 
(2011). 
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states in Article 6 (1) of the Draft Articles on the Responsibility of 
International Organizations of 2011 that  
“the conduct of an organ or agent of an international organization in the 
performance of functions of that organ or agent shall be considered an 
act of that organization under international law, whatever the position 
the organ or agent holds in respect of the organization”. 
The link between the international organization and its organ does not 
depend solely on what the organization defines as its organs by its 
rules. International organizations may not exhaustively define all the 
entities that have the status of organs. In such instances, the powers of 
an entity and its relation to other bodies under internal law will be 
relevant to classify its status.694 The ICJ noted that the official status of 
individuals is not relevant. It argued that “any person who, whether a 
paid official or not, and whether permanently employed or not, has been 
charged by an organ of the organization with carrying out, or helping to 
carry out, one of its functions” are organs of the organizations.695 The 
ILC adopted the same meaning for the term “agents” in its Draft 
Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations as used by 
the ICJ.696 
There are thus two categories of entities with a defined link with the 
international organization. One category is defined by its institutional 
or ‘organic’ link with the organization which is established by the rules 
of the organization. The other category is defined by its functional link, 
which means that the functions of the individual determine whether the 
individual is connected to the organizations. Any wrongful conduct, even 
ultra vires conduct,697 of either category is automatically attributed to 
the international organization in accordance with Article 6 of the ILC’s 
Articles.698  
NATO has both agents and organs with an institutional link defined in 
                                                             
694 ILC, Second report on responsibility of international organizations, A/CN.4/541, 2 
April 2004, p. 8. 
695 International Court of Justice, Reparations for Injuries suffered in the Service of 
the United Nations, (1949), ICJ Reports 1949, 174, p. 177. 
696 Article 2(d), Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations, “[...] an 
official or other person or entity, other than an organ, who is charged by the 
organization with carrying out, or helping to carry out, one of its functions, and 
thus through whom the organization acts.” 
697 Article 8, ILC Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations, 2011, 
“The conduct of an organ or agent of an international organization shall be 
considered an act of that organization under international law if the organ or agent 
acts in an official capacity and within the overall functions of that organization, 
even if the conduct exceeds the authority of that organ or agent or contravenes 
instructions”.  
698 Tzanakopoulos, A. (2009) ‘Attribution of conduct to international organizations in 
peacekeeping operations’, EJIL Analysis, 10 March. Available at:  
http://www.ejiltalk.org/attribution-of-conduct-to-international-organizations-in-
peacekeeping-operations/ ( 
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the rules of the organization, as well as agents and organs with a 
functionally-defined link.  
With respect to “organs”, NATO’s constituent document creates only one 
organ, the North Atlantic Council, but allows it to create subsidiary 
organs as required.699 As examined in the previous Chapter 4, the NAC 
created a significant amount of subsidiary organs, including Supreme 
Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), Allied Joint Force 
Command Brunssum and -Naples and various other headquarters that 
are able to command and control, or otherwise support, NATO 
operations.  
A large category of “agents” performing functions of the Alliance is 
civilian personnel. International civilian personnel are employees of the 
Alliance and, according to Article 6 of the Draft Articles on the 
Responsibility of International Organizations, their conduct is 
automatically attributed to NATO.  
There has been some debate on the attribution of conduct of other 
individuals working for NATO, in particular contractors.700 NATO 
employs contractors during military operations for a variety of reasons. 
Contractors ease the burden on military and stimulate the local 
economy. NATO contracts personnel for, e.g. engineering, logistic (air 
and land) support and management of operational bases. Contractors do 
not have a direct employment agreement with NATO,701 but are 
employees of private enterprises, who have a contractual agreement 
with NATO.702  
Contractors are charged by NATO to carry out, or help it to carry out, 
one of its functions, and therefore they are considered agents of NATO. 
Wrongful conduct is ostensibly automatically attributed to the 
organization.703 Practice shows that NATO acknowledges responsibility 
for contractors, evident from policy documents in relation to the 
carrying of weapons by contractors.704 
                                                             
699 Art. 9, North Atlantic Treaty 1949, 34 UNTS 243, 24 August 1949. 
700 Tzanakopoulos, A. (2009) ‘Attribution of conduct to international organizations in 
peacekeeping operations’, EJIL Analysis, 10 March. Available at: 
http://www.ejiltalk.org/attribution-of-conduct-to-international-organizations-in-
peacekeeping-operations/ ( 
701 E.g. employed as NATO international civilian personnel, Article III(1)(b) Paris 
Protocol or as locally recruited civilians, article IX(4) NATO SOFA, or as civilian 
personnel in the employ of an armed force that is placed at the disposal of NATO, 
Article I(1)(b) NATO SOFA. 
702 NATO Legal Deskbook, Second edition, 2010, p. 166. 
703 Article 6 ILC Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations. 
Tzanakopoulos, A. (2009) ‘Attribution of conduct to international organizations in 
peacekeeping operations’, EJIL Analysis, 10 March. Available at:  
http://www.ejiltalk.org/attribution-of-conduct-to-international-organizations-in-
peacekeeping-operations/ 
704 NATO Policy on Contractor Support, C-M(2007)0004, 26 January 2007, NAC, 
Senior Nations Logisticians Conference, NATO Policy on Contractor Support to 
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Besides (international) civilian employees and contractors, NATO relies 
heavily on personnel seconded to the various headquarters of the 
Alliance. Approximately 88%705 of the total amount of personnel in 
NATO’s military structure706 are seconded to the Alliance. A prime 
example of a seconded official to NATO is the Supreme Allied 
Commander Europe (SACEUR), who is traditionally a US four-star 
general officer. Military personnel remain in the employment of their 
sending nation but are ‘fully seconded’ to NATO, i.e. they act in the 
exclusive interest of the Alliance; they sign a declaration of loyalty to 
the organization and are subject to staff instructions. The ILC, in its 
commentary to the Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International 
Organizations, states that the rules of attribution under Article 6 apply 
to ‘fully seconded’ personnel like they do for other agents and organs of 
the organization. The ILC makes a sharp distinction between State 
organs and agents which are ‘fully seconded’ to the international 
organization, on the one hand, and State organs which to a certain 
extent still act in a national capacity during their secondment, such as 
national military contingents, on the other hand.707 It is unclear on 
which basis the ILC makes this distinction. NATO Member States 
always retain a significant degree of control, including that of criminal 
and disciplinary jurisdiction over both seconded military personnel 
placed within NATO (military) headquarters and military contingents 
provided for missions placed at NATO’s disposal. In the absence of a 
precise distinction between fully seconded personnel and personnel 
placed at the disposal of NATO during its operations, the attribution of 
their conduct must be assessed by the degree of control that the sending 
State still retains, i.e. by the test of Article 7 of the Articles of the 
responsibility of international organizations. This test is discussed in 
the following paragraph. 
 
7.3 Attribution of Conduct of Organs or Agents Placed at the 
Disposal of NATO 
 
Like any other international organization involved in military 
operations, the Alliance relies heavily on the contribution of military 
personnel by States. As described in chapters 4 and 5, NATO requests 
                                                                                                                                                    
Operations, 12 January 2007, para. 50.  
705 NATO Annual Manpower Plan 2016-2021, corrigendum 1, 2 March 2016.  
706 This excludes personnel employed at NATO’s International Staff and other 
international civilian headquarters. 
707 A. Sari, R.A. Wessel, International Responsibility for EU Military Operations: 
Finding the EU’s Place in the Global Accountability Regime, in Van Vooren, B., 
Blockmans, S. and Wouters, J. (eds.) (2013) The EU’s role in global governance: The 
legal dimension. United Kingdom: Oxford University Press, p. 126-141.  
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the required forces and materiel from troop contributing nations 
(TCNs), who on their turn place their personnel under the command 
and control of NATO. The TCNs retain full command over their forces, 
i.e. the power to re-assign these forces to national command. TCNs also 
maintain criminal and disciplinary jurisdiction over their forces. The 
military contingents therefore remain to a certain degree under the 
control of the TCN. Their acts can not automatically be attributed to the 
Alliance as would be the case for agents and organs that have a 
functional or institutional link with the organization. Instead, conduct 
is attributed in accordance with a different rule. Article 7 of the ILC’s 
Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations 
states that  
“[t]he conduct of an organ of a State or an organ or agent of an 
international organization that is placed at the disposal of another 
international organization shall be considered under international law 
an act of the latter organization if the organization exercises effective 
control over that conduct.”708 
The crucial part of this rule is the exercise of ‘effective control’. This 
criterion for attributability has been considered by the ICJ, ICTY and 
ECtHR, as well as domestic courts. Unfortunately, the term has been 
interpreted by each court and tribunal in a different manner, making it 
difficult to define with certainty what is meant with ‘effective control’. 
In 1986, the ICJ determined in the Nicaragua709 case that, in order to 
attribute the acts of the Nicaraguan Contras to the United States, the 
US had to have “directed or enforced the perpetration of the acts”. This 
could be either done by giving directions to the Contras or to force the 
Contras to carry out certain actions.710 In 1999, the ICTY reflected on 
the attribution of conduct of the Army of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina / Republike Srpska (VRS) to the government of the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The ICTY adopted a lower threshold: 
that of ‘overall control’, by which the conduct is attributable in 
situations of mere assistance or coordinating in the planning of 
(para)military activities.711 In 2007, however, the ICJ ‘rejected’712 the 
lower threshold of the ICTY and re-instated the effective control test in 
                                                             
708 Art. 6, ILC Report on the work of its sixty-first session (4 May to 5 June and 6 July 
to 7 August 2009, Supplement No. 10 (A/64/10). 
709 International Court of Justice, Case concerning the Military and Paramilitary 
Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), 
(1986), ICJ Reports 1986, 14, para. 115. 
710 Cassese, A. (2007) ‘The Nicaragua and Tadić Tests Revisited in Light of the ICJ 
Judgment on Genocide in Bosnia’, European Journal of International Law, 18(4). 
711 International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Prosecutor v. Dusko 
Tadic, IT-94-I-A, Judgment of 15 July 1999, para. 131.  
712 Obviously, the ICJ is not bound to any stare decisis of the ICTY or any other 
international tribunal or court.  
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its Bosnian Genocide judgment.713  
The ECtHR added extra confusion on the topic in its – widely 
criticized714 – Behrami and Saramati judgment.715 The circumstances of 
the joined cases regard the NATO operation “Kosovo Force” (KFOR). 
The case concerned two applicants, Mr. Behrami and Mr. Saramati. In 
Behrami, two boys, Gadaf and Bekir Behrami, played with undetonated 
munitions dropped by NATO in 1999 in the municipality of Mitrovica. 
The munitions detonated and respectively killed Gadaf and injured 
Bekir. The circumstances of Saramati were that Mr. Saramati was on 
various occasions arrested by UNMiK Police officers, by orders of 
COMKFOR, thereby allegedly violating his rights under the ECHR.  
In order to assess whether the conduct of personnel of KFOR and 
UNMiK could be attributed to either the UN or NATO, the Court 
assessed whether the UN or NATO had “ultimate authority and control” 
over the wrongful conduct committed against Behrami and Saramati. 
The Court turned to the text of Security Council’s Resolution 1244(1999) 
and noted that the UN Security Council delegated some of its powers to 
KFOR and UNMiK to conduct their respective missions.716 The Security 
Council retained, in the opinion of the Court, ultimate authority and 
control over the mission and therefore the conduct of UNMiK and 
KFOR is attributable to the UN.717 The Court’s decision is widely 
criticized for its conclusion that effective control exists when the UN 
“delegates” certain powers to entities. The issue of delegation is more a 
matter relating to institutional law than it is to the rules of 
international responsibility in general. The Court’s judgment might be 
                                                             
713 International Court of Justice, Case Concerning the Application of the Convention 
on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, (2007), ICJ Reports 
2007, 43, para. 401. 
714 Milanoviç, M. and Papiç, T. (2009) ‘As Bad As It Gets: The European Court of 
Human Rights’ Behrami and Saramati Decision and General International Law’, 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 58. 
715 European Court of Human Rights, A. Behrami against France, application no. 
71412/01 and R. Saramati against France, Germany and Norway, application no. 
78166/01, Decision of 2 May 2007. 
716 European Court of Human Rights, Grand Chamber Decision as to the admissibility 
of Application no. 71412/01 by A. Behrami and B. Behrami against France and 
Application no. 78166/01 by R. Saramati against France, Germany and Norway, 2 
May 2007, para 43. 
717 Milanoviç, M. and Papiç, T. (2009) ‘As Bad As It Gets: The European Court of 
Human Rights’ Behrami and Saramati Decision and General International Law’, 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 58. It is debatable whether the 
differentiation between “authorising” and “delegating” truly exists. The Security 
Council usually authorises, rather than delegates in its UNSC resolutions. The 
Council has been granted such vast powers by the UN Charter under the premise of 
the restoration of peace and security, that one could barely imagine which powers 
would not befall the Security Council. To illustrate, the Security Council created 
the International Criminal Tribunals of Yugoslavia and Rwanda in the context of 
the maintenance of peace and security. 
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explained by the fact that the Court uses the test of “overall authority 
and control”718 rather than the ILC’s test of “effective control”, the 
former seemingly describing a more formal approach. 
In a domestic ruling, the British House of Lords in the case of Al-
Jeddah made no reference to “overall authority and control” formulated 
by the ECtHR. Instead it returned to the “effective control” test as 
established by the ICJ. This test was also confirmed as being the correct 
one by the ILC’s Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International 
Organizations.719 Mr. Al-Jeddah was detained by British forces in Iraq 
and alleged that his human rights were violated. He maintained that 
the UK was responsible for the actions of the British forces as it had 
effective control over their actions. The House of Lords noted, by 
analogy, that the UN did not claim responsibility for the Abu Ghraib 
incident720 – although UN had ‘authorised’ the mission – nor did the US 
or the UK deny responsibility for the conduct of their forces.721 Although 
the UN had requested the UK and US to observe humanitarian law and 
to report periodically on the situation, his Lordship concluded that “it is 
one thing to receive reports, another to exercise effective command and 
control”.722 
The last case that deserves mentioning in this regard here is the 
Nuhanović-case before the Dutch Supreme Court. The case relates to 
the fall in 1995 of a Muslim enclave in Srebrenica that was under the 
protection of Dutch UN peacekeepers (DutchBat) serving in the UN-led 
mission UNPROFOR. Relatives of Mr. Nuhanović and mr. Mustafić, two 
local UN employees providing services at the Dutch compound, claimed 
that the Dutch forces did not provide adequate protection from attacks 
by Serbian forces against the Muslim population resulting ultimately in 
their deaths. The Supreme Court established the Netherlands’ 
government retained the power to reassign the forces placed at the 
disposal of the international organization (i.e. Full Command) and had 
criminal jurisdiction as well as disciplinary and administrative powers 
over the military forces placed at the disposal of the UN. Moreover, the 
Court considered that the command relationship shifted when the 
                                                             
718 European Court of Human Rights, Grand Chamber Decision as to the admissibility 
of Application no. 71412/01 by A. Behrami and B. Behrami against France and 
Application no. 78166/01 by R. Saramati against France, Germany and Norway, 2 
May 2007, para. 87, 134. The Court sometimes refers to “ultimate authority and 
control”, para. 133, 134, 135 and 140. 
719 Opinions of the Lords of Appeal, R (on the application of Al-Jedda) v Secretary of 
State for Defence, 12 December 2007, UKHL 58, para. 22.  
720 An incident relating to the abuse of Iraqi detainees by the US in the Abu Ghraib 
detention facility in Iraq in 2003. 
721 Opinions of the Lords of Appeal, R (on the application of Al-Jedda) v Secretary of 
State for Defence, 12 December 2007, UKHL 58, para. 23. 
722 Opinions of the Lords of Appeal, R (on the application of Al-Jedda) v Secretary of 
State for Defence, 12 December 2007, UKHL 58, para. 24 
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situation deteriorated in Srebrenica. The UN ceased to give instructions 
to the Dutch contingent and the Dutch government progressively took 
more control over the situation. The Netherlands ordered the 
evacuation of the refugees and the retreat of the Dutch forces. The 
Court concluded that under these circumstances, the Netherlands’ 
government exercised effective control over the Dutch military 
contingent and therefore their conduct is attributed to the 
Netherlands.723 
The overall approach taken in jurisprudence and by academics is that 
international organizations involved in military operations are 
presumed to have effective control over military contingents during the 
period that they are placed at the disposal of the international 
organization. By transferring Operational Command to the 
international organization, the contributing States cede a significant 
degree of control over their forces to the organization to allow it to 
conduct operations. This gives rise to the initial presumption that the 
international organization exercises effective control over the military 
contingents with respect to the conduct of operations.  
Military contingents still act to a certain extent as organs of the TCN, 
since the contributing State retains disciplinary powers and criminal 
jurisdiction over the members of the contingent.724 The lack of such 
powers certainly influences the degree of control that NATO has to 
enforce its decisions. Therefore, the existence of effective control must 
be assessed on a case-by-case basis. In most situations, however, the 
lack of disciplinary powers and criminal jurisdiction will not undermine 
the effective control that the Alliance has over forces placed at its 
disposal. As illustrated in chapter 2 of this thesis, the Commander of 
Kosovo Force may have lacked criminal and disciplinary powers, but 
still had adequate measures at its disposal to enforce the prohibition for 
military personnel to visit areas known for human trafficking and 
forced prostitution. These measures include the suspension of alleged 
perpetrators, conducting an investigation and reporting misconduct to 
                                                             
723 Hoge Raad, H. Nuhanović v. the Netherlands, ECLI:NL:HR:2013:BZ9225, 6 
September 2013. The Dutch Court examined whether the UN or the Dutch 
Government had exercised effective control over the Dutch contingent. It referred to 
article 6 of the ILC’s Draft Articles on Responsibility of International Organizations 
and concluded that the conduct of the forces can be attributed to the UN if the UN 
had effective control over the specific conduct. It also concluded that the same test 
applied to the attribution of conduct to the Dutch government. This conclusion is, 
however, in contradiction with the ILC’s draft articles and the Articles on the 
Responsibility of States. As the Dutch contingent is an organ of the Dutch 
government, there was no need to examine whether the Dutch government had 
effective control; this is to be presumed. The conduct of State organs is 
automatically attributed to the State.  
724 ILC, Commentary to the articles on the responsibility of international 
organizations, A/66/10, 2011, p. 87. 
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TCNs. This leads to the conclusion that NATO had effective control over 
the misconduct of KFOR personnel relating to human trafficking and 
forced prostitution. 
Jurisprudence and the ILC’s commentary on the Articles on 
Responsibility of International Organizations show that an 
international organization may not have effective control in a situation 
when a TCN specifically interferes in the command relationship. The 
interference may either be ad hoc, as was the case of The Netherlands 
which issued orders to the Dutch military contingent in Srebrenica, or 
repetitive, during operation Allied Force, where military contingents 
continuously sought approval from their respective nations.725 NATO did 
not have effective control over the military forces placed at its disposal 
for the time that the TCN interfered in the command relationship. 
In some cases, a TCN may put restrictions and limitations on the degree 
of control that NATO may exercise over military contingents placed at 
its disposal. These limitations are agreed upon between the TCN and 
the Alliance prior to the execution of the mission and are characteristic 
of the flexibility in the way TCN may contribute to NATO operations. 
TCNs may ‘veto’ certain individual missions in which their military 
forces partake, e.g. the targeting of an object or individual or the use of 
special forces in a detention operation. The so-called ‘red card’ procedure 
is a practice in NATO operations that provides some control to States in 
politically sensitive missions. Prior to the execution of a specific 
mission, a TCN can determine whether the mission could contravene 
national policies or obligations, and if so, will issue a ‘red card’. The 
military contingent will then not be used to conduct that particular 
mission.726  TCNs may also notify NATO prior to the execution of an 
                                                             
725 E.g. with respect to UNOSOM II, the UN did not have effective control over the 
peacekeepers, despite formal command and control arrangements. The “national 
contingents […] persisted in seeking orders from their home authorities before 
executing orders of the Forces Command” impeding the UN to exercise effective 
control over the forces, G. Gaja, Special Rapporteur, Second Report on 
Responsibility of International Organizations, A/CN.4/541, 2 April 2004, p. 20. The 
same happened in NATO’s operation Allied Force, where the NATO commander 
“had to wait for the individual nations to answer back [on the approval of targets], 
having gone to their capitals and asked whether they should accept that target”. A. 
Wall, ed, Legal and ethical lessons of NATO’s Kosovo campaign, US Naval War 
College, International Law Studies, Vol. 78, 2002, p. 25 
726 AJP 3.9, section 0117, “For targets of a politico-strategic importance, authority to 
prosecute will often be held at the national level. In the majority of other cases a 
designated officer will normally be empowered by his nation to authorise attacks 
against targets. Assuming that the officer has access to relevant legal, political and 
CD estimation information, and a full understanding of the military advantage 
anticipated in attacking the target, he will be able to perform the proportionality 
test and authorise his nation’s military forces to attack targets in support of the 
JFC’s operation plan (OPLAN) if appropriate. This authorisation may require some 
caveats, usually expressed in terms of the mitigation measures described in 
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operation that its military forces may not participate in certain aspects 
of the mission. These restrictions are defined as “national caveats”. 
These limitations may be based on domestic political or legal 
circumstances and can relate to limitation in the conduct of operation is 
a defined geographical area or limitations in certain military 
engagements.  
Obviously, when substantial limitations are set on the use military 
contingents either through veto or national caveats, the effective control 
of NATO over these forces is limited and may – in certain specific cases 
– not exist at all.  
In the case of detention operations in Afghanistan as illustrated in 
chapter 2, Canada informed NATO that it would not participate under 
NATO command when conducting detention operations. It placed the 
restriction that NATO would not have operational command once 
Canadian forces detain individuals. In this situation, Canadian forces 
would return under national command for the time that detention and 
transfer – or continued detention – would take place. In this situation, 
NATO does not have effective control over Canadian forces during 
detention operations and wrongful conduct during that period can only 
be attributed to the Canadian government. 
The fact that personnel may act in contravention of orders or direction 
of NATO commanders, does not affect the effective control that the 
organization has over individuals. Even ultra vires conduct is 
attributable to the organization as long as the agent or organ acts in the 
capacity in which it has been placed at the disposal of the 
organization.727 In the case of the incident in Kunduz, Afghanistan, 
NATO exercised effective control over the German military contingent 
in Kunduz, Afghanistan, even though the German PRT commander 
acted allegedly contrary to COMISAF’s orders and guidance. The result 
was the alleged wrongful conduct can be attributed to NATO. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                    
paragraph 0116, to ensure that his nation’s obligation to minimise CD is 
discharged. Any targets that fall outside his delegated authority would be referred 
back to his nation for clearance.” 
727 Article 8, Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations, 2011, “The 
conduct of an organ or agent of an international organization shall be considered an 
act of that organization under international law if the organ or agent acts in an 
official capacity and within the overall functions of that organization, even if the 
conduct exceeds the authority of that organ or agent or contravenes instructions. 
The article refers to the conduct of organs and agents of the organization and not 
specifically to organs and agents placed at the disposal of an international 
organization. In the latter circumstance its seems that in order to determine to 
which the ultra vires conduct must be attributed, it is necessary to determine the 
capacity in which the person was acting.  
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7.4 Multiple Attribution of Wrongful Conduct in NATO-led 
Operations 
 
Multiple attribution is the attribution of a single wrongful act to more 
than one entity. Although a rare occurrence in practice, multiple 
attribution is not new to international law. The ICJ’s cases in the Corfu 
Channel, Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru, East Timor and Legality 
of the Use of Force all consider aspects of multiple attribution of 
conduct.728 Likewise, the ECtHR has touched upon the subject in some of 
its cases.729  
The Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations 
and the Articles on the Responsibility of States consider multiple 
attribution of wrongful conduct to be theoretically possible. An act or 
omission of an agent or organ could trigger more than one rule of 
attribution, resulting in a contemporaneous application of two rules of 
attribution. For instance, if a joint organ is established by a State and 
an international organization (e.g. the Coalition Provisional Authority 
in Iraq established in 2003 by a coalition of States) the conduct of that 
joint organ is attributable to the State under Article 4 of the Articles on 
State Responsibility and to the international organization under Article 
6 of the Articles on Responsibility of International Organizations.730 
Multiple attribution may also occur when an act or omission is carried 
out jointly by two or more entities, each of which is acting on behalf of a 
State or international organization. For instance, if two soldiers, 
belonging to different coalition partners in Iraq, unlawfully harm 
civilians, the conduct is attributed to both States. As Messineo states, 
the issue here is not one of interaction of two rules of attribution, but of 
the simple application of the rules with relation to each subject of 
international law concerned.731 
                                                             
728 International Court of Justice, Corfu Channel (United Kingdom of Great Britain 
and Northern Ireland v Albania), (1949) ICJ Reports 1949, ICJ Reports 1949, 4. 
International Court of Justice, Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Nauru v 
Australia), (1992) ICJ Reports 1992, 240. International Court of Justice, East 
Timor (Portugal v Australia), (1995) ICJ Reports 1995, 90. International Court of 
Justice, Legality of the Use of Force (Yugoslavia v United States of America), 
Provisional Measures, 2 June 1999, (1999) ICJ Reports 1999, p. 916. 
729 European Court of Human Rights, Ilascu et al. v. Moldova and Russia, Application 
no. 48787/99, Judgment of 8 July 2004; European Court of Human Rights, M.S.S. v 
Belgium and Greece, Application no. 30696/09, Judgment of 21 January 2011. 
730 There are 21 permutations of the situation where the conduct of one actor could be 
deemed the conduct of two or more States or international organizations, Messineo, 
F. (2012) Multiple Attribution of Conduct. Available at:  
http://www.sharesproject.nl/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/Messineo-Multiple-
Attribution-of-Conduct-2012-111.pdf (Accessed: 2012), p. 11. 
731 Messineo, F. (2012) Multiple Attribution of Conduct. Available at:  
http://www.sharesproject.nl/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/Messineo-Multiple-
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Multiple attribution of conduct may equally occur during NATO 
operations. For instance, NATO has established with the UN Office on 
Drugs and Crime a joint counter-narcotics programme in several 
Central Asian countries.732 The conduct of that joint organ may be 
attributable to both the UN and to NATO.  
Multiple attribution is the exception rather than the rule. Article 7 of 
the Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations 
refers to an alternative outcome. The conduct of military contingents 
placed at the disposal of NATO is attributed to NATO if it exercises 
effective control over the specific conduct. If the Alliance does not 
exercise such control, the wrongful conduct is attributed to the State by 
virtue of Article 4 of the Articles on the Responsibility of States. Article 
7 of the Responsibility of International Organizations is designed to 
avoid the situation of multiple attribution. Multiple attribution is the 
exception733, rather than the default position.734 
But, jurisprudence seems to confirm the possibility of multiple 
attribution in the case of military contingents placed at the disposal of 
international organization.735  
In Nuhanović, the Dutch Supreme Court held that the wrongful conduct 
of the Dutch contingent may be attributable to the UN under Article 7 
of the Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International 
Organizations, as well as to the Netherlands for not taking action to 
prevent the wrongful conduct from happening. The court nuanced this 
by adding that the TCN would need to know about the wrongful 
conduct.736 Even with this nuance, there is little practice that supports 
                                                                                                                                                    
Attribution-of-Conduct-2012-111.pdf (Accessed: 2012), p. 21. 
732 http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_119956.htm?selectedLocale=en 
733 ILC, Comments and observations received from the United Nations, 
A/CN.4/637/Add.1, 13, para. 1. 
734 ILC, Comments and observations received from the United Nations, 
A/CN.4/637/Add.1, 15. In this regard, the judgment of the Dutch Court on 
Srebrenica is somewhat surprising where it stated that it could not rule out that 
the conduct of the Dutch military contingent placed at the disposal of the UN could 
be attributed to both the Netherlands government as well as the UN. The Court 
may have misinterpreted the notion of effective control over the conduct of lent 
organs by considering which entity – the Netherlands or the UN – had such control. 
It is not relevant to examine whether the Dutch government had effective control 
over the Dutch military contingent. If the UN did not exercise effective control, the 
wrongful conduct of the military contingents is automatically attributed to the 
Netherland on the basis of article 4 of the Articles on the Responsibility of State, 
because it is an organ of the State. D’Argent, P. (2014) ‘State Organs Placed at the 
Disposal of the UN, Effective Control, Wrongful Abstention and Dual Attribution of 
Conduct’, Questions of International Law, p. 30.   
735 Hoge Raad der Nederlanden, Judgment, The Netherlands v. H. Nuhanović, 6 
September 2013, ECLI:NL:HR:2013:BZ9225. European Court of Human Rights, 
Grand Chamber Decision as to the admissibility of Application no. 71412/01 by A. 
Behrami and B. Behrami against France and Application no. 78166/01. 
736 Hoge Raad der Nederlanden, Judgment, The Netherlands v. H. Nuhanović, 6 
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this argument.737 Responsibility does not exist by virtue of having the 
power to prevent wrongful conduct. There must also be a basis for an 
intervention, i.e. if there was an obligation of the UN peacekeepers to 
protect specific individuals, there would be a basis for The Netherlands 
to intervene within the chain of command.738 As Crawford notes, the 
inaction is only significant if there is a legal duty to act.739 The wrongful 
conduct of military contingents is only attributable to a State when 
there is an obligation for a State to prevent the conduct from happening, 
e.g. to prevent genocide.740 
In the situation of ISAF as illustrated in chapter 2 of this thesis, TCNs 
were obliged to prevent the transfer of detainees to the Afghan 
government, as there were substantial grounds for believing that the 
detainee would be in danger of being subjected to torture and there was 
an international obligation to prevent the detainees from being 
subjected to torture.741 The TCNs had the power to prevent the transfers 
by reclaiming command over their forces. Therefore, and in addition to, 
the attribution of wrongful conduct to NATO, the conduct can be 
attributed to the involved TCNs as well. 
 
7.5 Conclusions 
 
International organizations are abstract entities that act in the physical 
world through individuals. International organizations are responsible 
for the actions of individuals, if their conduct is attributable to the 
organization. The rules governing the attribution of conduct of 
individuals have been codified by the International Law Commission in 
2011 in its Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International 
Organizations.   
Conduct of agents and organs that have an institutional link with 
NATO is automatically attributable to the organization. Chapter 4 
described the various organs and agents of NATO. The North Atlantic 
Council, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe and NATO’s 
various operational headquarters all have an institutional link with the 
                                                                                                                                                    
September 2013, ECLI:NL:HR:2013:BZ9225, para. 5.18. 
737 Nollkaemper, A. (2013) ‘Dual Attribution: Liability of the Netherlands for Conduct 
of Dutchbat in Srebrenica’, Journal of International Criminal Justice, 9(5). 
738 Nollkaemper, A. (2013) ‘Dual Attribution: Liability of the Netherlands for Conduct 
of Dutchbat in Srebrenica’, Journal of International Criminal Justice, 9(5). 
739 J. Crawford, State Responsibility: The General Part, 2013, p. 218 cited by K.E. 
Boon, Are Control Tests Fit for the Future? The Slippage Problem in Attribution 
Doctrines, Melbourne Journal of International Law, Vol. 15, 2014, p. 34. 
740 Article 1, Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 
1948, 78 UNTS 277, 12 January 1951. 
741 Article 3(1), Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment, 1984, 1465 UNTS 85, 26 June 1987. 
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organizations and their actions are therefore automatically attributable 
to NATO under Article 6 of the ILC’s Articles. For instance, the decision 
of the North Atlantic Council to initiate Operational Allied Force in 
Kosovo, without the authorization of the UN Security Council is 
attributable to NATO as is the decision to transfer detainees to the 
Afghan government during the ISAF operation (as described in Chapter 
2 of this thesis).   
The actions of agents and organs that are placed at the disposal of 
NATO are not automatically attributable to the organization. Article 7 
of the Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International 
Organizations states that only conduct over which the organization 
exercises effective control is attributable to the organization. The 
Alliance relies for a significant part on agents placed at its disposal by 
States.  
The Alliance is responsible for the conduct of those individuals only 
when it exercises effective control over the specific wrongful conduct. 
The test of effective control – as contained in Article 7 ARIO – is 
complicated, as it requires detailed analysis of the factual 
circumstances of the conduct. Contrary to the Behrami case, effective 
control is not established by mere “authorization”, such as a UN 
Security Council resolution. The command and control arrangements as 
described in chapter 5 may give a general indication as to which entity 
has control over certain actions. In general, NATO is presumed to have 
effective control over agents placed at its disposal by States. States 
transfer Operational Command over troops that they contribute to 
NATO. Operational Command is the authority to assign missions or 
tasks, to deploy units and to reassign forces. While TCNs retain 
disciplinary and criminal jurisdiction over their forces and have the 
authority to withdraw their forces from NATO command, NATO has 
considerable control in respect to leading of operations. The amount of 
control may vary dependent on the influence that a TCN may exercise 
through the use of commonly used methods, such as national caveats 
and the “Red Card Holdership”, but in general it is presumed that 
NATO has effective control over individuals placed at its disposal. 
COMKFOR had effective control over KFOR forces placed at its 
disposal, even in absence of criminal jurisdiction or disciplinary powers. 
The commander had the authority to issue orders to its personnel. 
Similarly, COMISAF had the authority to direct subordinate Regional 
Commanders to minimise the risks of civilian casualties. Therefore, the 
conduct of ISAF and KFOR personnel is attributable to NATO. 
In some cases, conduct can be attributed both to NATO and the TCN or 
TCNs. Multiple attribution has not occurred in practice widely, but it is 
theoretically possible. A few examples have been given in how single 
conduct can be attributed to multiple subjects. With regards to NATO-
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led operations, it seems possible to attribute single conduct to both 
NATO and the TCN in cases where one of the two had effective control 
over the conduct and the other – while having the authority – failed to 
intervene and thereby violated an international obligation.  
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Chapter 8  
The Responsibility of NATO for International Crimes 
during NATO Operations  
 
 
8.1 Introduction 
 
The previous chapters dealt with the responsibility of NATO under 
international law in general. This chapter examines the responsibility 
of NATO for international crimes committed by personnel in NATO 
operations.  
There is no single definition of what constitutes exactly an international 
crime.742 The reason why certain acts are criminalised internationally is 
because these acts affect a significant international interest, e.g., the 
conduct is deemed offensive to the commonly shared principles 
throughout the international community or the conduct involves more 
than one State.743 The former could be categorised as universal crimes, 
and may even become international core crimes. Some authors 
categorise crimes that are not of concern to the entire international 
community, transnational crimes.744 Transnational crime is conduct that 
has trans-boundary effects, but may not be of universal concern. They 
are international because the nature of these crimes inherently involve 
more than one nation. Therefore, the main difference between 
transnational crimes and international crimes based on international 
customary law is that the latter category is often classified of being of 
universal concern.745 This chapter will examine both categories of 
crimes. 
In some specific cases, States have concluded international agreements 
and allowed international tribunals and courts to exercise jurisdiction 
over certain criminal conduct, such as the Special Court for Lebanon or 
the International Criminal Court. In other cases, conduct is 
criminalised through a decision of the UN Security Council, relying 
primarily on international customary law apply universally – so-called 
core crimes – to form the basis for the subject matter jurisdiction of the 
                                                             
742 Damgaard, C. (2008) Individual criminal responsibility for core international 
crimes: Selected pertinent issues. Germany: Springer-Verlag Berlin and Heidelberg 
GmbH & Co. K, p. 57. 
743 Damgaard, C. (2008) Individual criminal responsibility for core international 
crimes: Selected pertinent issues. Germany: Springer-Verlag Berlin and Heidelberg 
GmbH & Co. K, p. 58-60. 
744 Boister, N. (2003) ‘Transnational Criminal Law’, European Journal of International 
Law, 14(5), pp. 953-976. 
745 Boister, N. (2003) ‘Transnational Criminal Law’, European Journal of International 
Law, 14(5), p. 955. 
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International Court for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. 
International core crimes include crimes against humanity, war crimes, 
genocide and the crime of aggression. 
Chapter 2 provided in four illustrative cases where NATO’s 
responsibility under international public law could arise. The cases 
relate not only to potential breaches of international obligations binding 
upon the Alliance, but also to crimes allegedly committed by personnel 
during NATO operations.  
The first case dealt with human trafficking and forced prostitution in 
Kosovo, for which KFOR personnel were allegedly held responsible. The 
2000 United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized 
Crime and the Protocols Thereto addresses human trafficking as a 
crime and obliges States to adopt legislative and other measures to 
establish human trafficking as a crime.746 The Convention itself does not 
criminalise human trafficking or forced prostitution and therefore does 
not contain an obligation for States to refrain from committing such 
acts. Neither is such an obligation found in international customary 
law. Human trafficking and forced prostitution is criminalised in 
several domestic legislatures and, as such, are rather transnational 
crimes. 
The second case relates to the detention and transfer of individuals in 
Afghanistan by ISAF personnel. The transfer of detainees to the 
Government of Afghanistan was criticized as the transfers would violate 
the principles of non-refoulement, i.e. the prohibition to transfer 
individuals to another State where there are substantial grounds for 
believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture. The 
obligation of non-refoulement is found in the 1987 Convention Against 
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment747 and is also considered to be part of international 
customary law.748 State Parties to the Convention Against Torture shall 
ensure that acts of torture are defined as offences under their criminal 
laws, but there is no obligation to criminalise refoulement itself.  
The Kunduz case and the case regarding Operation Unified Protector 
relate to alleged indiscriminate attacks on the civilian population. Such 
acts would constitute a grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva Conventions 
and the 1977 Additional Protocol I thereto.749 The prohibition is also part 
                                                             
746 UN General Assembly Resolution 55/25, 15 November 2000, United Nations 
Convention Against Transnational Crime.  
747 Article 3, Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment, 1984, 1465 UNTS 85, 26 June 1987. 
748 Report of the Special Rapporteur on Torture to the UN General Assembly, 
A/59/324, 23 August 2004, paras. 25-29. 
749 Article 50, Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded 
and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field (Geneva Convention I), 1949, 75 UNTS 31, 
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of international customary law.750 Indiscriminate attacks on the civilian 
population would constitute a war crime if it is executed as part of a 
State or organizational policy. As stated above, war crimes are 
considered part of international core crimes.751  
As stated in the introductory chapter of this thesis there are two 
reasons to include a chapter on the responsibility of NATO for 
international crimes committed by its personnel during operations. 
International crimes constitute the most severe form of wrongful 
conduct that could possibly take place during Alliance operations. The 
severity of these crimes and the possible responsibility of NATO for 
these acts merit a dedicated chapter in this thesis. Secondly, there is a 
development in international law – in particular international human 
rights law – to contain ancillary obligation to prevent and punish 
perpetrators of international crimes. As a result, criminal offences 
perpetrated by NATO personnel can lead to the responsibility of NATO 
under international law. 
International criminal law and the rules on responsibility of 
international organizations govern two distinct aspects of responsibility. 
International criminal law focuses on the individual responsibility for 
an international crime, while the rules on responsibility of international 
organizations establish conditions for international responsibility of 
international organizations. Arguably, the two distinct sets of norms 
require separate study instead of being combined in a single thesis. 
There is, however, growing academic literature and practice on the 
existence of a relationship between international criminal law and the 
rules on responsibility under international public law.752 For instance, 
                                                                                                                                                    
12 August 1949; article 51, Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the 
Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea 
(Geneva Convention II), 1949, 75 UNTS 85, 12 August 1949; article 130, Geneva 
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (Geneva Convention III), 
1949, 75 UNTS 135, 12 August 1949: article 147, Geneva Convention Relative to 
the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (Geneva Convention IV), 1949, 75 
UNTS 287, 12 August 1949; article 11 and 85, Protocol Additional to the Geneva 
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of 
International Armed Conflicts, 1977, 1125 UNTS 3, 8 June 1977. 
750 Henckaerts, J.-M. and Doswald-Beck, L. (2005) Customary international 
humanitarian law: V. 1: Rules. United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, rule 
no. 11. 
751 Article 3, Statute of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. Article 
4, Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. Article 8,Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court, 1998, 2187 UNTS 38544, 1 July 2002. 
752 Bonafe, B.I. (2009) The relationship between state and individual responsibility for 
international crimes, The Netherlands: Brill Academic Publishers. Nollkaemper, A. 
(2003) ‘Concurrence Between Individual Responsibility and State Responsibility in 
International Law’, International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 52(3), pp. 615-
640. Spinedi, M. (2002) ‘State Responsibility v. Individual Responsibility for 
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when the ICTY started to prosecute Serbian leadership for the crime of 
genocide committed in Srebrenica, a claim was made before the ICJ by 
Bosnia and Herzegovina against Serbia and Montenegro for their 
responsibility for the commission of the crime of genocide on its 
territory.753 Academic writers similarly alluded to the responsibility of 
Liberia after the criminal conviction of its president for committing 
crimes against humanity by the Special Court of Sierra Leone in 2012.754 
As a final example, the NATO bombardment in 1999 against Serbian 
forces in Kosovo and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and 
Montenegro) led to a claim submitted by Serbia and Montenegro 
against several NATO member States and has led as well to a 
preliminary criminal investigation by the ICTY of NATO personnel for 
their participation in the air campaign.755 
This chapter is divided into 5 paragraphs. Paragraph 8.2 will examine 
the international responsibility of NATO for the commission of 
                                                                                                                                                    
International Crimes: Tertium Non Datur?,’ European Journal of International 
Law, 13(4). Cassese, A. (2002) ‘When May Senior State Officials Be Tried for 
International Crimes? Some Comments on the Congo v. Belgium Case’, European 
Journal of International Law, 13(853). Spinedi and Cassese maintain that State 
officials may commit international crimes in an official capacity – in contrast with 
the ICJ judgment – which consequently may result in the responsibility of a State 
under public international law. International Court of Justice, Case Concerning the 
Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide, (2007), ICJ Reports 2007, 43. The ICJ addressed the question whether 
genocide was carried out in Bosnia against the Muslim population in the mid 
1990’s, and whether Serbia was internationally responsible for that international 
crime. Since the ICTY already had convicted individuals charged with connection 
with the facts before the ICJ, the question of the relationship between individual 
and State responsibility become inevitable, Bonafe, B.I. (2009) The relationship 
between state and individual responsibility for international crimes, The 
Netherlands: Brill Academic Publishers, p. 1-2. 
753 International Court of Justice, Case Concerning the Application of the Convention 
on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, (2007), ICJ Reports 
2007, 43. International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Prosecutor v 
Popović et al, IT-05-88, Judgment of 30 January 2015. 
754 Special Court for Sierra Leone, Appeals Chamber, Judgment, Prosecutor v. Taylor, 
26 April 2012. K.A. Hardtke, The Actions of One, the Responsibility of a Nation: 
Charles Taylor’s Conviction by the Special Court for Sierra Leone and Its Impact on 
State Responsibility Claims Against Liberia, Wiscounsin International Law 
Journal, 2014. 
755 ICTY, Final Report to the Prosecutor by the Committee Established to Review the 
NATO Bombing Campaign Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. 
International Court of Justice, Legality of Use of Force (Serbia and Montenegro v. 
Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, United 
Kingdom and Yugoslavia v. United States of America), (1999), ICJ Reports 1999, 
916. Also, Dolman, M. and Kleffner, J. (2009) System criminality in international 
law. Edited by Andre Nollkaemper and Harmen van der Wilt. Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press, p. 18 and Van Sliedregt, E. (2012) Individual criminal 
responsibility in international law, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 21. 
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international crimes. As will be analysed, an act can constitute both an 
international crime as well as a breach of an international obligation 
binding upon NATO. Therefore, an act can trigger both the criminal 
responsibility of an individual under international criminal law and the 
responsibility of the Alliance under international public law. Paragraph 
8.3 examines the ancillary obligations imposed by international 
humanitarian law and international human rights law for international 
crimes. These bodies of law contain international obligations to prevent 
and supress international crimes.  
Paragraph 8.4 will examine the criminal responsibility of NATO 
commanders and superiors. This modality of criminal responsibility 
under international criminal law is relevant to the responsibility of 
NATO. Paragraph 8.5 will end the chapter with final conclusions and 
observations.  
 
8.2 International Responsibility for the Commission of an 
International Crime 
 
It is inconceivable that NATO personnel would commit international 
crimes as part of NATO policy or instruction. NATO personnel may 
commit crimes, but rarely as part of their official functions. Instead, 
criminal conduct will have been committed in a private capacity. 
Nevertheless, the Alliance can be responsible for wrongful acts 
committed by its personnel which fall outside of their official functions. 
Article 8 of the ILC Draft Articles on the International Responsibility of 
International Organizations states that the conduct of an organ or 
agent of an international organization shall be considered an act of that 
organization under international law if the organ or agent acts in an 
official capacity and within the overall functions of that organizations, 
even if the conduct exceeds the authority of that organ or agent or 
contravenes instructions.  
For instance, in the Kunduz-case illustrated in chapter 2 of this thesis, 
the Commander of Regional Command North acted allegedly in 
contravention of COMISAF’s order to impose restraint on air strikes to 
avoid civilian casualties. The airstrike was not only in contravention of 
COMISAF’s directive, but also constituted a violation of a rule of 
international humanitarian law.  NATO, notwithstanding that the act 
was in contravention of COMISAF’s orders, can be held responsible for 
violating an international obligation committed by its personnel.  
The circumstance that crimes are rarely committed within the official 
functions of NATO personnel also has implications for personal or 
functional immunity accorded by, for instance, the 1952 Ottawa 
Agreement. In the Yerodia-case before the ICJ, it was determined that 
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heads of State or Ministers of Foreign Affairs are accorded personal 
immunity from prosecution for official and private acts committed 
during its term in office.756 Even after the term in office, this immunity 
continues to exist for inter alia private acts committed while in office.757 
Similarly, it can be argued that NATO personnel accorded with 
personal immunity, can not be prosecuted for (international) crimes 
committed while in office, even after this person has ceased to be 
employed by NATO. In practice, however, the issue is marginally 
relevant. Personal immunity is accorded to only a very select group of 
people, including the NATO Secretary General. Almost everyone else is 
accorded a more limited functional immunity. 
Having examined that crimes committed by NATO personnel are likely 
to be private acts, rather than part of official function and having 
examined the relevance of the distinction between private official act to 
personal immunity accorded to certain categories of NATO personnel, 
the following paragraph will analyse in which circumstances an act can 
result in individual criminal responsibility and the responsibility of 
NATO. 
A single act can give rise to individual criminal responsibility and 
responsibility of an international organization or State at the same 
time. This is caused by the circumstance that an act may constitute a 
crime as well as a violation of an international obligation.  
The following example may illustrate this. The killing of a prisoner of 
war constitutes a breach of Article 13 of the 1949 Geneva Convention 
III, which states that “any unlawful act or omission by the Detaining 
Power causing death [...] of a prisoner of war in its custody is prohibited, 
and will be regarded as a serious breach of the present Convention.” 
Killing a prisoner of war is an act criminalised in many domestic 
legislations758 as well as in the Statute of the International Criminal 
Court. The latter states that wilful killing a person protected under the 
Geneva Convention is a war crime under Article 8(2) of the ICC Statute. 
Therefore, the single act of killing a prisoner of war entails individual 
criminal responsibility of the perpetrator and, under certain conditions, 
it can entail also the responsibility of that State. Since the provision is 
part of international customary law, responsibility of international 
organizations, such as NATO, equally may arise.759 The ICRC has 
                                                             
756 International Court of Justice, Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 
2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium), 2002 ICJ Reports 2002, 3. 
757 International Court of Justice, Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 
2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium), 2002 ICJ Reports 2002, 3, 
para. 61. 
758 E.g. article 5 Wetboek Internationale Misdrijven.  
759 Henckaerts, J.-M. and Doswald-Beck, L. (2005) Customary international 
humanitarian law: V. 1: Rules. United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, rule 
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compiled a useful comparative table of war crimes found in the Statute 
of the International Criminal Court and their source in international 
humanitarian law.760  
Equally, States and international organization can be held responsible 
in case of crimes against humanity. These acts are criminalised by 
article 7 of the ICC Statute and give rise to individual criminal 
responsibility.761 The conduct may also lead to international 
responsibility of States and international organizations as equivalent 
norms exists in e.g. the 1907 Hague Convention.762 Crimes against 
humanity also overlap with infringements of various international 
obligations contained in, for instance, international human rights law 
and international humanitarian law. A crime against humanity could 
automatically include a breach of, inter alia, the Convention against 
Apartheid763, 1949 Geneva Conventions764, or the European Convention 
on Human Rights.765 
The crime of aggression means – as defined in the Statute of the ICC – 
the planning, preparation, initiation or execution by a person in a 
position effectively to exercise control over or to direct the political or 
military action of a State, of an act of aggression which, by its character, 
gravity and scale, constitutes a manifest violation of the Charter of the 
                                                                                                                                                    
47. 
760 https://www.icrc.org/en/document/war-crimes-under-rome-statute-international-
criminal-court-and-their-source-international 
761 Article 7 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 1998, 2187 UNTS 
38544, 1 July 2002. 
762 Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its annex: 
Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 18 October 1907, 
preamble “Until a more complete code of the laws of war has been issued, the High 
Contracting Parties deem it expedient to declare that, in cases not included in the 
Regulations adopted by them, the inhabitants and the belligerents remain under 
the protection and the rule of the principles of the law of nations, as they result 
from the usages established among civilized peoples, from the laws of humanity, 
and the dictates of the public conscience.” Bassiouini, C. (2010) ‘Crimes Against 
Humanity: The Case for a Specialized Convention’, Washington University Global 
Studies Law Review, 9(4). 
763 Article 1, International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the 
Crime of Apartheid, 1974, 1015 UNTS 243, 18 July 1976, declares apartheid as a 
violation of principles of international law, in particular the purposes and principles 
of the Charter of the United Nations.  
764 If the crime against humanity is committed in the context of an armed conflict, 
most acts constitute a breach of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and 1977 Protocols 
Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions. 
765 Articles 2 and 3 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms, 1950, 213 UNTS 222, 3 September 1953. 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Prosecutor v. Blăskić, 
IT-95-14-A, Judgment of 29 July 2004, para. 143.  
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United Nations.766 The crime of aggression is ordinarily committed by 
individuals in official, high-level positions and in that case it can invoke 
individual criminal responsibility as provided by Article 8 bis of the 
Rome Statute. This is without prejudice to responsibility of States and 
also international organizations in case of unlawful use of force as 
established by the UN Charter and the General Assembly resolution 
3314(XXIX) of 1974. 
The crime of aggression is relevant to NATO operations, as it may be 
possible that NATO leaders and high-level officials get involved in a 
crime of aggression by ordering and exercising control over military 
forces of a member State to commit such an act. A practical example is 
the NATO air campaign “Allied Force” in Kosovo. The decision to 
initiate Operation Allied Force was taken by the North Atlantic Council 
in 1999. If the operation would constitute a violation of the UN Charter, 
as has been held by the Former Republic of Yugoslavia before the ICJ,767 
the members of the Council could be held criminally responsible for the 
commission of the crime of aggression. However, since the ICC 
definition of the crime of aggression was adopted only in 2010, i.e. 
eleven years after the operation Allied Force was carried out, the 
exercise of jurisdiction by ICC would not be possible.  
International criminal responsibility and responsibility under 
international law can be regulated by the same document under 
different rules. For example, the 1949 Geneva Conventions prohibit 
certain conduct (which if violated would present a war crime) and at the 
same time impose obligations on States parties to the Geneva 
Conventions to take certain measures (prevent, investigate and punish) 
which, if violated, would invoke international responsibility of that 
State.  
In other cases, individual criminal responsibility and international 
responsibility of States and international organizations for certain 
conduct are regulated by different documents. For instance, genocide is 
an act criminalised under Article 6 of the Statute of the International 
Criminal Court. The act does not give rise to international 
responsibility under international conventional law, since there is no 
international agreement prohibiting States (or international 
organization) to commit genocide.768 An act entailing genocide leads to 
                                                             
766 Article 8bis,Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 1998, 2187 UNTS 
38544, 1 July 2002, adopted by the Assembly of States during the Review Conference 
of the Rome Statute, held in Kampala between 31 May and 11 June 2010. 
767 International Court of Justice, Legality of Use of Force (Serbia and Montenegro v. 
Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, United 
Kingdom and Yugoslavia v. United States of America), (1999), ICJ Reports 1999, 916. 
768 Article II, Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 
1948, 78 UNTS 277, 12 January 1951, does not include the prohibition for States to 
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individual criminal responsibility under the ICC Statute, but not 
directly to the responsibility of a State. This is because the Genocide 
Convention does not impose an obligation on States not to commit 
genocide, but only to prevent or suppress acts of genocide.769 It is so that 
in case of factual commission of genocide there will always be 
individuals criminal responsibility, but for not preventing and 
punishing there will be international responsibility for corporate bodies 
(States and international organizations).  
As said above, in certain instances international crimes may not have 
an equivalent counterpart as an international obligation in 
international law. This is particularly true for international crimes that 
merely require States to criminalize certain conduct and to implement 
legislation for the criminal prosecution of this conduct in domestic legal 
systems. These international agreements oblige States to prevent and 
supress international crimes, but do not formulate a binding 
international obligation not to commit the crimes themselves. Human 
trafficking and forced prostitution are acts criminalised under article 7 
of the ICC Statute. There is no equivalent norm imposing an 
international obligation upon States not to commit human trafficking 
and forced prostitution. The only obligating resting upon States is to 
prevent, suppress and punish human trafficking and forced 
prostitution.770 Even if it was established that human trafficking and 
forced prostitution would have been committed by NATO officials, this 
would not result in the responsibility of NATO, as there is no 
international obligation prohibiting States or international 
organizations to commit such acts. NATO could – however – be held 
responsible for failing to prevent or suppress these acts, which 
obligation is further examined in the following paragraph. 
 
8.3 International Responsibility to Prevent or Punish 
International Crimes. 
 
Ancillary obligations are duties resting upon a State or international 
organization other than refraining from the direct commission of the 
prohibited act. It does not refer to the commission of the prohibited act 
                                                                                                                                                    
commit genocide, rather it contains the obligation to prevent and punish genocide. 
769 Gaeta, P. (2007) ‘On What Conditions Can a State Be Held Responsible for 
Genocide’, European Journal of International Law, 18(4), p. 633. For a different 
view: Milanović, M. (2006) ‘State Responsibility for Genocide’, European Journal of 
International Law, 17(3), p. 570. 
770 Article 5, Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, 
Especially Women and Children, supplementing the United Nations Convention 
against Transnational Organized Crime, 1951, 96 UNTS 271, 25 July 1951. 
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itself, rather the duty to prevent the crime from happening, to enact 
legislation or, for instance, to cooperate in the extradition of the alleged 
perpetrator.  
In preventing and suppressing international crimes, several 
international conventions impose obligations on States to criminalise 
certain conduct, to educate and train officials, to investigate alleged 
international crimes and to prosecute the suspects. States are obliged to 
enact necessary legislation to train individuals on the principles of the 
1949 Geneva Conventions.771 Article V of the 1948 Genocide Convention 
stipulates that State parties need to enact legislation to criminalise the 
act of genocide. Article 5 of the 2000 Convention against Transnational 
Organized Crime and the Protocols Thereto equally requires State 
parties to criminalise the trafficking in persons. States are required to 
exercise jurisdiction over international crimes and to investigate when 
there are reasonable grounds to believe that certain violations of 
international law have been committed.772 The 1949 Geneva Convention 
oblige State parties, for instance “to search for persons alleged to have 
committed, or to have ordered to be committed, such grave breaches, 
and shall bring such persons, regardless of their nationality, before its 
own courts.”773 The obligation to investigate extends also to other types 
of international crimes, such as torture.774 
Certain international conventions oblige States to cooperate with each 
other and with international tribunals to ensure that perpetrators of 
international crimes are prosecuted and punished.775  The Statutes of the 
                                                             
771 Articles 47, 48, 127, 144 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, art. 83 Protocol 
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the 
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, 1977, 1125 UNTS 3, 8 June 
1977, Article 19 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, 
and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, 
1977, 1125 UNTS 609, 8 June 1977, Art. 6 Convention on Certain Conventional 
Weapons. These obligations are considered part of international customary law, J-
M Henckaerts, L. Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law, 
2009.  
772 Article 2 ICCPR, “Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect 
and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction 
the rights recognized in the present Covenant, without distinction of any kind, such 
as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social 
origin, property, birth or other status”. The Human Rights Committee has 
interpreted this provision as including an obligation for State to prosecute violators 
of the ICCPR, Human Rights Committee, Quinteros v. Uruguay, Comm107/1981, 
UN Doc A/38/40, 1983.  
773 Articles 49, 50, 129, 146 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions I-IV respectively. 
774 Article 12, Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment, 26 June 1987, 1465 UNTS 85.  
775 Article 19 Second Protocol to the Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural 
Property in the Event of an Armed Conflict, 26 March 1999. 
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ICC and ICTY contain the obligation to cooperate with the respective 
tribunal and court with regard to the investigation of crimes mentioned 
in their Statutes.776 The obligations to prevent and suppress 
international crimes are referred to as ‘positive human rights 
obligations’.777  
The majority of these provisions to prevent and suppress international 
crimes are considered part of international customary law and hence 
binding upon the Alliance. However, NATO might not be in a position to 
implement all of the international obligations. NATO has made 
available various programmes and training to educate personnel in IHL 
prior and during their deployment, both at national and at NATO 
facilities.778 But the Alliance does not have the power to criminalise (or 
oblige States to criminalise) international crimes,779 nor does it have the 
jurisdiction to conduct criminal investigations or prosecute suspects of 
having committed international crimes that is not part of its obligation 
under international public law.  
The question that remains is to which extent the Alliance has the 
obligation to prevent and suppress international crimes. In essence, the 
answer is affirmative as NATO does have, albeit limited, powers to 
fulfill its obligations, in particular in relation to the investigation of 
international crimes and the cooperation with States and international 
courts and tribunals in order to facilitate the investigation of 
international crimes and the prosecution of suspects thereof.780  
The Alliance has the obligation to cooperate with the ICTY to enable 
                                                             
776 Article 86, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 1998, 2187 UNTS 
38544, 1 July 2002, entered into force 1 July 2002. Article 29 Statute of the 
International Criminal Tribunal fort he former Yugoslavia.  
777 P.H.P.H.M.C. van Kempen, Four Concepts of Security – A Human Rights 
Perspective, Human Rights Law Review 2013, Vol. 13, nr. 1, p. 1-23. 
778 NATO Standardisation Agreement 2249 (http://www.act.nato.int/law-of-armed-
conflict-nato-training-group-task-group-update). NATO School Oberammergau 
provides in a NATO legal adviser course and operational law course that allows for 
training in IHL for all NATO personnel and individuals employed at national 
Ministries of Defence. 
779 Article V, Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 
1948, 78 UNTS 277, 12 January 1951; Article 4, Convention against Torture and 
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 1984, 1465 UNTS 
85, 26 June 1987; Articles 49, 50, 129, 146 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions I-IV 
respectively. 
 The Statute of the ICC does not directly oblige States to incorporate international 
crimes into their own domestic legislation, but an indirect obligation may flow from 
the principle of complementarity of jurisdiction between the ICC and the domestic 
courts. 
780 There is sufficient State practice that the obligation to cooperate in order to 
facilitate the investigation of war crimes and the prosecution of the suspects is a 
rule of international customary law Rule 161, J-M. Henckaerts, L. Doswald-Beck 
(eds.), Customary International Humanitarian Law, 2005. 
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prosecution of individuals suspected of having committed international 
crimes.781 The relevance of this obligation nowadays is minimal, as the 
ICTY is scheduled to close in 2017.  If NATO declines to cooperate in 
these matters, the Alliance breaches an international (customary) norm 
and can be held responsible under international law. The obligation to 
cooperate with the International Criminal Court, as provided in article 
86 ICC Statute, is not extended to international organizations. The 
Statute of the International Criminal Court is only binding on the State 
parties. Moreover, there is no international customary norm to 
cooperate with the ICC.  
One of the first methods in which NATO tried to cooperate and 
investigate international crimes was the establishment of a NATO 
International Military Police in 1988. Proposals to convey investigative 
powers to an international police force were primarily based on 
arguments of practicality. On NATO operations, each TCN will have its 
own military police force in order to maintain order and to investigate 
misconduct of their forces.782 To avoid each TCN having to deploy a 
military police force and to combine functions regarding discipline and 
order on military compounds, member States have contemplated on 
creating a single international military police force. The member States 
agreed to create such a force authorized to conduct preliminary 
investigations, such as securing evidence and identifying witnesses in 
order that national authorities may interview them at a later stage.783 
Additional powers, including the authority to detain personnel would 
have been realised by concluding a technical arrangement between 
NATO and its member States. However, the necessary technical 
arrangements have never been concluded. Therefore, the IMP is limited 
to conduct only preliminary investigations. In practice, however, the use 
of the IMP in this regard has been marginal. 
The Alliance does not have criminal jurisdiction to conduct criminal 
investigations, but the obligation to investigate international crimes 
does not necessarily refer to criminal investigations alone. The 
obligation to investigate international crimes is of a broader nature and 
include various other types of investigations.784 According to the ICRC, 
                                                             
781 International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Prosecutor v. 
Milutinović et al., IT-05-87-PT, Decision of 17 November 2005. 
782 Generally, 2 military police officers will be deployed per 100 military and civilian 
personnel. Interview with the “Expertisecentrum Militair Strafrecht Openbaar 
Ministerie, mr. D. Ammeraal, 24 May 2011.  
783 STANAG 2085 OP (edition 4) – NATO Combined Military Police, 24 February 1988 
and Allied Procedural Publication-12, NATO Military Police Doctrine and 
Procedures, 28 October 2002. 
784 International Committee of the Red Cross, Commentary on the Additional Protocols 
of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, para. 3562.  
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any commander in an operation is key to implement the obligation to 
investigate possible international (in this case war-) crimes.785  
Commanders are not per definition conducting criminal investigations, 
but primarily are fact-finding in nature. 
NATO conducts operational fact-finding investigations in case violations 
of its policy or directives are violated. International crimes would 
certainly constitute a violation of NATO policy. For instance, human 
trafficking would constitute a direct violation of NATO policy,786 as 
would the commission of war crimes, genocide, crimes against 
humanity.787 Fact-finding investigations are intended to provide NATO 
leadership a general overview of the facts relating to an alleged 
violation of NATO policy. It is standard practice in the NATO-led 
operations to include the duty to report on any events that may be of 
relevance to higher headquarters, such as incidents involving the use of 
force, civilian casualties, incidents that may elicit political, media or 
international reaction or violations of international (humanitarian) law. 
Reporting mechanisms often include a preliminary “first impression 
report” followed by a more in-depth “second impression report” and an 
“after action report”. On the basis of these reports, a conclusion can be 
drawn whether the incident needs further investigation. The analysis of 
the reports is done in close consultation with a NATO legal adviser, 
which advises in cases of possible crimes or violations of NATO policy. 
The procedures proved to be efficient in providing an analysis of the 
incidents for operational purposes and to provide in a relatively short 
time a comprehensive description of the event. 
These investigations should be distinguished from criminal 
investigations. They are not intended to substitute a criminal 
investigation. Rather, they focus on the operational aspects and 
compliance with NATO directions and policy. Great care is taken to 
avoid that evidence gathered during such fact-finding investigations do 
not jeopardise a potential criminal investigation. As illustrated in 
chapter 2 of this thesis, NATO conducted an initial investigation 
directly after reports have been received of civilian casualties in 
Kunduz, caused by a NATO airstrike. The outcome of the preliminary 
investigation was that the act may have constituted an international 
crime. Subsequently the investigation was superseded in order to allow 
a criminal investigation led by Germany. 
Even though the investigations conducted by NATO are not criminal in 
                                                             
785 Schmitt, M.N. (2011) ‘Investigating Violations of International Law in Armed 
Conflict’, Harvard National Security Journal, 2, p. 41. 
786 NATO, NATO Policy on Combating Trafficking in Human Beings, 29 June 2004.  
787 Most NATO Operational Plans contain reference to obligations under IHL and 
IHRL. 
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nature, they do have a substantial impact on the exercise of criminal 
jurisdiction by TCNs over their personnel. In one instance, COMISAF 
announced a thorough fact finding investigation on the compliance of a 
TCN with ISAF procedures, after the TCN involved had been reluctant 
to investigate serious misconduct. To avoid public embarrassment, 
States tend to take such announcements seriously. On the other hand, 
NATO will also try to avoid putting too much pressure on TCNs, as it is 
highly dependent on contributions of these States for its missions.  
All NATO member States have the obligation to ensure that genuine 
investigations into allegations of international crimes are carried out. In 
NATO operations such investigations are unlikely to be prompt and 
effective given the fact that actors of various nationalities may be 
involved, requiring an equal number of States to exercise jurisdiction.  
One of the possibilities is to expand the powers of the IMP as described 
above, but other possibilities, such as the creation of a commission of 
investigation led by NATO and on behalf of the State involved are other 
feasible possibilities. 
NATO cannot prosecute alleged perpetrators of international crimes as 
it does not have any criminal jurisdiction. What it can do, is to inform 
the respective sending State to take appropriate action and in specific 
cases waive immunity granted to those individuals.788 Since all its 
member States are bound to ensure prosecution and punishment of 
perpetrators of international crimes, NATO does have an indirect 
obligation789 that alleged perpetrators of international crimes are 
prosecuted by the respective member State. If a member State fails to 
prosecute allegations of criminal conduct, the Alliance could exclude 
that member State from participating in the operation. Currently, such 
measures are not included in NATO policy. Hypothetically, if a member 
State would fail to prosecute alleged perpetrators of international 
crimes, it could bring the case to the attention of the ICC Prosecutor, by 
virtue of the ICC’s Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations.790 
Clearly, this would put enormous political strains on the relationship 
between NATO and the member States if such communications were 
done without careful deliberation. 
A final note on the ancillary obligations binding on NATO relates to the 
immunity of NATO personnel. Immunity may preclude NATO from 
facilitating prosecution of individuals suspected of being responsible of 
                                                             
788 Article XXII, Agreement on the Status of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 
National Representatives and International Staff, 1951, 200 UNTS 3, 20 September 
1951. 
789 ECJ (Grand Chamber), Kadi v Council of the European Union and Commission of 
the European Communities, Judgment, action for annulment, appeal, Case C-
402/05 P, [2008] ECR I-6351, [2009] AC 1225, 3 September 2008. 
790 ICC Prosecutor, Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations, November 2013. 
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having committed international crimes. As examined in previous 
chapters, international civilian staff employed at NATO HQ in Brussels 
and other international civilian headquarters enjoy functional791 – and 
in some cases absolute – immunity.792 The status of personnel deployed 
on NATO operations is regulated through bilateral agreements between 
NATO and the host State. These agreements often confer ‘exclusive’ 
jurisdiction on the sending State.793  Finally, personnel working for or 
seconded to NATO International Military Headquarters do not enjoy 
immunity, but fall under either the sending- or receiving State’s 
jurisdiction.  
The immunity provided for NATO personnel deployed in mission areas 
has been on occasion criticised. In the case regarding human trafficking 
and force prostitution in Kosovo by members of KFOR, it was held that 
the immunity of KFOR personnel impeded effective suppression of the 
crimes and that a waiver of immunity would be necessary to hold 
perpetrators criminally responsible. In its report on the alleged 
“widespread human trafficking and forced prostitution” committed by 
KFOR personnel, Amnesty International recommended NATO to ensure 
that the perpetrates will be prosecuted for such crimes by Kosovo by 
waiving the immunity granted by the UNMiK Regulation.794 Similarly, 
the Afghan government complained to NATO that the mission-SOFA, 
excluded the Afghan authorities from investigating possible misconduct 
                                                             
791 Article XVIII, Agreement on the Status of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 
National Representatives and International Staff, 1951, 200 UNTS 3, 20 September 
1951. 
792 Article XX, Agreement on the Status of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 
National Representatives and International Staff, 1951, 200 UNTS 3, 20 September 
1951. 
793 General Framework Agreement, Appendix B to Annex 1A Agreement on the 
military aspects of the peace settlement, 21 November 1995, paras. 2 and 7. See 
similarly ISAF: ISAF: Annex A, Arrangement regarding the Status of the 
International Security Assistance Force, to the Military Technical Agreement 
between the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and the Interim 
Administration of Afghanistan (‘Interim Administration’), 4 January 2002: e.g. para 
1 The provisions of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United 
Nations of 13 February 1946 concerning experts on mission will apply mutatis 
mutandis to the ISAF and supporting personnel, including associated liaison 
personnel. KFOR:. UNMiK Regulation 2000/47, 18 August 2000, section 2. 
794 Amnesty International (2004) ‘So does it mean that we have the rights?’ Protecting 
the human rights of women and girls trafficked for forced prostitution in Kosovo. 
Available at: http://reliefweb.int/report/serbia/so-does-it-mean-we-have-rights-
protecting, p. 57, recommendation 1.3. Also, Organization for Security and Co-
operation in Europe, mission in Kosovo, Department of Human Rights and Rule of 
Law, Kosovo Review of the Criminal Justice System, October 2001, p. 66 and ICRC, 
Report Expert Meeting on Multinational Peace Operations, 11-12 December 2003, 
p. 57.  
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of NATO personnel.795  
Sending nations may waive the right to exercise exclusive jurisdiction 
over their personnel and allow the host nation to prosecute perpetrators 
of international crimes. There is, however, no international obligation 
for States to waive this right. Whenever NATO receives allegations of 
the commission of international crimes, it is obliged to report, 
investigate and facilitate prosecution. This involves both with regard to 
personnel from NATO member States as well as with respect to 
personnel Non-NATO Contributing Nations on NATO operations.  
In case NATO international civilians pertaining to an international 
civilian headquarters have been involved in the commission of 
international crimes, the functional immunity granted by the Ottawa 
Agreement becomes relevant. The Agreement states that the functional 
immunity is granted “in respect of words spoken or written and of acts 
done by them in their official capacity and within the limits of their 
authority”.796 It is highly unlikely that the commission of international 
crimes could be considered an act done in the official capacity. If NATO 
would claim immunity for such conduct, it would also confirm the 
official capacity in which the conduct is performed and the conduct in 
question would be a priori attributable to NATO.797 It is argued here 
that when NATO claims immunity for personnel on NATO-led 
operations, it automatically confirms that the actions are part of 
functions of the organization and therefore attributable to NATO.798 
NATO would moreover be obliged to waive this immunity, so to allow 
the investigation and prosecution of international crimes. 
 
8.4 The Criminal Responsibility of NATO Commanders and 
Superiors and its Relation to the Responsibility of NATO 
 
Direct perpetration, conspiracy and complicity were the first recognized 
modalities of criminal responsibility in international law.799 The group of 
modalities grew quickly with the conclusion of international 
                                                             
795 Letter from the Afghan Minister of Defense to NATO’s Secretary General, 30 
August 2008, [CONFIDENTIAL?]. 
796 Article XVII(a), Article XVII, Agreement on the status of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization, National Representatives and International Staff in Ottawa, 20 
September 1951. 
797 Spinedi, M. (2002) ‘State Responsibility v. Individual Responsibility for 
International Crimes: Tertium Non Datur?,’ European Journal of International 
Law, 13(4), p. 898. 
798 In order for NATO to claim functional immunity for its personnel, it implies that 
the acts were carried out as part of his or her official function.  
799 Van Sliedregt, E. (2012) Individual criminal responsibility in international law. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 63. 
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conventions, including the 1948 Genocide Convention (e.g. incitement), 
grave breaches regime of the 1949 Geneva Conventions (superior 
responsibility) and the 1984 Convention Against Torture (passive 
superior responsibility). Additionally, the Statutes of the ICTY and 
ICTR and their interpretation included the Joint Criminal Enterprise 
as an additional modality of criminal responsibility. 
The broadened range of modalities under which individuals can be held 
criminal responsible is of relevance to the responsibility of NATO. With 
a much larger group that could become individually criminal 
responsible, the potential that NATO personnel could be held criminally 
responsible has also grown. While an international crime might not 
have been directly committed by NATO personnel, such personnel may 
be held criminally responsible under one of the modalities of 
international criminal law and may have as consequence that NATO as 
an international organization is responsible under international public 
law. In particular, one modality of international criminal responsibility 
is of relevance here, which is superior responsibility.  
A superior or commander is criminally responsible for crimes committed 
by forces or subordinates under his or her effective command and 
control, or effective authority and control, as a result of his or her 
failure to exercise control properly over such forces.800 The responsibility 
arises if the conduct was known by the superior or commander or, owing 
to the circumstances at the time, should have been known that the 
forces were committing or about to commit such crimes and that the 
superior or commander did not take any action to prevent or punish 
these acts.801  
                                                             
800 Art. 28 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 2002, 2187 UNTS 90, 1 
July 2002. This is less so with regard to civilian leaders, who often are not placed in 
a clear hierarchical structure. In the Čelebići-case before the ICTY, the Appeals 
Chamber held that the superior-subordinate relationship does not hinge on a 
formally established relationship.800 It is not necessary to look to formal titles, 
rather to determine that the superior has effective exercise of power or control to 
prevent or punish those acts committed or being committed by its subordinates. 
801 Art. 28 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 2002, 2187 UNTS 90, 1 
July 2002, “A military commander or person effectively acting as a military 
commander shall be criminally responsible for crimes within the jurisdiction of the 
Court committed by forces under his or her effective command and control, or 
effective authority and control as the case may be, as a result of his or her failure to 
exercise control properly over such forces, where:  
(i) That military commander or person either knew or, owing to the circumstances 
at the time, should have known that the forces were committing or about to commit 
such crimes; and  
(ii) That military commander or person failed to take all necessary and reasonable 
measures within his or her power to prevent or repress their commission or to 
submit the matter to the competent authorities for investigation and prosecution.” 
The ICTY Statute formulates command responsibility slightly stricter as the 
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The proof of a hierarchical relationship between a military commander 
and a subordinate is straightforward. It is sufficient to look at the 
command relationship to determine if such a hierarchy exists.802  
As for the mental requirement of liability under command / superior 
responsibility, the standard is that responsibility only incurs for acts 
which the commander “knew or had reason to know” that his 
subordinates had committed, or were about to commit. This is not a 
strict liability, meaning that only responsibility arises for acts which the 
commander or superior “had actual knowledge, established through 
direct or circumstantial evidence, that his subordinates were 
committing or about to commit crimes [...] or where he had in his 
possession information of a nature, which at the least, would put him on 
notice of the risk of such offences by indicating the need for additional 
investigation in order to ascertain whether such crimes were committed 
or were about to be committed by his subordinates.803 
Finally, command and superior responsibility only arises for the failure 
to exercise control properly, either by taking the necessary measures 
within his or her power to prevent or to repress the commission or to 
submit the matter to the competent authorities for investigation and 
prosecution. 
In conclusion, if NATO commanders fail to investigate and report 
international crimes, they are criminally responsible under the criminal 
modality of commanders’ responsibility. NATO is bound under a similar 
ancillary obligation of international human rights law and international 
humanitarian law to investigate and report international crimes. There 
is an overlap between the obligations of a commander under the 
modality of command responsibility and the ancillary obligation of 
NATO under IHL and IHRL. It would be hard to deny responsibility of 
NATO for failing to e.g. investigate allegations of international crimes, 
if a NATO commander is individually held criminally liable under the 
modality of command responsibility. NATO would be responsible for e.g. 
a breach of the 1949 Geneva Convention for not taking adequate 
                                                                                                                                                    
commander is also responsible if he had reason to know that the crimes were (about 
to be) committed. The ICTY Statute formulates command responsibility slightly 
stricter as the commander is also responsible if he had reason to know that the 
crimes were (about to be) committed. Article 7 ICTY Statute: “The fact that any of 
the acts referred to in articles 2 to 5 of the present Statute was committed by a 
subordinate does not relieve his superior of criminal responsibility if he knew or 
had reason to know that the subordinate was about to commit such acts or had 
done so and the superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to 
prevent such acts or to punish the perpetrators thereof.” 
802 International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, “Čelebići camp” case, 
IT-96-21-A, Judgment of 20 February 2001, para. 371. 
803 International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, “Čelebići camp” case, 
IT-96-21-A, Judgment of 20 February 2001, para. 383. 
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measures to investigate, report or to facilitate extradition.804 The 
relevant provision in the 1949 Geneva Conventions is part of 
international customary law and therefore binding upon NATO.805 It can 
be held that NATO is capable to investigate, report and facilitate 
extradition of those suspected of having committed international 
crimes. 
NATO commanders however are somewhat limited in the reasonable 
measures within their power that they should undertake to prevent or 
redress international crimes.806 While NATO commanders can receive 
reports periodically, they do not have disciplinary or criminal 
jurisdiction to suppress crimes if the perpetrator is of a different 
nationality than the NATO commander. The extent of his command 
responsibility is limited to “submit the matter to the competent 
authorities for investigation and prosecution”.807 The text of Article 28 of 
the ICC Statute underscores that a commander is relieved from 
responsibility if he or she refers reports of alleged crimes to competent 
authorities.808  
Under the modality of command responsibility, a commander is obliged 
to take reasonable measures to be informed on international crimes that 
are committed or about to be committed.809 This task is implemented by 
NATO by establishing a thorough reporting mechanism which is 
standard practice in almost all military operations and is described in 
the previous paragraph relating to the ancillary obligations of NATO 
under international law. 
 
                                                             
804 Art. 49, Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded 
and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 31; Art. 50, 
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick and 
Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 85; art. 
129 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 12 August 
1949, 75 UNTS 135; art. 146, Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of 
Civilian Persons in Time of War (Geneva Convention IV), 1949, 75 UNTS 287, 12 
August 1949, 75 UNTS 287.  
805 Rule 158 Henckaerts, J.-M. and Doswald-Beck, L. (2005) Customary international 
humanitarian law: V. 1: Rules. United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press. 
806 Article 28(a)(ii) Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 2002, 2187 
UNTS 90, 1 July 2002. 
807 Article 28(a)(ii) Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 2002, 2187 
UNTS 90, 1 July 2002. 
808 W.J. Fenrick, Prosecution of International Crimes, in Gill, T.D. and Fleck, D. (eds.) 
(2010) The handbook of the international law of military operations, United 
Kingdom: Oxford University Press, p. 511.  
809 Article 28(a)(i) Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 1998, 2187 
UNTS 38544, 1 July 2002“That military commander or person either knew or, 
owing to the circumstances at the time, should have known that the forces were 
committing or about to commit such crimes”. 
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8.5 Conclusions 
 
This chapter has examined the responsibility of NATO for international 
crimes committed by its personnel on military operations.  
While it is inconceivable that NATO personnel would commit 
international crimes as part of NATO policy or instruction, it might 
occur that personnel commit – in their private capacity – such crimes.  
A single act can result in both individual criminal responsibility and 
international responsibility of NATO. This is because the act can be an 
international crime and at the same time can involve a breach of an 
international obligation of NATO, which may be attributed to the 
organization. This can be the case for war crimes, crimes against 
humanity, the crime of aggression. 
NATO is under the international obligation to prevent and suppress 
international crimes. These obligations are found in international 
customary norms of IHL and IHRL. The ancillary obligation includes 
the criminalisation of certain conduct, provide for education, it should 
investigate allegations of the commission of international crimes and 
should prosecute suspects thereof. The Alliance does not have the power 
to implement all of these obligations and hence it cannot be held 
responsible for failing to do so, but it is certainly obliged to train, 
investigate and to cooperate with States and international courts and 
tribunals.810  
NATO has initiated several projects to implement the ancillary 
obligations to prevent and suppress international crimes, including the 
formation of an international military police force and the formulation 
of reporting and investigation procedures. NATO-led investigations 
have seen some success in achieving effective suppression of 
international crimes. The NATO led investigations could be even 
effective in situations where where Troop Contributing Nations are 
reluctant to investigate themselves. In conclusion, in situations where 
NATO does not investigate or ensure that an investigation into 
allegations of commission of international crimes are conducted, the 
Alliance is responsible under ancillary obligations of customary 
international humanitarian and human rights law. 
                                                             
810 So far, the obligation to cooperate with international courts and tribunals only 
exists with respect to the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia.  
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9.1 Final conclusions 
 
The drafters of the North Atlantic Treaty could not have predicted in 
1949 the course that NATO would fare. NATO was designed to portray 
collective trans-Atlantic resolve to counter a military threat from the 
Soviet bloc. It relied on numerous conventional forces stationed in 
various parts of Europe and on nuclear deterrent. NATO was a static 
collective defence alliance in which the member States were the main 
actors.  
After the Cold War NATO shifted from defending the territorial 
integrity of the member States to crisis-management operations in 
areas outside the territory of NATO where conflict has emerged or is 
about to emerge. The UN – tasked with the primary responsibility in 
preservation of international peace and security – has relied many 
times on NATO capabilities. NATO has become the only security 
institution capable of commanding large military operations at any 
place in the world. 
The transformation also changed NATO in legal and organizational 
aspects. While in 1949 the main actors of the Alliance were its member 
States, with the end of the Cold War the organization gained a more 
distinct role separate from them. In this new role NATO broadened the 
scope of its military activities which inevitably invoked several 
important questions on the responsibility of the organization.  
Questions arise whether NATO could bear rights and obligations as a 
separate international legal entity. And, if so, to which obligations 
would the Alliance be bound? Which conduct of NATO personnel on 
operations can be attributed to the Alliance, given the fact that most of 
NATO personnel consists of military personnel contributed by nations. 
In how far is NATO responsible for criminal conduct of its personnel?  
In answering these questions, four cases were used to illustrate the 
relevance and practicality of responsibility of NATO during its 
operations, followed by chapters on international legal personality, 
international obligations of NATO and rules of attribution for conduct of 
NATO personnel. This chapter will summarize the main conclusions 
drawn throughout the thesis and takes the liberty to provide several 
recommendations for NATO.  
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•  CONCLUSION 1: NATO IS AN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION WITH 
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PERSONALITY. 
The existence of international legal personality of NATO has both been 
disputed and acknowledged. Academic writers have been ambiguous 
regarding the status of NATO. There are a variety of reasons underlying 
the ambiguity. There is no evidence of an explicit intent of the founders 
of the Alliance to create an international organization with legal 
personality. Some academic writers look at NATO from a perspective of 
its earlier days when it operated mainly as an alliance of States and 
come to the conclusion that the Alliance does not possess international 
legal status. But, NATO undeniably possesses several of the indicia of 
international legal personality. The organization has concluded 
international agreements with both States and other international 
organizations and enjoys immunity in the member States’ territory. All 
indicia that point toward the existence of international legal 
personality. 
None of the international courts or tribunals have directly dealt with 
the question of international legal personality of NATO as of 2016, but 
with the increasing amount of operations that NATO conducts, the 
question may very well arise in the near future. Already, there is a 
tendency of international actors in international law to treat the 
Alliance as having international legal personality, such as the ICTY. 
And, in the proceedings before the ICJ, States have confirmed that 
NATO exists as a separate entity from its members. In its inquiry in the 
events in Libya in 2011 the UN has also treated NATO as a legal entity. 
Finally, NATO itself, also, confirms that the Alliance has separate legal 
status from the member States.811 
                                                             
811 NATO Secretary General, Strategic Airlift Capability (SAC) – Initiative Adoption of 
the NAMO charter, 20 June 2007, “It is accordingly agreed that only the member 
States of NAMO shall jointly and directly assume responsibility vis-à-vis NATO, 
and shall bear any resulting cost and liability for the implementation of the Airlift 
Management Programme, notwithstanding the fact that NAMO will be established, 
by the Council, pursuant to Article 9 of the North Atlantic Treaty and within the 
meaning of the Ottawa Agreement and will share in the international legal 
personality of NATO as well as the juridical personality possessed by NATO by 
virtue of Article IV of the Ottawa Agreement.” UN General Assembly, International 
Law Commission, Responsibility of International Organizations, Comments and 
observation received from international organizations, UN Doc A/CN.4/637, “The 
following comments relate to the structure of the organization, its decision-making 
procedures and its practice with respect to claims. NATO is an international 
organization within the meaning of draft article 2(a) of the draft articles, and as 
such a subject of international law. It possesses international legal personality as 
well as treaty-making power.” Para. 2, p. 11. B. DeVidts, Speaking notes on 
“aspects related to the Legal Status of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation”, 22 
November 2004 (CJ(2004)0910, copy on file with the author. Only on one occasion, 
NATO’s legal office of the International Staff has commented that NATO does not 
have international legal personality. Amnesty International, NATO/Federal 
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•  CONCLUSION 2: NATO HAS BINDING INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS 
UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW. 
This thesis examined the international obligations that are relevant to 
NATO’s operations. The main sources of international obligations for 
NATO are found in the customary rules of IHL and IHRL. Since NATO 
is not a party to any of the conventional norms of IHL and IHRL, the 
obligations relating to jus in bello are limited to the customary norms. 
Most conventional IHL and IHRL are customary in nature and 
therefore the difference between conventional and customary rules is 
relatively marginal. International obligations prohibit NATO of 
committing certain acts or to engage in a certain activity. NATO is 
prohibited to target civilians and is obliged to prevent or suppress such 
actions. The latter category of obligations is defined as positive 
obligations. NATO is bound to take precautionary measures in its 
attacks during air strikes in Libya in Operation Unified Protector. 
Likewise, in the case of Kunduz, it was obliged not to conduct attacks on 
military targets if the incidental loss of civilian life would be excessive 
to the military advantage anticipated. In relation to detention 
operations in ISAF, NATO was obliged to stop the transfer of detainees 
to Afghan authorities if there are substantial grounds to believe that 
they would be in danger of being subjected to torture. 
Indirect obligations come into existence when all the member States of 
an international organization are bound by a certain international 
obligation, but the organization itself is not. In this situation, the 
organization has to take due care that its actions do not violate the 
international obligations of its member States. The UN Charter and the 
resolutions of the UN Security Council are examples of indirect 
international obligations binding upon NATO. The Alliance itself is not 
formally bound by the UN Charter or by decisions of the UN  organs as 
it is not a party to the UN Charter.812 However, all of its member States 
are and therefore it is required to take note of these provisions.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                    
Republic of Yugoslavia “Collateral damage” or unlawful killings? Violations of the 
Laws of War by NATO during Operation Allied Force, p. 13, 5 June 2000. 
812 States that are not party tot he UN Charter are similarly not bound to UN Security 
Council resolutions. ICJ, Advisory Opinion of 21 June 1971, Legal Consequences for 
States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) 
Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276, ICJ Reports 1971, p. 16, para 
126; M.D. Öberg, The Legal Effects of Resolutions of the UN Security Council and 
General Assembly in the Jurisprudence of the ICJ, 16 European Journal of 
International Law, 2006.  
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•  CONCLUSION 3: NATO IS RESPONSIBLE FOR CONDUCT OF ITS AGENTS 
AND ORGANS. WITH RESPECT TO PERSONNEL PLACED AT ITS 
DISPOSAL, THE ALLIANCE IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THEIR CONDUCT IF IT 
EXERCISED EFFECTIVE CONTROL 
This thesis has examined the conditions under which wrongful conduct 
of personnel on NATO operations can be attributed to NATO. Based on 
the observations made in the chapter dealing with the institutional 
framework of NATO and having examined the conditions under which 
wrongful conduct is attributed to international organizations under 
international law, the following conclusions are made.  
Wrongful conduct of agents or organs that have an institutional link 
with the Alliance can be directly attributed to NATO if the conduct falls 
within the performance of functions of that agent or organ. NATO 
international civilians and contractors fall in the category of agents and 
organs that have a direct institutional link with the Alliance. 
The majority of personnel on mission, however, do not have an organic 
or institutional link with NATO. That is a result of the fact that nations 
which contribute troops retain full command over their forces as well as 
criminal and disciplinary jurisdiction. As a result, the contingents 
remain organs of the TCNs. Their conduct is attributed to the Alliance 
only when NATO exercises effective control over that conduct. Effective 
control can be undermined when military contingents continuously seek 
instructions from their national governments, as was the case in the 
NATO Operation Allied Force. As a consequence, the US government 
felt responsible for the incident regarding the bombing of the Chinese 
Embassy, even though NATO initially took responsibility for the action.  
In general, NATO has effective control over military contingents placed 
at its disposal. NATO commanders have operational command and 
control and can direct forces to execute the operation. There are few 
cases known where TCNs completely reassume command over their 
forces so that NATO does not exercise effective control anymore over 
their conduct. This was illustrated by the case where the Canadian 
government assumed command over its forces with respect of detentions 
operations. Wrongful conduct during Canadian-led detention operations 
is then only attributable to Canada. 
 
•  CONCLUSION 4: NATO CAN BE RESPONSIBLE UNDER INTERNATIONAL 
LAW FOR INTERNATIONAL CRIMES COMMITTED BY ITS PERSONNEL 
DURING OPERATIONS 
International crimes may occur during NATO operations. It is 
inconceivable that NATO personnel would commit international crimes 
as part of Alliance’ policy or instruction. However, the Organization can 
be held responsible for a criminal act that per definition falls outside 
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official functions of NATO personnel. Such acts lead to the individual 
criminal responsibility under international criminal law, but can also 
entail a breach of an international obligation of international customary 
law binding upon NATO, giving rise to the responsibility of NATO 
under international public law. For other international crimes, there 
may not be a prohibition for States or international organizations to 
commit the act under international public law. This is the case for e.g. 
human trafficking and forced prostitution where the act itself is not a 
breach of an international obligation, but the failure to prevent or 
suppress the crime is.  
Positive obligations exist to prevent or suppress international crimes 
and are part of international customary law. NATO is, therefore, bound 
to these provisions in so far that it can implement these obligations. The 
Alliance is not able to criminalise conduct or to prosecute alleged 
offenders of international crimes as it lacks criminal jurisdiction. 
However, NATO has taken measures to prevent international crimes by 
providing training to NATO personnel prior and during operations. 
NATO does have the authority to investigate criminal conduct to a 
limited extent. The investigations are not intended to replace a criminal 
investigation by troop contributing nations. The Alliance can report 
allegations of criminal conduct to nations to pursue with criminal 
prosecution. NATO has also initiated ways to cooperate with States in 
order to prevent and punish perpetrators of international crimes. 
Finally, NATO is obliged to cooperate with – so far, only – the ICTY in 
accordance with its Statute.  
NATO’s obligation to prevent and suppress international core crimes is 
not only found in international humanitarian and human rights law, 
but also derivative from international criminal law. Superiors and 
commanders are obliged to report and investigate international crimes 
under the international criminal modality of superior- or command 
responsibility. This responsibility exists also for NATO commanders and 
superiors. If they fail to do so, not only the commanders and superiors 
are criminally responsible, but also NATO will be responsible under 
international law as their conduct is attributable to the Alliance and the 
conduct entails a breach of an international obligation. 
 
9.2 Recommendations 
 
Based on the conclusions made in the previous paragraphs, the 
following recommendations are made. Since the subject of this thesis is 
NATO and its responsibility for personnel during operations, the 
recommendations are primarily aimed at this organization and relate to 
its responsibility under international law. 
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•  RECOMMENDATION 1: NATO SHOULD DEVELOP GUIDELINES TO 
RESPOND TO INTERNATIONAL CLAIMS 
This thesis demonstrated that NATO meets several indicia of 
international legal personality. It has entered into various international 
agreements and enjoys immunity from the member States’ jurisdiction. 
On the other hand, the Alliance did not bring or receive international 
claims, which is another indicator of international legal personality. 
Seemingly, there is a reluctance to receive international claims. When 
such claims are presented, the member States assert the responsibility 
to process the claim on a national basis. This was evident with regard to 
the bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Serbia, where initially the 
Alliance did respond to the claim and issued formal apologies and where 
the US instantly took over. Instead, given the international legal 
personality of NATO, the organization should take a more proactive role 
in the handling of international claims. 
In that respect, NATO – as a legal entity under international law 
separate from its member States – should respond to inquiries from 
international organizations, such as the UN. The Alliance has done so 
in relation to the air strikes in Libya in response to the question of the 
UN Human Rights Council’s Commission of Inquiry.  
 
•  RECOMMENDATION 2: NATO SHOULD INCORPORATE ITS 
INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS INTO POLICY 
This study concluded that the Alliance has binding obligations under 
international law. NATO does not consider itself bound to international 
law. It limits itself to abide by the principles of international 
humanitarian law and international human rights law. Even though it 
does not run the large risk of violating international law, it nevertheless 
should express its international obligations in stronger terms. There is 
a risk that the Alliance is held responsible for violations of international 
law if it does not clearly state its obligations to Troop Contributing 
Nations participating in NATO operations. 
 
•  RECOMMENDATION 3: NATO SHOULD ADVOCATE NON-
INTERFERENCE IN THE MISSION BY TCNS  
Troop Contributing Nations place their forces under the command of 
NATO for the duration of the operation, which leads to the assumption 
that NATO exercises effective control over the forces. However, practice 
shows that the nations quite often interfere in the command 
relationship by either directly issuing national orders, placing caveats 
on rules of engagement or positioning a ‘red card holder’ in targeting 
processes.  
NATO is only responsible for wrongful conduct if it exercises effective 
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control over the conduct in question. The interference of nations in the 
operation may result that the wrongful conduct is not attributable to 
the Alliance but to the troop contributing State.  
The current tendency is that States interfere in order to avoid that their 
forces could violate national or international obligations and hence 
would be attributed to the State. This perception is somewhat 
unfounded, since the conduct of troops placed at the disposal of NATO is 
attributable solely to the organization as long as it exercises effective 
control. Hence – as depicted in the illustrative cases – there would be no 
need for nations to enter into individual bilateral agreements with 
Afghanistan to regulate the transfer of detainees in order to ensure that 
their national obligations will be respected. Neither is there a need for a 
red-card holder or national caveats. 
•  RECOMMENDATION 4: NATO SHOULD INVESTIGATE AND REPORT
INTERNATIONAL CRIMES COMMITTED BY ITS PERSONNEL
The thesis demonstrated that the Alliance is under direct and ancillary 
obligations to prevent and suppress international crimes. Currently, 
NATO receives report on possible misconduct of NATO personnel during 
operations through an established reporting mechanism and the 
organization has conducted more investigations into misconduct than it 
has done so in previous operations. It is recommended that NATO 
continues to investigate misconduct, in particular into allegations of 
international crimes. If no investigations are conducted by either NATO 
or the concerned TCN into allegation of international crimes, NATO 
breaches its obligations under international law and can be held 
responsible.   
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Appendix B  
Table of abbreviations 
ACHR American Convention on Human Rights 
ACIL Amsterdam Centre for International Law 
ACO Allied Command Operations 
ACT Allied Command Transformation 
AD Allied Doctrine 
AI Amnesty International 
AIHRC Afghanistan Independent Human Rights 
Commission 
AIRCOM Air Command 
AJP Allied Joint Publication 
AMIS African Union Mission in Sudan 
AMISOM African Union Mission in Somalia 
ANP Afghan National Police 
AP Allied Publication 
API Additional Protocol I 
ARIO Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International 
Organizations 
ASR Articles on State Responsibility 
AU African Union 
AWACS Airborne Warning and Control System 
BCCLA British Columbia Civil Liberties Association 
BDA Battle Damage Assessment 
CAOC Combined Air Operations Centre 
CFI Coalition Forces Iraq 
CIS Commonwealth of Independent States 
CN Counter Narcotics 
COMISAF Commander International Security Assistance Force 
COMKFOR Commander Kosovo Force 
CONOPS Concept of Operations 
CPA Coalition Provisional Authority 
CRC Crowd and Riot Control 
CSCE Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe 
DC Defence Committee 
DDCPO Disciplinary Directive Civilian Personnel Office (UN) 
DFAIT Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and 
Development (CAN) 
DIIS Danish Institute for International Studies 
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DPA Department of Political Affairs 
DPC Defence Policy Committee (NATO) 
DPKO Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UN) 
EAPC Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council 
EC European Council 
ECCC Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia 
ECHR European Convention on Human Rights 
ECJ European Court of Justice 
ECMM European Community Monitor Mission 
ECOSOC Economic and Social Council 
EJIL European Journal of International Law 
ESDP European Security and Defense Policy 
EU European Union 
EUNAVFOR European Union Naval Forces 
EUPM European Union Police Mission 
EUPOL European Union Police Mission 
GPS Global Positioning System 
HQ Headquarters 
HRC Human Rights Council 
IACHR Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
ICC International Criminal Court 
ICCPR International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
ICJ International Court of justice 
ICMPD International Centre for Migration Policy 
Development 
ICRC International Crescent and Red Cross 
ICTR International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
ICTY International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia 
ID Identification 
IFOR Implementation Force 
IHL International Humanitarian Law 
IHRL International Human Rights Law 
ILA International Law Association 
ILC International Law Commission 
IMP International Military Police 
IMS International Military Staff 
IPAP Individual Partnership Action Plans 
ISAF International Security Assistance Force 
IT Italy 
JCE Joint Criminal Enterprise 
JFCB Joint Force Command Brunssum 
JFCBS Joint Force Command Brunssum 
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JFCNP Joint Force Command Naples 
JTAC Joint Tactical Air Controller 
JTWG Joint Targeting Working Group 
KFOR Kosovo Force 
LANDCOM Land Command 
MARCOM Maritime Command 
MC Military Committee 
MNB Multi-national Brigade 
MONUC Mission de l’Organisation des Nations Unies en 
République Démocratique du Congo 
MOU Memorandum of Understanding 
MP Military Police 
MTA Military Technical Agreement 
NAC North Atlantic Council 
NACC North Atlantic Cooperation Council 
NAEW NATO Airborne Early Warning 
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
NCPR NATO Civilian Personnel Regulations 
NCS NATO Command Structure 
NDS National Directorate of Security 
NNCN Non NATO Contributing Nation 
NPG Nuclear Planning Group 
NSPA NATO Support Agency 
NTM NATO Training Mission 
OEF Operation Enduring Freedom 
OHCHR Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights 
ONUC Opération des Nations Unies au Congo 
OPCOM Operational Command 
OPCON Operational Control 
OPLAN Operation Plan 
OSCE Organization for Security and Co-operation in 
Europe 
PCIJ Permant Court of International Justice 
POHRF Post-Operations Humanitarian Relief Fund 
PRT Provincial Reconstruction Team 
RC Regional Command 
REV Revision 
ROE Rules of Engagement 
SACEUR Supreme Allied Commander Europe 
SACLANT Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic 
SACT Supreme Allied Commander Transformation 
SC Supreme Command 
SCR Senior Civilian Representative 
SFOR Stablisation Force 
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SHAPE Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe 
SOFA Status of Forces Agreement 
SOMA Status of Mission Agreement 
SOP Special Operations Forces 
SRSG Special Representative to the Secretary General 
STANAG Standardization Agreement 
TCN Troop Contributing Nation 
TEU Treaty on European Union 
TF Task Force 
TFU Task Force Uruzgan 
TPIU Trafficking and Prostitution Investigation Unit 
UDHR Universal Declaration on Human Rights 
UN United Nations 
UNAMA United Nations Assistnace Mission in Afghanistan 
UNCC United Nations Compensation Commission 
UNDP United Nations Development Programme 
UNDPKO United Nations Department of Peacekeeping 
Operations 
UNFICYP United Nations Forces in Cyprus 
UNHRC United Nations Human Rights Council 
UNIFEM United Nations Women’s Fund 
UNISOM United Nations in Somalia 
UNMIK United Nations in Kosovo 
UNODC United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 
UNOHCHR United Nations Office of the High Commissioner of 
Human Rights 
UNOSOM United Nations Operations in Somalia 
UNPROFOR United Nations Protection Force 
UNSC United Nations Security Council 
UNSCR United Nations Security Council resolution 
WEU Western European Union 
WHO World Health Organization 
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The thesis examines the international responsibility of NATO and its 
personnel during military operations.  
A characteristic of NATO operations is that they involve the use of 
(military) force, which is governed by jus ad bellum and jus in bello. For 
this reason, the study focuses particularly on the responsibility of 
NATO for breaches of international obligations that pertain to those 
bodies of law. 
The motive for dedicating a study on this topic is manifold. The lack of a 
clear position of NATO’s responsibility is detrimental to ensuring 
respect for international law and undermines efforts to prevent and 
repress violations thereof. It is the intention here to determine whether 
NATO has responsibility for breaches of international obligations and 
whether it should adopt a more proactive role in taking up that 
responsibility. Secondly, the study aims to contribute to further 
development of responsibility of international organizations in 
international law. There is increasing academic research on the topic 
and the discussion on NATO’s responsibility – with its specific 
institutional framework – may contribute to that effort. 
To illustrate the importance of the topic, as well as to provide practical 
examples for the theory put forward in the thesis, the second chapter 
outlines several cases that relate to NATO operations. They concern 
incidents of human trafficking and forced prostitution, non-refoulement 
of detainees, and indiscriminate attacks. 
Chapter 3 provides in a short historical overview of NATO, illustrating 
the transformation that the Alliance has gone through from its 
inception, the end of the Cold War to its current state. NATO has 
transformed from a static collective defence organization to adopt to a 
more flexible organization capable of conducting out-of-area crisis 
response operations. It has changed in scope and character of its 
activities through political processes, i.e. strategic concepts and other 
political decision, without involving any formal changes in its legal 
character. The fact that the legal framework has not changed, has a 
consequence that an examination whether the organization possesses 
international legal personality or whether it has international 
obligations has to be conducted on facts, rather than the examination of 
the legal framework. 
Chapter 4 analyses NATO’s current institutional framework and its 
decision making process. NATO consists of a civilian and military 
structure. The highest political organ, the North Atlantic Council, takes 
its decision through consensus. This has been often used as an 
argument that NATO lacks autonomy. However, the degree of control 
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that the member States exercise over the organization is limited. The 
so-called ‘silence-procedure’ allows sufficient autonomy for the 
organization. Moreover, member States are free to choose which 
operations they participate in, letting the organization continue with 
planning and executing operations even when certain members do not 
wish to participate in. The degree of control that the member States 
exercise is limited by the post-Cold War planning processes and the 
command and control arrangement. Besides the relationship between 
NATO and its member States, the relationship between NATO and the 
UN is also examined. While NATO depends on the authorization of the 
UN Security Council for most of its non-article 5 crisis response 
operations, the UN does not exercise control over personnel of the 
Alliance. This aspect is of relevance to the attribution of wrongful 
conduct, which is discussed in chapter 7 of the thesis. 
Chapter 6 examines the international legal personality of NATO. 
Without international legal personality, NATO cannot be held 
responsible under international law. Several indicia of international 
legal personality are the power to conclude international agreements, to 
bring and receive international claims, to enjoy privileges and immunity 
in the host nation, among others. NATO meets several indicia, which 
leads to the presumption that the Alliannce has international legal 
personality. Practice of States and international organization also show 
that the Alliance is considered to have such status. 
Chapter 7 answers the question whether NATO has international 
obligations. In conclusion, NATO’s constituent documents do not 
contain a wide breadth of obligations, except that of the obligation to 
respect the UN Charter and to waive immunity of personnel if this 
impedes the course of justice. NATO itself is not a party to the UN 
Charter and therefor is not bound to it, nor to the UN Security Council 
resolutions. Since the member States of NATO are bound to these 
bodies of law, the Alliance is bound to take this “into due account”. 
Conventional international law in general is not a significant sources of 
binding international obligations for NATO as it has not acceded to 
international human rights or international humanitarian law 
conventions. However, NATO is bound to international customary 
norms. The thesis concludes that NATO can become a party to an 
armed conflict and is therefore bound to international humanitarian 
law. NATO is also capable of implementing many of the obligations 
found in international human rights and international humanitarian 
law. Finally, the internal rules of NATO have been examined, but, in 
conclusion, do not pose a significant source of international obligations. 
Chapter 8 deals with attribution of wrongful conduct to the Alliance. 
Conduct of agents and organs that have an institutional link with the 
organization can be automatically attributed to NATO. Attribution of 
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conduct of agents and organs that are placed at the disposal of NATO 
follow a different rule. Their conduct can only be attributed to NATO if 
the Alliance exercises effective control over the conduct in question. 
Since most personnel of NATO is place at the disposal of the Alliance, 
this rule is particularly relevant. Troop Contributing Nation transfer a 
degree of control to NATO over their personnel deployed in operations. 
The degree of control – operational command and control – is generally 
speaking sufficient to assume that NATO has effective control over 
personnel place at its disposal. Unless Troop Contributing Nations 
interfere in the command relationship, either through caveats, red card 
holdership or otherwise, it is assumed that NATO has effective control. 
Chapter 9 examines the responsibility of NATO for international crimes 
during NATO operations. A single criminal act can result in both 
international criminal responsibility of the individual and the 
international responsibility of NATO. The act may constitute a breach 
of an international obligation binding upon the Alliance and may be 
criminalised under domestic or international criminal legislation. 
International human rights law and international humanitarian law 
contain obligations to prevent and suppress certain crimes, including 
crimes against humanity, torture, human trafficking, genocide and war 
crimes. These obligations are binding upon NATO. The organization has 
taken several measures to implement such obligations, for instance by 
investigating criminal acts of personnel, by cooperating with States and 
international courts and tribunal, and to train personnel. These 
obligations are also reflected in the modality of criminal responsibility 
of commanders and superiors. Commanders are criminally responsible 
for failing to exercise control, by either taking the necessary measures 
within his or her power to prevent or to repress the commission of 
certain criminal acts, or to submit the matter to the competent 
authorities for investigation and prosecution. 
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Het proefschrift onderzoekt de internationale verantwoordelijkheid van 
de NAVO en haar personeel tijdens militaire operaties. 
Een kenmerk van de NAVO-operaties is dat er in veel gevallen sprake is 
van gewapend optreden, hetgeen wordt gereguleerd door het ius ad 
bellum en het ius in bello. Om deze reden richt het onderzoek zich vooral 
op de verantwoordelijkheid van de NAVO voor de schendingen van de 
internationale verplichtingen die hierop betrekking hebben. 
De volgende twee voornaamste redenen liggen ten grondslag om een 
studie over dit onderwerp toe te weiden. Ten eerste is het ontbreken van 
een duidelijk standpunt van de NAVO over haar internationaal-
rechtelijke verplichtingen een ondermijning van inspanningen om 
schendingen daarvan te voorkomen. Dit onderzoek beoordeelt of de 
NAVO verantwoordelijk voor inbreuken op internationale verplichtingen 
die op haar rusten en de vraag of het een meer proactieve rol moet 
aannemen om die verantwoordelijkheid in te vullen. Ten tweede heeft de 
studie als doel bij te dragen aan de verdere ontwikkeling van de 
verantwoordelijkheid van de internationale organisaties in het 
internationaal recht. Er wordt steeds meer onderzoek over het onderwerp 
en de discussie over de verantwoordelijkheid van de NAVO - met zijn 
specifieke institutionele kader - kunnen bijdragen aan die inspanning. 
Om het belang van het onderwerp te illustreren, worden vier 
praktijkvoorbeelden in het het begin van het proefschrift gegeven. De 
voorbeelden hebben hebben betrekking op incidenten tijden NAVO 
geleide operaties, waaronder gevallen van mensenhandel en gedwongen 
prostitutie, non-refoulement van gedetineerden en willekeurige 
aanvallen. 
Hoofdstuk 3 geeft een kort historisch overzicht van de NAVO en 
illustreert de transformatie die de Alliantie vanaf het einde van de Koude 
Oorlog heeft doorgemaakt. De NAVO is veranderd van een statische 
collectieve verdedigings-organisatie naar een meer flexibele organisatie 
die in staat is om buiten haar NAVO gebied crisisbeheersingsoperaties 
uit te voeren. De NAVO is veranderd in omvang en het karakter van haar 
huidige activiteiten middels politieke processen, dat wil zeggen dat - door 
middel van het aannemen van Strategic Concepts en andere politieke 
beslissingen - zonder tussenkomst van een formele wijziging in de 
constitutionele status van de NAVO, de organisatie heeft kunnen 
veranderen. De omstandigheid dat het wettelijk kader niet is veranderd, 
heeft tot geval dat de vraag of de organisatie internationale 
rechtspersoonlijkheid bezit en of het internationale verplichtingen heeft, 
feitelijk moet worden onderzocht, in plaats van een onderzoek op basis 
van het wettelijk kader. 
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Hoofdstuk 4 analyseert de huidige institutionele kader van de NAVO en 
haar besluitvormingproces. De NAVO bestaat uit een civiele en militaire 
structuur. Het hoogste politieke orgaan, de Noord-Atlantische Raad, 
neemt haar besluiten op basis van consensus. Dit werd vaak gebruikt als 
een argument dat de NAVO autonomie ontbeert. De lidstaten oefenen 
echter maar een beperkte mate van controle op de organisatie uit. De 
zogenaamde silence procedure maakt het mogelijk om de organisatie 
voldoende autonomie te geven om operaties te kunnen plannen en 
uitvoeren. Bovendien zijn de lidstaten vrij om te kiezen aan welke 
activiteiten zij wensen deel te nemen, zodat de organisatie verder kan 
gaan met het plannen en uitvoeren van operaties. De mate van controle 
die de lidstaten uitoefenen op de organisatie – in het bijzonder in de 
periode na de Koude Oorlog – is beperkt door planningsprocessen en de 
command and control systematiek die de organisatie haar eigen heeft 
gemaakt. Naast de relatie tussen de NAVO en haar lidstaten, wordt de 
relatie tussen de NAVO en de VN ook onderzocht. Hoewel de NAVO 
afhankelijk is van de autorisatie van de VN-Veiligheidsraad voor 
crisisbeheersingsoperaties, heeft de VN geen controle over het personeel 
van de Alliantie. Dit aspect is met name van belang voor de toerekening 
van onrechtmatige gedragingen, hetgeen wordt besproken in hoofdstuk 7 
van het proefschrift. 
Hoofdstuk 6 gaat in op de internationale rechtspersoonlijkheid van de 
NAVO. Zonder internationale rechtspersoonlijkheid kan de NAVO 
internationaalrechtelijk niet verantwoordelijk worden gesteld. Er zijn 
verschillende aanwijzingen dat de NAVO internationale rechtspersoon-
lijkheid bezit. Zo heeft de organisatie de bevoegdheid om internationale 
overeenkomsten te sluiten, om de internationale vorderingen te brengen 
en te ontvangen, en geniet het privileges en immuniteit in het gastland. 
NAVO voldoet aan die kenmerken, en deswege moet dit tot de 
veronderstelling leiden dat de organisatie internationale rechtspersoon-
lijkheid heeft. De praktijk van staten en internationale organisaties laat 
ook zien dat de Alliantie wordt beschouwd een dergelijke status hebben. 
Hoofdstuk 7 geeft antwoord op de vraag of de NAVO internationale 
verplichtingen heeft. Het constitutionele documenten, waaronder het 
NAVO verdrag en de Status of Forces Agreements, bevatten geen groot 
aantal internationale verplichtingen, daargelaten de verplichting om het 
VN-Handvest te respecteren en om de de immuniteit van personeel af te 
wijzen indien dit de rechtsgang belemmert. De NAVO zelf is geen partij 
bij het VN-Handvest en is daarom niet gebonden aan het Handvest noch 
aan de resoluties van de VN-Veiligheidsraad. Aangezien alle lidstaten 
van de NAVO gebonden zijn aan het Handvest, dient de organisatie deze 
bepalingen "naar behoren in aanmerking te nemen". Conventioneel 
internationaal recht bevat geen belangrijke bronnen van bindende 
internationale verplichtingen voor de NAVO omdat het geen partij is van 
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internationaal mensenrechtelijke verdragen of het internationaal 
humanitaire recht. De NAVO is echter wel gebonden aan internationaal 
gewoonterechtelijke normen. Het proefschrift concludeert dat de NAVO 
een partij kan worden in een gewapend conflict en daarom gebonden is 
aan het gewoonterechtelijk internationaal humanitair recht. De NAVO is 
ook in staat om  uitvoering te geven aan een groot aantal internationale 
mensenrechtelijke en internationaal humanitair rechtelijke 
verplichtingen. Ten slotte zijn de interne regels van de NAVO onderzocht, 
echter zijn deze geen belangrijke bron van internationale verplichtingen 
gebleken. 
Hoofdstuk 8 behandelt toerekening van onrechtmatige gedragingen van 
personneel van de NAVO. Gedragingen van ‘agenten en organen’ die een 
institutionele band hebben met de organisatie kunnen automatisch 
worden toegerekend aan de NAVO. Toerekening van het optreden van 
agenten en organen die ter beschikking van de NAVO worden geplaatst 
volgen een andere regel. Hun gedrag kan alleen worden toegerekend 
worden aan de NAVO als de Alliance effectieve controle over het gedrag 
in kwestie uitoefent. Aangezien het meeste personeel van de NAVO ter 
beschikking is gesteld aan de Alliantie, is met name deze toerekenings-
regel relevant. Troepenleverende landen houden een zekere mate van 
controle over hun personeel dat ingezet wordt bij NAVO operaties. De 
mate van controle  “operational command and control” is in het algemeen 
voldoende is om aan te nemen dat de NAVO de feitelijke zeggenschap 
heeft over het personeel dat ter beschikking is gesteld. Tenzij de 
troepenleverende landen zich inmengen in de missie, hetzij door middel 
van caveats, ‘red-card holdership’ of anderszins, wordt aangenomen dat 
de NAVO de feitelijke zeggenschap heeft over het ter beschikking 
gestelde personeel. 
Hoofdstuk 9 gaat in op de verantwoordelijkheid van de NAVO voor 
internationale misdrijven tijdens NAVO-operaties. Een enkele straf-
rechtelijk vergrijp kan leiden in zowel de internationale strafrechtelijke 
verantwoordelijkheid van het individu alswel de internationale 
verantwoordelijkheid van de NAVO. De gedraging kan een schending van 
een internationale verplichting voor de Alliance zijn en kan alsmede 
strafbaar zijn gesteld door, bijvoorbeeld, nationaal of internationaal 
strafrecht. Internationaal mensenrechtelijke en internationaal 
humanitair rechtelijke verdragen bevatten verplichtingen om 
schendingen (waaronder misdrijven) te voorkomen en te onderdrukken. 
Deze schendingen omvatten onder meer misdaden tegen de menselijk-
heid, foltering, mensenhandel, genocide en oorlogsmisdaden. De 
gewoonterechtelijke verplichtingen zijn bindend voor de NAVO. De 
organisatie heeft een aantal maatregelen genomen om dergelijke 
verplichtingen te implementeren door ondere andere strafbare feiten te 
onderzoeken en door samen te werken met staten en internationale 
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gerechtshoven en tribunaleen, maar ook om personeel op te leiden en te 
trainen. Deze verplichtingen worden ook weerspiegeld in de strafrecht-
elijke verantwoordelijkheid van commandanten en superieuren. 
Commandanten zijn strafrechtelijk verantwoordelijk voor het onvoldoen-
de uitoefenen van controle, door ofwel het niet nemen van de nodige 
maatregelen die binnen zijn of haar macht liggen om strafbare feiten 
voorkomen of om het plegen van bepaalde strafbare feiten te 
onderdrukken, of om de zaak voor te leggen aan de bevoegde autoriteiten 
voor onderzoek en vervolging. 
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